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ABSTRACT
For most of Western history, tuberculosis was an incurable disease—its victims, destined
to die. However, in late-19th century Philadelphia, changes in science, public health, and
medical charity contributed to a remaking of the disease. Through the experiments of the
bacteriological laboratory, and the commitment of governmental and private resources to
tuberculosis treatment, scientists and physicians would come to tout the disease’s curability. By
the beginning of the 20th century, the disease was transformed into a curable entity caused, not
by an uncontrollable force of nature, but by an ostensibly containable microbe, the tubercle
bacillus.
This dissertation argues that this transformation was produced by and productive of a
new form of liberal individualism. The emergent subject of tuberculosis was no longer a victim
of physiological fate. Rather, the tubercular were increasingly constituted as capable of willing
themselves better through participation in hygienic regimens.
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By focusing on the physician Lawrence Flick and the Philadelphia anti-tuberculosis
movement, this dissertation explores the various spheres and spaces through which this new
tubercular subject takes shape. These include discourses and practices of self-care—cultivating
immunity and disinfecting personal pathological material; the political-economic evaluation of
the sick poor in almshouses; the surveillance and disciplining of the tubercular in sanitaria;
and efforts to reform the urban population into tools of tuberculosis prevention.
Where liberal individuals, prior to the 1890s, were constituted in political economic
thought and practice as possessing a willpower—and a responsibility—to be productive and
independent, this dissertation traces the emergence, in Philadelphia, of a new type of liberal
individual: the tubercular emerge as subjects with the purported willpower to cultivate
immunity by wittingly changing the quality of their bodies—of their internal tissue. By arguing
that the willpower of tubercular individuals is, itself, a product of the erasure of the
“willpower” or “vitality” of tuberculosis, this dissertation contributes to a body of scholarship
on the relationship between the human and non-human—scholarship that challenges the
presumption, central to the humanities and social sciences, that humans are the most
important, if not the only relevant historical actors.
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Introduction
“Despite the availability of effective treatment” reports the Voice of America, “in 2010
there were an estimated 8.8 million [worldwide] TB cases and 1.45 million deaths” (America
2012). These staggeringly high numbers locate tuberculosis, “a disease once thought to be
under control,” amongst the most dangerous infectious diseases in the 21st century (World
Health Organization 1999). The attempted “control of tuberculosis,” first espoused and
pursued as a public health goal in the United State in the 1890s, has proven far from total.
Mutating strains of the disease, resistant to antibiotics, task public health operations like the
World Health Organization, and private philanthropists like Bill Gates with a mutating form of
contagious nature that is not easily identified or contained. Furthermore, in clinics across the
world, physicians are faced with not only determining if a patient is tubercular, they also must
determine how dangerous a patient might be to the public health. Hospitals have the authority
to isolate those tubercular patients that are suffering from a drug-resistant superbug, a strain that
is difficult and expensive to treat.
Such diagnostic ambiguities and threats to the public health were dramatized, in 2007,
when multi-drug-resistant-tuberculosis (MDRTB) briefly took center stage. Andrew Speaker, a
lawyer from Atlanta, seemingly endangered the global public health—and, in some accounts,
the entirety of the human species—by traveling internationally while infected with a strain of
drug-resistant tuberculosis. Speaker became an unwitting threat when he boarded a commercial
flight from the United States to Paris, en route to his wedding in Greece. Prior to his departure
from the United States, Speaker’s physicians ambiguously diagnosed him as “relatively noncontagious” and thus, safe to fly (Haupt 2007). However, a barrage of media coverage ensued
1

when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) revised the diagnosis,
issuing a forcible isolation order, claiming that Speaker’s tuberculosis was, in fact, multi-drug
resistant and that he was endangering those with whom he came into close contact. By the
time of order, Speaker was already in Europe.
With his name in the headlines, Speaker evaded public health and airline authorities,
sneaking out of Europe, into Canada, and covertly crossing the border into the U.S. before
eventually turning himself in to the CDC. He was subsequently quarantined in Denver—the
first forced federal quarantine since 1963—where he was infamously interviewed by Dianne
Sawyer with a mask covering his face. Yet while in isolation, Speaker’s physicians once again
revised the diagnosis of his condition. The strain he possessed was, in fact, not the feared drugresistant variety. Rather, Speaker had drug-susceptible tuberculosis—a highly treatable form of
the disease—and, as such, had not posed a significant threat. To treat his disease, Speaker took
part in the routine World Health Organization (WHO) program, Directly Observed Therapy,
or DOTs.
The WHO developed DOTs as a “strategy” for both curing the sick and for combatting
the evolution of superbugs after “decades of reports documenting the failure of patients to
complete [antibiotic] treatment.” The program is based upon a “treatment regimen [that]
requires patients dutifully to take multiple antibiotics daily for several months.” During this
long period of treatment, lasting for years for some patients, the sick must take their antibiotics
under the watchful gaze of the physician—“a reporting system to document the progress (and
failure) of treatment for individual patients and of the programme [sic] [and] direct observation
of treatment by an independent and trained third party.” The WHO developed and came to
2

recommend DOTs to all national governments after observing that, left to themselves, most
tubercular patients—facing side effects from medication, feeling cured and no longer in need
of drugs—would stop taking their antibiotics (Frieden 2007). The sick, in the parlance of public
health authorities, tend toward “non-compliance.” DOTs is designed to make compliant
subjects out of the tubercular by insuring patient completion of antibiotic regimen.
In the view of the WHO, the importance of this practice—completion of antibiotic
regimen—and the concomitant production of compliant tubercular subjects cannot be
understated. For public health authorities, the non-compliant tubercular subject, failing to
complete his or her antibiotic regimen, is routinely cited as the cause of the evolution of
superbugs: “if there are any deviations from protocol or incomplete courses [of drug treatment],
drug resistance develops easily” in the microbes. Thus, DOTs is premised upon the tubercular
individual—in his or her capacity to dutifully take drugs—as the first line of defense in
combating drug resistance as it seeks to remake non-compliant subjects into compliant
individuals (Frieden 2007).
Importantly, through both the fallout over the Speaker scare, and the practice of DOTs,
humans generally, and individuals, specifically, are rendered not only capable of containing the
threat of tuberculosis, but as responsible for doing so. Various takes on responsibility have
emerged in the aftermath of the Speaker debacle: some sources argued that Speaker owed it to
the public to manage his own contagion—to have erred on the side of caution and not traveled
(Haupt 2007, Schwartz June 2, 2007); others pointed to the situation as evidence of the failure
of public health officials and institutions to contain the tubercular threat to the international
social body (Knox July 4, 2007, Schwartz June 2, 2007); still others claimed that resurgent
3

tuberculosis underscores the need for individuals to protect themselves from the dangers of
contagion—by vigilantly washing hands and wearing masks in public. Finally, through the
persistent global investment in DOTs as an antidote to the non-compliance of the tubercular,
sick individuals take shape as the parties responsible for the evolution of tuberculosis, as
individual failure to complete regimen is cited as the cause of the superbug threat.
In spite of the activist proclamations for the annual March 24th celebration of “World
TB Day”—the “I am stopping TB” campaign (World Health Organization 2013)–and the
continued investment of public health in taking responsibility for the control of the disease,
the contemporary resurgence of tuberculosis, and, more specifically, evolving drug-resistant
strains, suggest a form of nature that was never truly stopped or mastered. Indeed, while sociomedical efforts to control tuberculosis, underwritten by Western medicine's proclaimed
conquering of infectious disease in the latter half of the 20th century, are key to the elaboration
of a particular and commonsensical progressive history that informs contemporary public
practices, they are still nascent efforts on the scale of human history. Prior to the late 19thcentury, tuberculosis, or consumption, was thought to be an uncontrollable force of nature
rather than a mastered microbe—a force that was incurable, much less eradicable. Those
suffering from the disease were seen as subjects fated to die—incapable of cultivating tissue and
an internal physiology fit enough to resist the disease.
This work seeks to elaborate on the very point at which human control over
tuberculosis in the United States—with individuals as the tools of this control—emerged: a
point, in the late-19th century, when the articulation of bacteriology, liberal public health
initiatives, and charitable investment in the treatment of tuberculosis remade the disease as
4

conquerable, and individuals as responsible for this conquering. How has Western medicine
arrived at a point where tuberculosis is a conquerable disease? How have medical science,
public health, and charity in the United States come to produce tubercular individuals as
responsible for overcoming or controlling the disease in their own bodies? How has the
evolution and propagation of the disease come to be understood as a human failure—as a
failure of individuals?
In what follows, I argue that the remaking of tuberculosis as a curable disease was
produced by and productive of an emergent late-19th century subjectivity: an individualism,
formed through the practices of bacteriological science, public health, and medical charity, that
constituted tubercular subjects as possessing a willpower—a capacity—to shape their own
physiology and internal tissue to a desired end—a state of immunity—so as to resist the disease. I
argue further that this novel capacity of individuals to take responsibility for their health,
through a witting cultivation of particular physiological states, is sustained through a sociomedical elision of the agency of the nonhuman microbes that cause tuberculosis. The very
historical reduction of the disease to its microbial cause—the tubercle bacillus—and the
rendering of the bacilli as inert and passive objects in the discourses and practices of both the
laboratory and tuberculosis treatment and prevention campaigns, produced a late-19th century
world in which a patient's overcoming or succumbing to tuberculosis appeared as the outcome
of individual success or failure in willing a particular bodily state: in willing of a state of health.
To make clear the emergence of this new liberal subjectivity, I trace a genealogy of those
attitudes and practices in the United States, focusing on the emergent anti-tuberculosis
movement, in late-19th century Philadelphia, that produced the disease as a controllable form
5

of nature. Prior to the last decade of the 19th century, a sick tubercular subject—a consumptive—
was not capable of surviving the disease, much less controlling it. Yet that very decade, changes
within the co-constitutive worlds of science, public health, and liberal charity took shape—
changes that were themselves bound up with a progressive-liberal-investment in the capacity for
individuals to forge their own destinies, the circumstances of their own success, and their own
propensity to life or death. This is a place and point in time where a particular type of liberal
individual emerges—bacteriology and tuberculosis treatment and prevention were not the only
sites where liberal individualism was taking shape. Yet the modern liberal individual emerges,
in late-19th-century Philadelphia in a unique form: unique in his or her capacity—and duty—to
will him or herself into a particular biological state: a state free of tuberculosis.
This emergent subjectivity, formed through the articulation of medicine, public health,
and charity, is not wholly different from that of other times and places to the extent that it is
constituted by the canonical qualities of liberal individualism—rationality, calculation, selfinterest and self-determination; qualities that purportedly take shape through the exercise of
individual willpower. The dutiful liberal subject of 18th and 19th political economy was expected
to exercise this willpower as a means toward an independent and productive life. Yet what
differentiates the tubercular subject of the last decade of the 19th century from that of the prior
historical incarnations is the manner in which the assumed willpower of the individual is
increasingly produced as a capacity, not simply to become an independent and productive
member of liberal society, but to wittingly shape one's internal bodily processes and the
material—the tissue—of one's body. Through the treatment of the tubercular, the modern liberal
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individual emerges, in the late-19th-century, in a unique form: unique in his or her capacity—
and social duty—to will him or herself free of tuberculosis.
This subjectivity clearly materializes through the bodies of poor Philadelphians
struggling with health and sickness in the last decade of the 19th century—Philadelphia, where a
growing investment in bacteriological science articulated with a nascent anti-tuberculosis
movement, public health investments in the management of disease threats, and a spirit of
medical charity directed toward treating and eradicating infectious disease, including
tuberculosis. The remaking of the subjects of consumption in Philadelphia as a population
fated to die into individuals capable of cultivating bodily tissue strong enough to resist and
retard the disease—capable of cultivating immunity—took shape through this very constellation
of science, charity, and public health. The traffic between the bacteriological laboratory, the
coffers of philanthropists, and municipal concerns with curbing death rates and protecting the
public from disease threats, coalesced into an urban landscape where physicians, city officials,
and reformers sought to regulate the habits of the population, and in particular, the poor
tubercular, in the interest of containing tuberculosis.
I focus on Philadelphia as it was a city heavily invested, from its founding in 1682, in
both medical treatment and research, and in the municipal reform of the needy and sick into
purportedly responsible individuals. My study materializes through a particular Philadelphia
physician and anti-tuberculosis reformer, Lawrence Flick. The young Flick, a former sufferer of
tuberculosis, spent the 1890s advocating for the treatment of the tubercular—for more hospital
beds and better treatment methods—while simultaneously attempting to convince his
colleagues that the disease was both contagious and curable. From his creation of the United
7

States' first anti-tuberculosis organization—the Pennsylvania Society for the Treatment of
Tuberculosis—and his charitable service, his participation on hospital boards, and his founding
of numerous institutions for poor consumptives in Pennsylvania, Flick embodied a liberal
reformist spirit and a positivist investment in knowledge as a tool for the achievement of social
reform. Preaching the progressive nature of science, the efficacy of modern medicine, and the
legitimacy of liberal governmental interventions as rational and necessary means to treat and
eradicate tuberculosis, Flick, in the 1890s, initiated what he termed a “crusade” against
tuberculosis.
Rather than taking an autobiographical approach, I use Flick's life—his investment in
building an anti-tuberculosis movement in Philadelphia, his sensitivity and charity, and his
academic investment in this history of tuberculosis—as a tool for analyzing the emergence of
late-19th century poor tubercular individuals and the concomitant materialization of the disease
as a form of nature purportedly subject to human control. Indeed, Flick served as a conduit
through which the late-19th-century medical establishment in Philadelphia struggled over the
new bacteriological paradigm, new forms of diseased-nature, new forms of microscopic medical
evidence, and the new iterations of public health that constituted the state and municipal
efforts to accommodate this emergent model of microbial disease transmission. Precisely
because he was outspoken and controversial on many issues related to the science of
tuberculosis, and social approaches to treating the disease, Flick would find himself respected
and followed by a new vanguard of medical practitioners, even as he bemused and frustrated an
old guard of physicians.
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Flick is also important to the extent that his praxis—his approach to tuberculosis
treatment, prevention, and eradication—materialized a philosophy that was heavily invested in a
belief in the progressive nature of science and social reform. As I show throughout, Flick's
commitment to Enlightenment narratives of science as capable of mastering, dominating, and
controlling nature required a concomitant investment in producing humans—individuals—as
having a personal capacity to control disease, and thus as subjects capable of taking
responsibility, on the physiological level, for the enactment of such control. Disease, in this
narrative, is there to be subjected—all that is required is the design of the correct technologies
and the implementation of an “enlightened” approach to the management of urban
populations.
In pursuing his “crusade” against tuberculosis, Flick's investment in science was evident
in his advocacy of the work of Robert Koch—the bacteriological experiments that would form
the foundation of 20th-century research on and approaches to treating contagious disease. As
one of the United States most outspoken proponents of both the “truth” and utility of Koch's
discovery of the microbe responsible for tuberculosis, Flick promoted the bacteriological
paradigm and a series of practices for containing tuberculosis, before such a model and such
practices were fashionable. The laboratory “mastery” of the disease in culture catalyzed a
remaking of the disease: tuberculosis, formerly an uncontrollable force of nature, would take
shape, in the last decade of the 20th century, as an object, subject to human efforts to control it.
In reaction, Flick and his colleagues would work to translate the purported laboratory “power
over the disease” into the social sphere, pursuing the “administrative control of tuberculosis” in
urban environments.
9

As I argue throughout, this laboratory subjection of the disease was produced by and
productive of the broader liberal remaking of sick individuals as masters of both their own
bodies and of the microbes seeking to take up residence in their tissue. This sense of subjects as
capable of mastering their bodies took shape, in the late 19th century, through an inherited
tradition, present in the 18th and 19th century almshouses and hospitals of reforming the sick
poor. Flick and his peers and colleagues in Philadelphia inherited and propagated a standard
understanding of the worth of the subjects of charity and disease as being linked to a capacity
to better oneself. The emergent understanding of tuberculosis as a curable disease thus
articulated with a broader liberal commitment to the care of the sick poor on the grounds that
the subjects of medical charity demonstrated a will to get better. This will, traditionally
measured through the capacity of a subject of medical charity to “better” him or herself,
moving from a state of economic dependence—dependence upon hospitals and almshouses—to
a state of independence and productivity, materializes, in the last decade of the 19th century, as
a physiological capacity to better oneself by intentionally cultivating a resistance to tuberculosis.
This liberal-reformist production of the subjects of medical charity as possessing a
willpower capable of shaping their tubercular state and, thus, their bodily futures, articulated
with the practices of the bacteriological laboratory—the objectification of the disease in the
laboratory. The will of the tubercular to overcome the disease in the sphere of the clinic
materialized through the laboratory transformation of consumption as a force of nature into the
microbial tubercle bacilli, the material cause of tuberculosis. The objectification and subjection
of the microbe through the bacteriological experiments of Robert Koch translated into a
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clinical model—the sanitarium as a space for the pursuit of regimen—through which to produce
individuals capable of subjecting the disease within their own bodies.
Importantly, institutional conversations and practices took shape around the cultivating
of this willpower—both a physiological capacity and a desire—within individuals, to master the
disease in their own bodies. The tubercular thus came to struggle, not with an external and
unwieldy force, but with an internal-pathological object—an object that only proved deadly to
the extent that the sick failed to control it through the cultivation of the requisite bodily soil. In
sanitaria and clinics, those suffering from the disease were remade as subjects capable of
exercising control, like that of the scientist in the laboratory, over the disease in their bodies. I
thus demonstrate the manner in which the very willpower of individuals was dependent upon
the laboratory remaking of the disease as a controllable and inert object: the will to make
oneself better was constituted through a concomitant elision, amongst physicians and social
reformers, of tuberculosis as a “vital” force, actively shaping the bodies of the sick in a manner
that consistently undermined the efforts of the tubercular to cultivate immunity.
This historical production of tuberculosis as controllable and individuals as responsible
for this control remains important to the extent that the vestiges of Flick's late-19th century
investment in progressive science and technology recur in the visions, practices, and
explanation of contemporary public health officials, even in the face of evidence that
challenges this purported human capacity to master disease. Rather than hailing the ingenuity
of the Mycobacterium tuberculosis in evolving in the face of human attempts to eradicate it, “noncompliant” individuals, in their failure to hew to antibiotic regimen, are viewed as the cause of
the superbug evolution. Furthermore, rather than viewing science and technology as elements
11

in this evolution, the continued progressive investment in science, evidenced in CDC and
WHO responses to tuberculosis, posit contemporary techno-scientific solutions as better or
more informed than those of the past. Western science's participation in producing the very
superbugs that threaten global public health through the invention of the antibiotic is omitted
in favor of explanations centered on failed individuals—explanations that focus on the
irresponsible use of technologies rather than on questioning the assumed progressiveness of
the technologies themselves. Indeed, the very ingenious creation of medicine—the antibiotic—
has proven both the solution to the initial problem of infectious tuberculosis, and a key
element in the resurgent threat. By disregarding the constituent roles of both the bacteria and
the technologies used to treat the bacteria, contemporary approaches to tuberculosis treatment
and prevention leave in place a key assumption: the assumption that science is forward-moving
and that scientific-technical solutions fail because of a paucity of individual willpower.
I critique this attitude that focuses on human error and human irresponsibility in the
treatment of tuberculosis by arguing that liberal individualism and individual willpower are, in
fact, constituted by the elision of the will of the nonhuman and the erasure—through public
health and social reform discourses and practices—of limitations on the human capacity to
achieve a total mastery of nature. In critiquing this contemporary attitude and approach to
solving disease problems with socio-medical technologies, I tell the story of its development, in
relation to tuberculosis, through Lawrence Flick's late-19th century anti-tuberculosis “crusade.”
The story hinges on the modern constitution of liberal subjects as possessing certain qualities
and capacities, and on the concomitant modern rendering of the nonhuman as a passive object
rather than a vital force shaping humans, the world, and history.
12

Liberal Individualism and Willpower
In what follows, I introduce liberal individualism as it has been studied through a
particular lineage of scholarship that views the very substance of such individualism—the will of
the subject—as a social product rather than a natural capacity. I then locate my project within
this lineage by pursuing the question of how the state of being healthy—the bodily state of
being immune or resistant to tuberculosis—becomes a quality subject to the will of liberal
individuals. Health, in the late 19th century, becomes a political-economic consideration as the
body is remade as an object to be shaped by witting individuals: the body becomes the currency
and the material of the individual pursuit of health—an object subject to the personal pursuit
of a wise liberal economy.
My analysis takes shape through an focus on scholarship shaped by a particular political
economic tradition of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is but one approach to the theorization of
the formation of liberal subjectivity and it is necessarily limited as it is heavily invested in the
work of a handful of white-male-Western thinkers. Other lineages of liberal scholarship look
beyond these limitations to, for instance, the colonial context and the constituent presence of
non-Western and non-white colonized subjects in the formation of liberal individualism (Stoler
2002, Anderson 2006, Fanon 1970). The analysis of liberal individualism as a product of the
West is dangerous to the extent that it ignores the role of colonized non-Western subjects in
the elaboration of the discourses and practices that constitute Western individualism.
The liberalism of classical political economy is a political orientation, philosophy, and
approach to governing that promotes individual liberty and rights and the maximizing of
individual interest. As a mode of thought and a constellation of practices, its thinkers and
13

practitioners have viewed “liberty...as a specific grant or right bestowed [to individuals] by law”
(Ross 1991, 11). A primary consideration of liberalism, then, is the question of the role of the
state in legislating and facilitating this liberty for individuals. Dorothy Ross outlines the
fundamental primacy of individualism in liberalism by tracing a genealogy of the word
“liberal.” The designation “liberal” took shape in the early nineteenth century through “english
and continental radicals [who] sought to destroy the remains of feudal and mercantilist power
in the state and to place justice, representation, and economic activity on individualistic
bases...Their visions of society, polity, and economy acknowledged a central place for the rights,
powers, or potentialities of the individual person” (10). Liberal ideals, by linking freedom,
individualism, and government, have historically organized around various principles,
practices, and institutions—legislative and judicial and regulatory bodies, markets—that seek to
maximize individual freedom while simultaneously limiting the influence of government as
evidenced in the liberals radical resistance to “feudal and mercantilist power.”
Liberalism and the liberal individual materialize in the 17th and 18th centuries as both
increasingly integral features of governance in the Western world, and as primary objects of
study amongst political economists. From the 18th century onwards, the substance of this
“individual person” of liberalism was defined and constituted, through both formal and
informal practices of governmental bodies, and, academically, through the work of political
economists. The body of classical political-economic-thinkers such as Adam Smith of the 18th
century (Smith 1937), and David Ricardo (Ricardo 1911), and John Stuart Mill (Mill 1975) of
the 19th century contributed to the production of the political subjectivity of the liberal
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individual—a figure referred to, amongst historians and political economists, as “economic
man.”
The classical-liberal canon theorized this figure of “economic man” as a self-interested,
enterprising, rational subject. This figure has formed the basis of many of the assumptions,
policies, and practices of liberal-governmental efforts. Economic man, according to Nancy
Cohen, “demonstrated his rationality by calculating his self-interest, all the time aware that
natural economic laws determined and constrained his behavior” (Cohen 2002, 32). “Liberal
reformers,” like Philadelphia's Lawrence Flick, according to Cohen, “equated “economic man”
with “citizen,” thereby subordinating political activity to a normative model of economic
behavior” (32). This “normative model of economic behavior” thus established, not only an
inhabitable subjectivity for citizens of liberal societies, but it also constituted the sociogovernmental network for the making of these subjects. In the realm of late 19th century health
and medicine and liberal charity, this network takes shape through the evaluation of subjects—
the worth of the poor and sick—in relation to the normative standard of “economic man.”
Cohen continues, noting how this notion of the “individual subject of interest,” or
economic man carried with it both a normative and a naturalizing function: “a man’s character
should be judged according to how well he performed according to the norm of the
instrumentally rational, acquisitive economic man” (38). Liberalism thus presupposes
individuals with certain desires, or with a certain will to achieve particular standards of
subjecthood—standards based on the qualities of rational acquisitiveness, and the perceived
capacity for subjects to act both autonomously, and in their own best interest. Yet liberal society
is also productive of these very desires and standards: the very substance a liberal individual is
15

supposed to act upon, supposed to desire, supposed to shape is, itself, produced and policed
through social practice. While “health” and “happiness” take shape, as early as the work of
Adam Smith (Wealth), as desires central to the pursuit of liberal individualism, this
dissertation seeks to understand how the desire for health becomes a technical capacity
through discourses and practices to treat and prevent tuberculosis in the late 19th century.
Indeed, the remaking of tuberculosis, detailed in this dissertation, was, itself, produced by and
productive of a concomitant remaking of liberal individualism that broadened the standards
and the presumed technical capacity of economic man to include the cultivation of the
physiological economy of the body—the rational pursuit of a state of health through the willful
remaking of diseased tissue into resistant tissue.
Liberal Individualism and “Modes of Government”
These remakings—both of tuberculosis and liberal individualism—are, themselves, the
products of a series of governmental discourses and practices, or what Barry Hindess calls
“mode[s] of government” (Hindess 1996) According to Hindess, these modes are themselves
productive of the liberal values of autonomy, and productive of practices through which
individuals can realize or perform their freedom. Elaborating on this particular orientation
toward the study of liberalism, Hindess draws off of the work of Michel Foucault, locating
liberalism in relationship to the manner in which this subject—economic man—with his or her
presumed right to autonomy, is a product of various governmental practices and governmental
bodies. He writes,
the sphere of individual liberty should be seen, not so much as reflecting the natural
liberty of the individual, but rather as a governmental product—that is, as the effect of a
multiplicity of interventions concerned with the promotion of a specific “form of
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life”...centered on the regulative ideal of personal autonomy—a composite notion
including, on the one hand, ideas of personal independence, rationality and
responsibility, and on the other, a persistence slippage between the idea of the person
as adult individual and the idea of their person as (male) head of household. Personal
autonomy, then, is often understood as involving responsibility for oneself and also for
the care and the behavior of a few select others—who are accordingly regarded as less
than fully autonomous. The liberal mode of government fosters the form of life
appropriate to a community of such autonomous individuals. (Hindess 1996, 65)
Thus, liberalism emerges as a governmental technology for the production of autonomous
individuals, all the while setting the conditions of possibility for, and policing the borders of,
such autonomy. The very capacity to be independent and productive, and the sense that a
person is constituted by a willpower that in some ways, determines their successes and failures,
their health or sickness, their life or death, does not inhere in the nature of the human being;
rather it is, in Hindess' estimation, a “governmental product” that serves as a regulatory tool:
the government of liberal society proceeds, in part, through the production of individuals as
subjects capable of taking control of their destinies—including, in the late 19th century, those
destinies that are intertwined with the unpredictable circumstances of the tubercular disease
process.
Liberal-economic modes of government take shape through a hailing of subjects—the
citizenry—into practices of economic self-government—individual management of one's body.
Nikolas Rose writes of liberalism as working through mechanisms that produce individuals
who “will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1996, 45). Such
self-government, in the realm of disease prevention, is fundamentally about bringing the will of
individuals in line with the broader social establishment of what subjects ought to do—the way
they are supposed to behave—so as to ensure their own health and the protection of the public
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health. The tubercular and those subjects exposed to the preventative measures of the late 19th
century anti-tuberculosis movement increasingly take shape through the pursuit of practices of
regimen and disinfection, and through self-care in the form of the cultivation of tissue capable
of resisting the tubercle bacillus. Emerging from these articulations of liberal modes of
governance and individual subjectivity, and the pursuit of economy on both the level of the
state and the level of the individual, is a question of the willpower of subjects—of the
willingness and of the intent of an individual to, in the words of Foucault, “do as he or she
ought” by practicing economic self-government.
The burden of this willpower thus appears in the liberal expectation that individuals
are not only capable of, but expected to make economic choices—choices, in the present, that
facilitate the future materialization of a subject's best interests. The value of this liberal will
emerges in discourses and practices of monetary and medical charity where the sick poor are
hailed into modes of government that presuppose both their capacity and their desire to exert
control over their financial and physiological futures, realizing a future state of being where
they are independent and productive. Liberal autonomy thus takes shape as not just a desirable
state of being, but rather as a required state of being. To the extent that a subject does not
possess the capacity for such autonomy, liberalism presumes the capacity of charitable social
institutions to better or reform subjects, so as to produce within them, this will, and thus, the
capacity to intentionally pursue an independent future. The role of reform and education in
forging the willpower of the subject is evident in Ricardo's suggestion that “by impressing on
the poor the value of independence by teaching them that they must look not to systematic or
casual charity, but to their own exertions for support, that prudence and forethought are
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neither unnecessary nor unprofitable virtues, we shall by degrees approach a sounder and more
healthful state” (Ricardo 1911). Hence Ricardo defines the health of the broader population of
the state in terms of the production, through reform of the poor, of prudential individuals—
individuals capable of being autonomous in the present, or, though the exertion of willpower,
the achievement of future independence through a bettering of the self. Late 19th century
efforts to treat and prevent tuberculosis increasingly introduce the cultivation of healthy tissue
as an element of “prudence and forethought,” as sick individuals are called upon to help
themselves get better.
As I will show throughout the dissertation, this capacity to practice self-government in
the realm of tuberculosis treatment—the ability to exert one's individual will over one's body—
while theorized by physicians, officials, and reformers as a capacity that inheres in individuals,
is paradoxically, a product of modes of government. Indeed, in spite of the fact that individual
willpower is valued because it ostensibly exists independently of the will of others and the will
of the state, the willpower of tubercular subjects takes shape through the provisions of medical
charity, through the caring of physicians, and the dependency on liberal institutions. This very
paradox, and the question of the substance of liberal willpower, form the material through
which tubercular individuals are remade, from subjects of a force of nature into tools for the
control of tuberculosis and into cultivators of a healthy bodily soil capable of retarding the
growth of the disease.
Within the context of tuberculosis in late-19th century Philadelphia, the purpose of
studying liberal modes of government and individualism is thus to understand the formation
of this individual will as a product of the articulation of self and government—to understand
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how the choices and actions of individuals are constituted by modes of government, and how
the subjectivity of “economic man” becomes a hegemonic standard, mobilized, through various
liberal fields, including bacteriological science, public health, and charity, through which
individuals and populations are produced through processes of valuation and evaluation. Such
modes of government take shape, both through formal political processes and law, but also,
and perhaps more importantly, through informal techniques and individual conduct—through
the efforts of liberal Philadelphia institutions to educate and discipline the urban population
in the correct hygienic behaviors for curing, treating, and preventing the spread of tuberculosis.
Burchell writes of these informal and non-legislated codes of conduct as “assembled techniques
[that] require and integrate within them ways in which individuals conduct themselves...they
involve governed individuals adopting particular practical relations to themselves...the
promotion in the governed population of specific techniques of the self around such questions
as, for example, saving and providentialism, [and...] the development of habits of cleanliness,
sobriety, fidelity, self-improvement, responsibility and so on” (Burchell 1996, 25-26). Public
health and private institutions of medical charity served as the spheres for the promotion of
these habits—for the promotion of the development of hygienic and self-help techniques
amongst sick urban individuals.
Following Burchell, where, for much of the 18th and 19th centuries, liberal individualism
largely concerned the cultivation of productive industrial habits—the worthy individual was one
for whom productivity, in the form of laboring, was paramount—late 19th century liberalism in
Philadelphia introduces the expectation of the economic management of the body or the
physiological economy. As I show throughout this dissertation, the very notion of economy
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broadens to include health and the self-government of the human body and any accompanying
disease processes. More specifically, through tuberculosis treatment and prevention, the worthy
tubercular individual is increasingly disciplined through educational campaigns, rule placards,
and cautionary codes of conduct, developed by charitable and medical institutions, into the
management of his or her internal body and into the containment and disinfection of his or
her personal pathological material—the disinfection of infectious sputum. The subject of liberal
individualism thus becomes a technology through which diseases, like tuberculosis, are to be
controlled, through the individual exercise of willpower so as to combat disease.
Enlightenment Science and Technology: Challenging the “Bifurcation of the World”
This investment in the capacity of the tubercular subject to make him- or herself
healthy through the cultivation of healthy tissue articulated with the practices of the
bacteriological laboratory and, in particular, with an investment, on the part of reformers like
Flick, in a progressive vision of bacteriological science as having provided a more true version
of the nature of tuberculosis. Flick, reacting to Robert Koch's 1882 discovery of the microbial
cause of tuberculosis proclaimed, over ten years later, that “[s]cience has given us...power over”
tuberculosis (Flick 1896). Indeed, for many physicians and public health officials, tuberculosis
prevention emerged naturally out of the bacteriological truths about the disease and its
transmission. In telling the story of this traffic between the laboratory and the city streets and
clinics, I also aim to critique the manner in which such Enlightenment investments in science
and technology took shape through a presumed human capacity to subject nature.
Critiques of Enlightenment narratives of the progressive nature of science are well worn
within the field of Science and Technology Studies (Smith and Marx 1994, Haraway 1991,
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Latour 1993). Such critiques are attentive to the manner in which ostensibly progressive
scientific and technological solutions are produced by and productive of two presumed
separations or “bifurcations” (Whitehead 1920). The presumed separations include that
between science and society, and that between the human and nonhuman. Historians of
science have established the manner in which science and scientists operate within the realm of
the social rather than in an idealized space separate from society (Haraway 1991, Latour 1993).
In what follows, I will show how science in late-19th century Philadelphia is both produced by
and productive of the social: Western scientists are embedded in human communities and
engage in a social profession that both affects and is affected by liberal society.
By viewing scientists as actors engaged in a social practice, the very act of studying
nature becomes a matter, not of “discovering” an objective natural world. Rather, the space of
the laboratory takes shape as a space that facilitates the interaction between human subjectivity
and those material objects of study—microbes, for instance. In approaching the subject matter
in this manner, I elaborate on the ways in which the laboratory work of discovering, studying,
and cultivating the tubercle bacillus is a remaking of the disease rather than an uncovering of
the “true nature” of tuberculosis. Furthermore, the laboratory practices of cultivating the
disease and, in Flick's words, demonstrating “power over” the disease—a practice that underlies
the emergence of a tubercular subject capable of exercising will over his or her own internal
body—is not unique to the lab but emerges in interaction with the clinic and with efforts to
treat and prevent tuberculosis. Through the supposed objectification and subjection of the
bacillus in the lab, the human body, too, is remade as an object to be subjected by the
tubercular individual.
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The Human/Non-Human: The Limitations of Human Agency
The second presumed separation that I will challenge is the distinction between
microbes and individuals. A traditional humanities orientation, this separation is premised on
an a priori distinction between the human and the nonhuman, and the concomitant
investment in humans as the legitimate actors and makers of history and the erasure of the role
of the nonhuman in contributing to this history (Mitchell 2002). This dissertation speaks to
this limitation within the scholarship of the humanities and social sciences by exploring the coconstituitive nature of the human and nonhuman—of liberal individuals and infectious
disease—by examining Philadelphia's efforts to govern, contain, and take and assign
responsibility for the control of tuberculosis. Engaging this articulation of nonhuman and
human, nature and society, microbe and individual requires an approach that complicates the
very notion of agency—of willpower—a concept central to the elaboration of both contemporary
and late-19th century understandings and embodiments of liberal individualism. This
complication, in an oversimplified manner, proceeds from an opening up of the question of
the “will” of nature—of the capacity of nature to act upon and through humans: how might the
emergence of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis be understood, not as human failure to control,
but as the product of an interaction between individual efforts, human technologies, and the
ingenuity of microbes?
In order to explain this process, I draw on scholarly conversations about the “agency”
or “vitality” of nature (Bennett 2010)—conversations about the degree to which disease is elided
or acknowledged, by scholars of the humanities, historians, and social theorists, as a legitimate
actor or shaper of human affairs. This conversation is fraught to the extent that I am using the
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notion of agency even as I intend to complicate notions of individualism and intent. I argue,
throughout, that the very presumption of individual agency and the corresponding production
of subjects capable of acting in their own best interest vis-a-vis disease are, themselves, products
of liberal scientific-medical individualism: the willpower of the sick individual does not exist in
nature, but rather materializes through the articulation of bacteriological laboratories, medical
charity, and efforts to treat and prevent tuberculosis. Thus, in initiating a conversation about
the “agency” of nature, I am not claiming that nature has an inherent willpower. Rather, I am
arguing that the willpower of liberal individuals takes shape through a concomitant elision, in
socio-medical discourses and practices, of the nonhuman as a legitimate actor of shaper of
events. In other words, for individuals to master tuberculosis, the disease had to first be
rendered a non-participant in the process: increasingly, tuberculosis did not make people sick;
rather, tubercular individuals failed to get better. Human failure is made possible by the
Enlightenment presumption that nature is conquerable and controllable: for individuals to fail,
nature must first be made inert—it must be mastered and one method through which mastery
is achieved is through the routine dismissal of nonhuman agency.
Scholars of Science and Technology Studies have attempted to understand the manner
in which the non-human objects studied by science interact with and influence the behavior
and thinking of both natural and social scientists (Hacking 1999, Haraway 1991, Latour 1993,
Mitchell 2002). In doing so, they stress the scholarly tendency to dismiss the manner in which
the nonhuman serves as a driver, an “agent,” or a force in the shaping of history. These
scholars use a variety of approaches to illustrate the manner in which the objects of science are,
in fact, subjects of history. Where some scholars (Hacking 1999) distinguish between the
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“interactive” objects of the social sciences—people—and the inert objects of the natural
sciences—quarks—others argue that non-human nature possesses biophysical qualities that
shape human actions (Prudham 2005)—as though the raw material of nature is making
demands upon, directing, or, at least, limiting what humans can do.
Latour argues that the materiality of microbes made demands upon Louis Pasteur by
prompting him to seek an ideal medium in which to reproduce the bacillus (Latour 1999). He
suggests that Pasteur’s discovery that the bacillus thrived best in a urine culture evidenced the
preference of the microbe, thereby intimating that the progress of the science of bacteriology
was produced, in part, through Pasteur’s ability to interact with the demands made by
biophysical properties of the non-human bacillus—through his search for the culture medium
that would most adequately facilitate the biophysical properties of scientific objects (Latour).
Latour's attribution of historical agency to the microbe establishes a world where outcomes are
not the product, solely, of human intent or will, but rather the product of the interaction of
human and nonhuman. Such an orientation epitomizes the Science and Technology Studies
method of rejecting the dualisms as advised by Alfred Whitehead in his critique of the
“bifurcation of the world” into subject and object, nature and culture, human and nonhuman.
Donna Haraway articulates this project, this rejection, as a political intervention
(Haraway 1991). This intervention is reflected in her attempts to theorize the possibility of the
world as actor/actant—the possibility that nonhuman nature does indeed shape the conditions
of human success and failure. She begins by positing the Enlightenment-objective-view of
science: “any status as agent in the production of knowledge must be denied the object. It—the
world—must, in short, be objectified as thing, not as an agent; it must be matter for the self25

formation of the only social being in the production of knowledge, the human knower” (198).
Hence we see the Cartesian split between subject and object through the denial of “any status
as agent” to the thing being studied. Yet in contrast to this inert object, she advises that the
academic observer come to terms with the agency of the object—a method she terms “situated
knowledge”: “Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor
and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource” (198). Here, Haraway gestures toward a
notion similar to that of Ian Hacking’s notion of “interaction” wherein she acknowledges the
manner in which the social science researcher is “transform[ed]” by the “people studied.” She
proposes viewing the “object of knowledge” as possessing an agency—again, a problematic
notion to the extent that it implies the very naturalness of the willpower that, as I argue
throughout, is produced. The scholar, in Haraway's view, should seek the “dialectic” of
knowledge production that occurs through the movement between researcher and object. She,
like Latour, opens the door to the possibility of such an interaction in the natural sciences as
well. Thus a framework emerges within which “the world” can be studied as having, if not an
agency, then an urgency that acts upon and through humans—a gross materiality that enables,
that limits, that works in interaction with humans.
This study thus seeks to open up the question of what constitutes a historical actor by
taking seriously that which is routinely erased, by both scholars in the humanities and by
physicians and officials engaged in disease control and prevention: the will of the nonhuman
microbe. Microbes are notable as “active entit[ies]” (Haraway 1991, 198) expressing preferences
in the laboratory, attaching to dust in the dwellings of the sick, and entombing themselves and
hibernating in the tissue of bodies—and in being active, they partially establish the realm of the
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possible. Human willpower is both limited and facilitated by the activity of the nonhuman
tubercle bacillus.
Braun and Whatmore (2010) note this commitment to the human and its
consequences as “the stubborn attachment of many scholars—liberal and radical alike—to a
humanism that finds ever new ways of positing the nonhuman as “out there,” as Cary Wolfe
puts is, rather than “in here,” at the very heart of human becoming, and to a liberalism that
continues to posit intention and action as attributes of autonomous individuals, rather than
locating individuals and their capacities in relation to a larger transindividual field that the
precedes the individuation of singular things” (xx). Thus, within the context of the tubercular
disease process, the manner in which subjects become sick and become healthy, and take
responsibility or fail to take responsibility, are not fully understood to the extent that they are
explained as the actions “of autonomous individuals.” Taking the “will of nature” seriously
includes acknowledging the constituent role of the nonhuman—the microbe—as part of a
broader “transindividual field” through which, in the parlance and practices of liberalism,
individuals emerge as autonomous entities. As a result of taking seriously the role of the
nonhuman, individual willpower ceases to exist as a commonsensical capacity—indeed, one
cannot simply take responsibility for one's health, or for a disease, to the extent that those
extra-individual forces, including the behavior of the microbes, are constantly shifting the
circumstances through which a subject of disease takes shape. Asking questions of the
nonhuman opens up the production of liberal individualism by acknowledging the manner in
which human and nonhuman emerge in tandem: a tubercular individual is only capable of
shaping their internal bodily physiology to the extent that the nonhuman microbes, and the
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very body of the sick, cooperate. Thus, key to my analysis is an engagement with the manner in
which the positive materialization of individual willpower is only made possible through a
concomitant elision of the “willpower” of the nonhuman.
Telling the story of humans by acknowledging the “willpower” of the nonhuman is an
intervention that Jane Bennett recognizes as a “political project” (Bennett 2010). Rather the
conceptualizing the agency of the nonhuman as a will, she advises that scholars “take seriously
the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies...the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms,
metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi
agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (viii). Thus, the
process of becoming a cured subject cannot be reduced to the success of an individual—to their
exercise of willpower; rather some interaction between individual and the “vitality” of the
microbe has resulted in a state of health.
This “vitality” takes shape through the articulation of unpredictable forces in the work
of Timothy Mitchell (2002). In telling the story of the gambiae mosquito in Egypt, and the
complex process through which DDT emerged as a technical solution to the problem of
malaria at the end of World War II, Mitchell notes the manner in which the calculated
intentions of human agents run up against nonhuman limitations in the form of unintended
consequences—the products of the unpredictability of nonhuman nature: “[H]uman agency
appears less as a calculating intelligence directing social outcomes and more as the product of a
series of alliances in which the human element is never wholly in control” (10). Far from
viewing DDT as a scientific innovation—a triumph of the human will—he sees it as a technology
born of unpredictable alliances between nonhuman actors like the mosquitoes and the puddles
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in which they bred and the humans—the soldiers, engineers, and locals—who trod those those
puddles and suffered the mosquito bites. This nonhuman interaction with, and indeed, often
the nonhuman subversion of the rational-technical calculations of human actors leads Mitchell
to a rethinking of human agency as it begins to appear highly contingent and circumstantial.
This reframing challenges both historical and contemporary narratives of tuberculosis
suffering, transmission, and propagation: discourses of success and failure, compliance and
non-compliance, worth and unworth are inadequate to the extent that they rest on this
fundamental denial or erasure of the broader transindividual field—the multiplicity of vitalities or
unpredictable alliances—that constitute the processes of becoming sick or healthy, and remaining
sick or healthy. Tuberculosis, and its microbial cause, the tubercle bacillus were, as I show
throughout, vital to this remaking of liberal individualism—this remaking by which internal
physiological processes came to be regarded, like disease, as subject to individual willpower.
And the disease was remade by a concomitant aspect of liberal individualism—namely,
discourses and practices of the control of nature that took shape through the contagious
propagation of ideas between the laboratory and the clinic. This capacity to control nature was,
itself, the product of the discourses and practices of the bacteriological laboratory. Thus, in
order for the individual to take shape as a subject capable of exerting willpower over his or her
own body and thus over tuberculosis, the disease had to first be objectified, rendered inert,
reduced to a controllable form.
In what follows, I aim to participate in the project of confronting and undermining the
bifurcation of the world by elaborating on the manner in which the tubercular individual of
the late-19th century—an individual constituted by willpower—takes shape precisely through the
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elision of the capacity of the nonhuman to shape events and outcomes: the materialization of
the subjectivity of liberal individualism is produced by and productive of the erasure of the
capacity of the bacillus to act in a manner that defies human intention. As I argue in this
dissertation, tuberculosis and efforts to cure, prevent, and eradicate the disease, while not the
only site, were fundamental locations in the production of a late-19th century liberal
individualism that presumed the capacity of the sick to wittingly intervene in and reshape their
internal body. This capacity—this willpower—is made possible by the elision of the vitality of the
bacillus and the valorization of human subjects to manipulate, subdue, and resist the
pathological nature inside their tissue. The study of tuberculosis and the implementation of
methods to treat and prevent the disease thus served as fields through which American society
reified its supposed mastery over nature—through both medicine's conquering of disease and
the individual's conquering of his or her own body and the disease processes within. By telling
this story through an attentiveness to the manner in which the nonhuman—microbes—shapes
the human, I mean to make evident the manner in which the late-19th century remaking of
liberal subjectivity to include a tubercular individual's capacity to overcome the disease by
wittingly shaping his or her physiology, continues to resonate in the contemporary moment in
a manner that is contingent upon the continued erasure of this very role of the nonhuman.
This erasure of the nonhuman is important as the absence of nonhuman vitality constitutes
the presence of individual willpower: the willpower of the liberal individual is the product of
the elision of the nonhuman—an elision that assumes the human mastery of nature.
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Dissertation Chapter Summaries
I tell this story of the interaction between humans and microbes by beginning in the
late-19th century, with the laboratory encounter between scientists and the tubercle bacillus. In
Chapter 1, I focus on the late-19th century remaking of consumption—the scientific work
through which an incurable disease became curable. This remaking was produced by and
productive of a concomitant remaking of individuals: no longer subjected by the tubercular
disease process, the sick emerge as subjects capable of helping themselves get better through the
witting cultivation of immunity.
I place this late-19th century phenomena in the context of Western historical attempts
to understand the cause of tuberculosis. I demonstrate the manner in which these attempts
largely explained the disease as a natural force that inevitably killed those unfortunate enough
to contract it. Western medicine from the Ancient Greeks through the mid-19th century was
constituted by a body of medical knowledge and an array of practices that were both based
upon an understanding and productive of tuberculosis as a disease that could not be cured—as
a disease that was not subject to human control. Medicine, in regarding tuberculosis as
incurable, thus simultaneously produced consumptives or tubercular individuals as subjects of
the disease: while treatment might lengthen life, the sick were fated to die of consumption.
I trace the efforts of physicians to develop alternative theories of a material agent
responsible for causing the disease—explanations that remained unpopular before coalescing
into the “discovery” of the microbial cause of the disease, the tubercle bacillus, through the
laboratory practices of Robert Koch. This remaking of the disease from an external force of
nature to a pathology caused by a specific organism, operating internally, in the tissue of the
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human body, constituted a scientific and medical confrontation with what Lawrence Flick
called the “physicality” of the disease.
Flick and other anti-tuberculosis reformers translated the laboratory demonstration of
“control” over the disease—the capacity to grow it in culture—into the sphere of treatment. I
analyze this translation and the corresponding emergence of a revolutionary socio-medical
optimism toward the possibility of controlling and curing the disease in the bodies of the sick
through the popular late-19th century language of soil and seed and the concomitant remaking
of individuals as cultivators of personal soils of immunity. The very production of the sick as
subjects with the capacity, through the exercise of individual will, to retard and subject the
disease by exercising discipline over their own physiological processes undergirded the
emergent understanding of liberal individuals as agents, capable, in Flick's words, of “helping
themselves” overcome tuberculosis.
I trace this traffic between clinics and laboratories, arguing that the the control of
tuberculosis in the laboratory articulated with political economic theorizations of
individualism—of the content, boundaries, and aspirations of “economic man”–yielding both a
reworking of political economic thought, to include control of one's own body and health (and
thus, over disease processes) and of the substance—willpower—of liberal individualism. Through
the remaking of tuberculosis, both the disease, and the human body, were increasingly remade
as objects, awaiting subjection by the exertion of individual willpower.
In Chapter 2, I contextualize the emergence of this tubercular individual, capable of
helping him or herself in overcoming the disease within a genealogy of Philadelphia's
charitable efforts to care for the sick poor. By tracing the articulation of discourses and
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practices of self-government within the 18th and 19th century almshouses and hospitals of the
city, I detail the manner in which poor-sick-urban subjects were evaluated—valued and
devalued—by municipal officials, reformers, and physicians through the application of a
political economy of care.
In order to understand how and why the tubercular subject of the late-19th century took
shape as an individual capable of helping him or herself, I trace the emergence of this political
economy of care: an orientation toward, and set of practices for expediently and efficiently
treating the sick and poor through the evaluation of the worthiness of potential subjects of
charity. Efforts to run the almshouses in a prudential manner so as to not waste public money
resulted in the elaboration of a charitable tradition centered on a triaging of the subjects of aid
so as to ensure that money was not wasted on those deemed unworthy.
I detail this political economy of care to establish the manner in which this system of
evaluation articulated with chronic diseases like tuberculosis. Where the almshouses and
hospitals of Philadelphia historically valued subjects that demonstrated a capacity to “better”
themselves, moving from a state of dependence into one of independence, chronically ill
consumptives, ever slipping back into sickness, and in need of seemingly perpetual aid, could
never embody this idealized subject of independence and productivity. Thus, consumptives
found themselves consistently marginalized in the eyes of reformers, and consequently, they
remained largely untreated. The lack of worth of subjects, typically attributed to a failure of
individual willpower, was, in chronic tubercular subjects, ironically, not a matter of mental
fortitude, but a matter of the physiological inability—the chronic inability—of the consumptive
body to get well.
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With a particular focus on the 18th century Bettering House and on the infamous 19th
century Blockley almshouse and hospital, I characterize this challenge to liberal individualism
posed by the chronically ill body: diseased subjects in general, and consumptives in particular,
proved a material impediment to the realization of the idealized productive and independent
liberal subject to the extent that they required aid in perpetuity. In part, through Flick's
advocacy, and in part, through the broader remaking of tuberculosis as a curable disease in the
late 19th, the emergent capacity for the tubercular to get well resulted in a slow and incomplete
re-evaluation of their charitable worth.
In this chapter, I broaden the analysis of the role of the individual in caring for him or
herself to explore the threat to both human health, and to the professed liberal boundaries
between self and other, that took shape through the remaking of tuberculosis as contagious
disease. Contagious tuberculosis, as I show, taxed municipal officials, physicians, and the
public in general with a new form of threatening nature. Where most infectious diseases were
acute—doing their damage and dying off—as a chronic disease, tuberculosis lingered in the sick:
the contagious tubercular were not an easily containable population. Furthermore, the method
of its contagious transmission proved vexing: it could seemingly infect in the absence of a sick
individual. These curious qualities of the disease required specialized forms of governmental
and community interventions.
I detail the process by which Flick advocated and agitated for both the acceptance of
the contagious nature of the disease and for governmental intervention in preventing the
spread of the disease. Tracing Flick's interactions with his peers in the community of
physicians—both contagionists that shared his perspective and anticontagionists that still
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believed tuberculosis to be an hereditary disease—I show the manner in which struggles over
the science of the transmission of the disease were simultaneously struggles over the rights of
individuals and over the appropriate reach of governmental bodies—public health—in regulating
both the habits of the sick and the practices of physicians.
I show how these debates over the disease's contagious potential took shape, in part,
through reactions to the peculiar materiality of tuberculosis—namely, its capacity to survive for
long periods of time, and to infect, even in the absence of a witting sower of the disease
through the fomite—objects, like dust particles, that served as vectors for the transmission of
the disease. The remaking of tuberculosis as a contagious disease thus confronted liberal
physicians and reformers with a disease that paradoxically required both sick individuals
“helping themselves,” and the broader municipal efforts to facilitate the containment of those
dead and inanimate objects were the contagion thrived. It was within this context that antituberculosis reformers came to reassert the capacity for human control over the disease through
the implementation of a state-led “administrative control of tuberculosis”—a process of
educating, disciplining, and reforming the habits of the public, passing laws designed to
contain and eradicate contagious pathological material, and taking more drastic quarantining
action where necessary.
In the final chapter, I tell the story of the 1902 founding and the first few years of
operations of the Henry Phipps Institute—a sanitarium, clinic, and laboratory created to treat
Philadelphia's poor consumptives and to prevent the spread of the disease. I focus on
elaborating the tensions between the Institute's two founders, Flick, and former steel-magnate
Henry Phipps. I use these tensions regarding the Institute's ideal mission to explore the
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paradox whereby the independence of sick tubercular subjects was constituted through their
dependence upon institutional and/or charitable resources.
I explore the production of this sick subject—constituted simultaneously by dependence
and independence—through attention to the Institute's sanitarium and dispensary. I trace a
history of the still-nascent late-19th-century-sanitarium-movement, and the corresponding
emphasis on the cultivation of regimen as a tool for healing the sick. I establish the means by
which the “cure” of the disease required the structured environment of the sanitarium, and
thus proved fleeting once the sick attempted to reintegrate into the world outside the
sanitarium walls. The dispensary served as the node for the attempted translation of the
elements of physician-surveillance and enforced regimen beyond the space of the Institute, into
the private spaces of the homes of the city's sick. In serving as a seat for the elaboration of the
“administrative control of tuberculosis,” the clinic engaged in educational campaigns, home
visits, provision of free resources, and the disciplining of the tubercular in the correct habits for
preventing the spread of the disease.
I trace the manner in which these efforts increasingly implicated the Institute and
Phipps' resources in the treatment of, not simply individual tubercular bodies, but the social
conditions—the poverty—underlying the spread of tuberculosis—the poverty underlying
susceptibility to the disease. Flick's desire to treat and prevent the spread of the disease in the
entirety of the poor urban population of Philadelphia thus resulted in a situation requiring, in
Phipps' estimation, an endless allocation of resources—a “bailing out” of “the sea.” It was
within this context and through the discourses and practices of Institute charity, discipline,
education, and surveillance, that tuberculosis was remade once again—this time, as a
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sociological disease. Where individuals attending the Institute's clinic and/or living in the
sanitarium were still produced as having a capacity to help themselves through the witting
cultivation of immunity, tensions between Phipps and Flick grew as the two founders
confronted the emergent understanding that the very capacity to resist the disease was, itself, a
function of social status and access to resources—nutrition, time to rest, access to fresh air.
I conclude by tracing the Institute's efforts to distribute free milk to “worthy” patients. I
detail this practice as the ground through which Flick's own struggle with this very paradox of
producing independent subjects through dependence materialized in an increased mistrust of
the motives of those poor subjects seeking aid from the Institute—those subjects who, in Flick's
words, ought to be able to help themselves. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, as
Phipps set about transferring the Institute to the University of Pennsylvania, Flick's operating
of the free milk program and his realizations regarding the breadth of the sea of needs of
Philadelphia's poor undergirded the broader recognition, echoed by the University and by
other reformers across the United States, that the disease was sociological—while the tubercle
bacilli was the agent responsible for the disease, a subject's access to resources determined their
susceptibility to this agent. Facing the complicated nature of treating these social conditions
and facing the University of Pennsylvania's distancing of itself from the provision of welfare
that seemed necessary to sustain the cure of the tubercular, Flick's tenure ended in bitterness as
he both rejected and felt rejected by the Institute's new approach. The very paradox of the cure
of the poor tubercular—this very articulation of dependence and independence underlying the
capacity of the sick to get better—proved a problem with no immediate solution, and no
evident role for Flick.
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Chapter 1
The Remaking of Tuberculosis: Bacteriology, the Tubercle Bacillus, and the Cultivation of
Individual Immunity
In 1908, tubercular patients using the dispensary of Philadelphia’s Henry Phipps
Institute found their supply of free milk cut off. Institute co-founder and physician Lawrence
Flick—himself, a survivor of tuberculosis—defended this new cost-cutting measure, claiming that
a sick individual who had “received milk for six months ought by that time to be restored to a
condition of health in which he can help himself” (Bates 1992, 127). Flick made this statement
some twenty years after he initiated a novel campaign—a “crusade”—to prevent, cure, and
eradicate tuberculosis the world over. This campaign was underwritten by his unbridled
optimism in the new bacteriological science: with Robert Koch's late-19th-century discovery of
the material cause of tuberculosis, a host of bacteriologists, physicians, and public health
officials saw an opportunity for humanity to take control of a centuries-old scourge—a scourge
that was responsible, by the mid-19th century, for having killed, in Flick’s estimation “one
seventh of the human family!” (58). With tuberculosis ravaging Philadelphia and most major
cities in the Western world, Flick spent the 1890s organizing and seeking funding for state and
private care to achieve his goals. The Phipps Institute was the crowning materializations of his
efforts—a space in which he had succeeded in providing resources—space, beds, physicians, free
milk—and conditions within which the tubercular could help themselves overcome the disease.
Flick’s optimism toward and pursuit of a cure took shape through the articulation of a
series of broader late-19th century liberal ideals and practices—ideals and practices that
constituted and were constituted by the realms of public health, public and private charity, and
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bacteriology science. The mainstreaming of state and municipal public health in U.S. cities was
accompanied by a spirit of reform that included a broad range of efforts—cleaning up city
environments, promoting individual hygiene, and identifying and quarantining contagious
threats. With regard to tuberculosis, these efforts were increasingly influenced by the findings
of the bacteriological laboratory: the identification of the tubercle bacillus and the fixation on
these microbes as the cause of tuberculosis. The culturing of these bacilli in the lab was
addressed, by scientists, physicians, and public health reformers as evidence of the scientific
mastery of tuberculosis—efforts that had brought the disease, in Flick's words, “completely
within [human] power” to control (Flick 1896, 639). The rhetoric and practice of reform
efforts increasingly paralleled that of the bacteriological laboratory, inspired by the belief that if
the disease could be controlled in the laboratory it could similarly be controlled in the bodies
of the sick and in the populations of cities.
By the 1890s, Flick and other reformers, participating in a burgeoning public health
movement invoked the work of Robert Koch, “the father of bacteriology,” as foundational to
their conviction that tuberculosis was both curable and eradicable. Citing Koch’s discovery of
the microbial tubercle bacillus, and his establishment of the bacillus as the agent that caused
tuberculosis (Flick 1892, 640), anti-tuberculosis reformers organized around the bacillus—a
tangible-material-target—for their campaigns. Hopes and visions for overcoming the disease
translated into disinfection and prophylactic practices designed to control the bacillus beyond
the laboratory, containing its spread in urban populations by educating and disciplining
individuals in the proper methods to stifle the disease in their own bodies. The control of the
bacillus was routinely equated with, even substituted for, the control the disease.
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Yet Flick’s statement regarding the capacity of tubercular individuals to help themselves
also suggests a challenge to his conviction: in the space of Phipps Institute, his confidence in
the capacity of bacteriological science, liberal society, and liberal individuals to master
tuberculosis was being undermined by bodies that failed to get better. In spite of all his
goodwill, and the Institute's considerable investment of resources in the treatment of the sick,
Flick’s laborious efforts had run up against a limitation—a limitation that he identified as a
certain type of tubercular individual deficient in the necessary willpower to “help himself”; a
subject incapable of managing the resources of his or her own body in the interest of
controlling the disease, and therefore, unworthy of charitable resources; a subject lacking an
affinity for health. In a liberal society where the worth of potential subjects of financial and
medical charitable aid was routinely judged, the tubercular subject of the first decade of the
20th century was faced with a choice: choose to be healthy, or choose to be sick. And beneath
the roof of the Phipps Institute, it appeared to Flick as though many were choosing sickness.
Flick’s linking of the cure of tuberculosis to the exercise of individual will and choice
was increasingly common by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, and in many ways,
his withholding of free milk at the Henry Phipps Institute appears unremarkable given the
broader coeval field of liberal social discourses and practices regarding the provision of
resources to the poor and needy. His identification of certain patients as unworthy of free
handouts reflected general anxieties, amongst liberal policymakers and philanthropists, that
charity would produce dependence amongst “unworthy” recipients. I outlined this anxiety, and
the social distinction between the “worthy” and the “unworthy” in my discussion of the tenants
of classical liberal individualism in the Introduction. The classical liberal individual embodies
40

rationality, intention, and prudence in managing his or her own resources. In the 19th century
discourses of charity and aid, one’s worth as a potential recipient of state or philanthropic care
was determined, in part, by one’s demonstration of the capacity to economically manage one’s
resources. I will further elaborate on this broader field of circumstances in Chapter 2 by
analyzing Philadelphia’s late-19th century political economy of care, and the co-production of
“unworthy” tubercular subjects and the city’s “unworthy poor.” Given these circumstances,
Flick’s identification of a problem in those patients incapable of helping themselves was rather
conventional for the first decade of the 20th century.
However, in light of the then recent-history of tuberculosis in the Western world,
Flick’s conviction that individuals were responsible for controlling the tubercular conditions
within their body—indeed for controlling their own life and death—was remarkable. For Flick,
tubercular subjects not only could, but should help themselves by pursuing proper nutrition,
rest, and fresh air to wittingly cultivating the proper bodily conditions to stave of the advances
of the tubercle bacillus. Flick’s investment in the social and individual mastery of The Great
White Plague represents a vast departure from the prevalent 19th-century medical
understanding of the disease as largely incurable. To early-19th-century physicians, those
suffering from tuberculosis could not help themselves, nor, in most cases, could they be helped
by medicine: medical and individual intervention in the disease process was largely seen as
futile, for the tubercular were fatalistically predisposed, via their biology—what physicians
referred to as the tubercular diathesis—to be sick (Ackerknecht 1982) (Ott 1996). 1

1

This formation of both the disease and the tubercular individual, famously underwritten by the French physician
Laennec, bears a Malthusian sensibility regarding inherent limitations in nature: in this case, limitations on the
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Indeed, in the United States, this late 19th and early 20th century medical view of the
individual as capable of developing the necessary physiological resistance to subject
tuberculosis is remarkable in its departure from two thousand years of medical ambivalence
toward the curability and controllability of this disease alternatively known as phthisis,
consumption, and the Great White Plague. These varying historical formations of tuberculosis
consistently produce the disease as a force of nature—a force that defies human attempts to
cure, master, or control—and they produce material, or “natural” limitations on the capacity of
both the willpower of individuals and the expertise of medicine to cure, much less eradicate
tuberculosis. How, then, in half a century, had tuberculosis, an incurable and uncontrollable
disease, become a disease that science had mastered? That medicine could cure? How did the
perceived scientific mastery of this ancient plague translate into an optimism regarding the
possibility, and a set of practices designed to materialize the control of the disease? And how, in
turn-of-the-century Philadelphia, had the cure for tuberculosis become located within the
capacity of an individual to “help himself”?
I argue that the re-making of tuberculosis as a controllable disease in the late-19thcentury United States, constituted and was constituted by a specific embodiment of liberal
individualism premised upon the production of the biological processes and tissue of the human
body as subject to individual willpower—the production of the body as an object, subject to the
intentions, choices, and prudence of the individual. Beyond a mere transcribing of classical
liberal principles onto tubercular subjects, Flick and the anti-tuberculosis movement of late19th-century Philadelphia were involved in a re-making of the classical liberal individual
capacity of physicians and the sick to overcome tuberculosis. I discuss this and the diathesis in more detail later in
the chapter.
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through this concomitant re-making of the tubercular body as an object upon which and
through which liberal willpower was able, even expected to act. Through the articulation of
bacteriological science, liberal charity, and public health practices, the emergent liberal
individual of the turn-of-the-century will increasingly be held responsible for the management
of his or her internal body—for wittingly developing immunity. Individuals who failed to
manage their bodily resources through the application of foresight, intention, and will—those
who failed to help themselves—were those who failed, in the words of a popular parable, to
cultivate the requisite soil necessary to enable themselves to arrest the tubercular disease process.
Yet this hailing of tubercular subjects into the rational management of their internal
body does not account for the corresponding assumption, made by Flick and scores of
scientists and physicians, that, counter to thousands of years of history, medical science and
tubercular individuals were capable of overcoming material limitations and mastering the
disease. Indeed, in order for individuals to become responsible for controlling the disease in
their own bodies, tuberculosis had to be re-forged. This nonhuman force that had historically
subjected human individuals had to be rendered controllable. As I will show below, this
historical inversion of master and subject—of nonhuman and human—was produced by and
productive of the late 19-century remaking of tuberculosis: what Flick described, in 1896, as the
“newly discovered knowledge about” tuberculosis—a disease no longer understood as “the
direct interference of an angry Providence,” but rather “a physical phenomenon subject to the
control of man” (Flick 1896, 639).
I address this historical inversion by drawing attention to the manner in which the
social and clinical transformation of liberal individualism takes shape through the scientific
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remaking of the materiality of the disease—a shift in the production of knowledge about the
disease’s physicality. The primary site for this late 19th century remaking is the bacteriological
laboratory; and it is through the translation of Robert Koch’s bacteriological experiments
within the controlled environment of the laboratory—his making the bacilli visible and his
culturing of the bacilli (Lechevalier 1965)—into the realm of clinical treatment, that the
perceived human mastery over tuberculosis begins to take shape: the assumption of the human
capacity of mastery over the nonhuman bacillus that undergirds the remaking of the liberal
individual.
My argument is primarily concerned with the effects of this late 19th century
articulation of tuberculosis and individualism in Philadelphia. Yet the uniqueness of this
particular constellation of science and society emerges, partially, through a re-working of prior
articulations of tuberculosis, nature, and self. Hence, before detailing the intercourse between
Koch’s “mastery” of tuberculosis in the laboratory and the clinical pursuit of the “mastery” of
tuberculosis in human bodies, I trace a series of three historical flash points in the making of
the materiality of tuberculosis—what Flick terms the “life history” of the disease (Flick 1925)—to
establish these shifting articulations. I will juxtapose the telling of these moments with Flick’s
treatment of the disease in his own body, his vision of preventing and curing the disease at
large, and his analysis of Koch and the history of tuberculosis.
These moments are important as they constitute, in differing manners, both the
historical production of tuberculosis as a nonhuman force of nature and various “natural” or
material limitations on physicians and on sick individuals in their efforts to treat the disease.
By natural limitations, I am referring to the manner in which historical makings of tuberculosis
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and self are constituted by a corresponding production of “nature” as a force that limits or
checks human willpower and techno-scientific attempts at mastery. The capacity of humans—
physicians in their prescribing of treatment methods and sick individuals combating the
disease in their bodies—to achieve an unequivocal cure is absent prior to the 19th century, as
phthisis is regarded as a force of nature and, as such, as uncontrollable.
I begin with the Hippocratic epidemic. Consumption takes shape, in the Hippocratic
texts of the Greeks, as an epidemic force of nature. As a force of nature, phthisis is not subject
to human will; rather, humans—sick individuals—are subject to the disease: fatalistic subjects. In
this historical formation of self and consumption, a cure is limited by the medical production
of diseased nature as more powerful than human willpower—more powerful than both the
physician's capacity to cure, and the sick individual's capacity to help him or herself get better.
This fatalism toward the ravages of the disease was challenged, though not entirely
replaced, through a second flash point, the 18th-century autopsy. Physicians observing the
pathological material made visible through the application of the anatomical knife to dead
human bodies remade consumption, not as a force of nature, but as a disease rooted in a material
form of pathological nature—the tubercle. In Richard Morton’s infamous treatise on phthisis
(Morton 1689), this remaking occurs with the concomitant production of the individual as
capable, under limited circumstances, of intervening in the disease process—in the material
development of the tubercle—by subjecting the tubercle, and thus, the disease, through proper
“self-government.” Yet, in spite of this potential, Morton’s work simultaneously reproduces
diseased nature as a more powerful force than both the “art of medicine”—attempts, by
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physicians, to proffer a cure for disease—and more powerful than the individual will in
adopting a regimen to overcome the disease.
Finally, I detail the early 19th century application of various clinical technologies for
listening to the chests of the sick—percussion, auscultation, and the employment of the
stethoscope. Where the autopsy allowed for investigation into the materiality of the disease
after death, these new practices enabled physicians to produce knowledge about the
pathological tubercle in the living human body. Yet even in reckoning with the specifics of the
matter of the disease, these physicians located the cause of consumption in the inherited
constitution of individuals: this inherited constitution served as a limitation on the powers of both
medicine and the individual as the tubercular were produced as subjects, predisposed, by their
biological nature, to be tubercular.
These flash points, while dissimilar in many ways, all serve to produce various natural
limitations on human willpower—on the human capacity to intervene in the nonhuman
disease process known as tuberculosis—limitations that are increasingly challenged, in the late-19th
century, through the emergence of a constellation of discourses and practices that establish human
dominance and control of diseased nature as fundamental to liberal individualism. Developments in
liberal public health, medicine, and charity, intersect with Koch’s methods of staining and
culturing the microbial cause of tuberculosis to challenge the notion that humans are
inevitably subject to tuberculosis by producing a subject—a liberal individual—that is
constituted by the capacity to control his or her own physiology through the willful cultivation
of tissue that resists tuberculosis. I elaborate on the manner in which Koch's laboratory
innovations—making the tubercle bacillus visible and isolating a pure culture of the bacilli in a
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proper “soil”—humanized and individualized the microbe, solidifying its status as an agent of
the tubercular disease process through the production of knowledge of its preferences and
affinities. In designing his experiments to cater to these microbial desires, I show how Koch’s
work established a material basis for the perception, amongst physicians, that the life of the
disease could be mastered—sown, or destroyed—through human means and human willpower.
Koch’s experimental designs were translated by Flick and his late 19th century peers
from laboratory practice into clinical methods. In positing Koch’s work as having ushered in an
era in which humans would master tuberculosis, Flick frames the late 19th-century laboratory
experiments of Koch as a challenge to and an overcoming of these natural limitations—an
inversion of historical perspectives on the interaction of humans and disease nature. In other
words, the outcome of Koch’s experiments is the production of tuberculosis as subordinate to
humans. Here, both the identification of the material bacillus—the “foe” in Flick’s words (1896,
639)—and the mastery of the disease, by cultivation, in the laboratory, translates into a program
for the treatment and prevention of tuberculosis modeled on the capacity of individuals to
master the disease by wittingly cultivating tissue that is inhospitable to the development of the
tubercle inside their bodies. Through the clinical prescription of methods to designed to
strengthen patient immunity, early 20th century medical practice would rework the sick as
sowers of healthy tissue and the tubercular body—the soil—as a resource subject to the
prudential management—the cultivation—of the “worthy” liberal-individual. Beneath the roof
of the Henry Phipps Institute, a long history of material limitations on a cure to tuberculosis
would lift, in theory, but remain in the form of bodies that would not do as they ought; bodies
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that seemingly would not get better; the bodies of individuals that, in Flick's estimation, failed
to help themselves.
Flick, Koch, and The Life History of Tuberculosis
In the summer of 1882, a tubercular Lawrence Flick returned from his travels to the
Western United states to his father’s farm in Carolltown, Pennsylvania to recover from his
sickness through a regimen of fresh air, horseback riding, and light work. Flick had sought and
failed to find a cure for himself in California (Flick 1944). On March 24 of the same year,
shortly before Flick’s return home, Robert Koch presented a lecture entitled “On Tuberculosis”
to the Physiological Society of Berlin. In the lecture, he patiently delivered his groundbreaking
finding that he had “discovered” the tubercle bacillus, and proven it to be the germ responsible
for tuberculosis (Brock 1988, 128).
In 1896, Flick would reflect on the implications of Koch’s discovery, assessing the
latter’s uncovering of the microscopic organism—the physical cause of tuberculosis—as evidence
of the late 19th-century advance of scientific knowledge. Flick wrote that tuberculosis had
existed “through myriads of generations…and continues to exist under definite environments,
requiring a certain soil for its development, a certain temperature for its prosperity, and certain
cycles of organic change for its propagation. These have all been unwittingly furnished it by the
human family since the days of Hippocrates…although at any time they could have been
withdrawn…had man possessed the knowledge necessary to enable him to do it” (1896, 640;
italics added). In attributing the survival of the disease over centuries to a lack of knowledge
and to the unwitting behavior of previous historical incarnations of the human family—
including the Greeks—in dealing with the scourge of tuberculosis, Flick underscores a vast-late48

19th-century change in the perception of the interaction between humans and tuberculosis. In
Flick's Enlightenment narrative, prior to the 19th-century, Western civilization merely lacked the
correct knowledge of the disease—knowledge that would have allowed them to wittingly combat
tuberculosis by creating an environment that was hostile to the disease.
The knowledge Flick refers to was that of the knowledge of the cause of the disease—a
cause that, through the work of Koch, was increasingly grounded in the physicality of
tuberculosis—the material tubercle bacillus. Knowledge of this physicality was, for Flick, a
rectifying of the mistaken understandings of past science and medicine. Indeed, while Flick
was respectful of the history of medicine and of those who practiced the treatment of disease
and theorized disease processes, he viewed the present of the late 19th-century as a progressive
improvement upon the past: a substitute of correct knowledge and practice for the flawed
knowledge and practices of the past. Such flaws began, in Flicks assessment in his tome
Development of Our Knowledge of Tuberculosis, with the Ancient Greeks and their understanding
of the physicality of phthisis and their attribution of the cause of the disease to a mélange of
natural matter and natural forces—phlegm, bile, the humors, bad breath, bad air, and weather
patterns.
The Making of Tuberculosis: The Hippocratic Epidemic as a Nonhuman Limitation on
Human Willpower
For the Hippocratic authors 2 of the classical Greek texts on medicine, the physicality of
tuberculosis was characterized as an excess of “phlegm decay[ing] in the head”:

2

Classical Greek understandings of tuberculosis are based primarily on the Hippocrates corpus—writings that are
now generally attributed to an amalgamation of Greek physicians and thinkers on medicine rather than a single
individual (Flick 1925, 13) (Arikha 2007, 18, Lloyd 2006).
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When the head gets filled with phlegm it becomes sick and when heat has developed
the phlegm decays in the head which having been accomplished, it can no longer be
moved in the direction in which it ordinarily goes; then when it is thick and decayed
and when the veins have been filled beyond measure, a dropping into the lungs takes
place; and the lungs, having received it, presently become affected, being irritated by
the phlegm which is salty and rotten. (Translated in Flick 1925, Hippocrates. Littré)
This explanation of tuberculosis as resulting from the changing state and movement of phlegm
from the head to the lungs locates the disease within the broader Greek model of the four
humors—phlegm, black bile, yellow bile, and blood. Health, according to the Hippocratic
corpus, functioned through the balance of these four humors. Disease resulted from a lack of
harmony in these bodily fluids. The Hippocratic author of Nature of Man argues that “human
nature [is] a balanced mixture (krasis) of a variety of humors (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and
black bile)” (Sassi 2001, 153). Disease, including phthisis, “is produced by the varying degree to
which each humor may grow comparatively hot or cold, dry or wet” and by excesses or
deficiencies of a particular humor (153). Diseases, thus, were not constituted by their own
materiality; rather they were the products of a pathological imbalance of the material of the
human body.
The Greeks characterized the suffering wrought by such an excessive and rotting
phlegmatic humor as a burning up of the body. The Greek words for tuberculosis—phthisis and
consumption—are derived from this symptom of burning up with “phthisis” translating as “I
waste away” (Webb 1936, ix). This “consumption” of the body (ix) manifested as a slow wasting
with a variety of symptoms including an intermittent acute cough, expectoration of thick
sputum, vomiting, chills, and recurring fevers, producing a “watery transparency” in the body
(Flick 1925, 19-20).
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The Hippocratic authors delineate three differing types of phthisis. These three types
are roughly differentiated by the span of time—one year, three years, or nine years—through
which they work their effects on the human body. While physicians make recommendations,
in the literature, for treating the disease—fresh milk, and proper rest—such treatments are
stopgap measures rather than cures: in Greek medicine, all three types of phthisis lead,
inevitably, to death. In the worldview and practice of the Ancient Greeks, the pursuit of a cure
for individual cases of phthisis or a wholesale eradication of the disease was unthinkable,
remaining beyond the capacity of individuals and physicians.
This was not true for all maladies observed and treated by the Greeks. A patient, under
supervision from a physician could become an agent in effecting a cure so long as they suffered
from a certain type of disease: those diseases “which arise soon after their origin, and whose
cause is clearly known.” In such cases, “The patient himself must bring about a cure by
combating the cause of the disease, for in this way will be removed that which caused the
disease in the body” (Hippocrates 1931, XIII). This location of the capability to combat and
overcome disease within the locus of the “patient himself” suggests the formation of a self, in
Hippocratic medicine, as a willful agent eliminating the causes of pathologies in his or her own
body, thus bringing about the transition from sickness to health. The Classical Greek
individual achieved such a transition through the adoption of physician prescribed regimens of
conduct.
Regimens of conduct—the word “regimen” derived from the Latin regere meaning to
rule—were constituted by practices of bodily self-government: an individual’s pursuit of correct
diet and exercise. One duty of the Greek physician committed to practicing the “art of
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medicine” was “to consider the patient’s mode of life and to take it into account” when
treating the sick (Hippocrates 1923, XXV). Such considerations allowed physicians to
recommend “changes…in regimen to suit the several conditions of age, season, physique, and
disease” (Hippocrates 1931, ix). Failure to change one’s habits did not merely exacerbate
pathological processes; rather an individual’s inability to cultivate correct conduct could cause
disease. Hence, Flick and the late 19th century physicians were not unique in positing
individuals as capable of helping themselves in overcoming sickness; rather, Hippocratic
medicine carved out a pathological category—diseases of regimen—that could be addressed and
even cured through disciplined self-rule of one’s own body.
Phthisis, however, was not a disease of regimen; rather, it was categorized as an epidemic
disease. Greek medicine posited the epidemic disease as that which could not be stopped through
individual willpower. In the literature of the Ancient Greeks, epidemics like phthisis emerge as
forces of nature, confronting both physicians—practitioners of the “art of medicine”—and the
individual sufferer with material limitations on their capacity to control the disease. At worst,
the epidemic as force of nature was unavoidable and uncontrollable; at best, it could be
mitigated. Physicians were careful to speculate on cures for epidemic diseases and they did not
write of the eradication of such diseases.
The Hippocratic author of Nature of Man typifies these two forms of disease by
differentiating between sicknesses that “arise…from regimen” and those epidemic diseases that
emerge “from the air by the inspiration of which we live” (Hippocrates 1931, vm.-ix.). This
distinction between those sicknesses brought on by failures in individual regimen and those
emanating from the breathing of bad air hinges on the prevalence of the disease in a
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population. As the Hippocratic author explains, diseases caused by regimen affect a single
individual; conversely, diseases “from the air” are “epidemics” that affect “many men…at the
same time” (vm.-ix.). Where the former could be treated, if not cured, through the cultivation
of correct self-rule of the body (ix.), those latter diseases affecting many “at the same time” were
“epidemic” and thus, beyond the reach of regimen: “when an epidemic of one disease is
prevalent, it is plain that the cause is not regimen but what we breathe, and that this is charged
with some unhealthy exhalation” (ix.). In contrast to diseases of regimen, the epidemic as force
of nature—bad air—subjected individuals. This pathologized air—this “unhealthy exhalation”—
was the product of climate, of seasonal change, and weather patterns. Its deadly whims were
determined by variations in natural conditions: shifts in temperature, the direction and
virulence of the wind, and the moisture in the air (Hippocrates 1931, I). And importantly, such
whims occurred in spite of human willpower.
Phthisis takes shape through these natural conditions in the Hippocratic writing
Epidemics I. Evidencing a seeming invulnerability to human intervention, it runs its course
through the population of the Greek island Thasos, leaving the observing physician (the
author) and the observed victims with little recourse to medicine or self-government—regimen—
in the pursuit of a cure. The Hippocratic author begins his description of the onset of
consumption by tracing the changing weather across the year’s four seasons. Having described a
relatively uneventful autumn and spring, his account changes with the onset of summer
(Hippocrates 1923, I).
The early summer brought consumption—the “coughing of sputa”; chills, “disordered”
and frequent bowel movements; the excretion of “slight, thin, pungent” material from the
53

body: bodies “averse to all food and experiencing no thirst” wasted away. The disease did not
discriminate as it struck those “who had been ailing a long time”; those whom the physician
had not expected to be consumptive; and those who were predisposed or “inclined to be
consumptive.” In all cases, the epidemic killed: “of those who took to their beds, I do not know
one who survived even for a short time” for “[d]eath came more promptly that is usual in
consumption.” The author notes that other diseases “with fever” took root; yet they “did not
prove fatal”: “consumption was the worst of the diseases that occurred, and alone was
responsible for the great mortality” that year (Hippocrates 1923, II).
The Hippocratic author further articulates this capacity of the seasons to exacerbate, if
not cause the epidemic of consumption, describing a second instance where the “severest and
most troublesome disease, as well as the most fatal, was the consumption” (Hippocrates 1923,
XIII). This fatal scourge is brought on by “spring…the worst enemy.” The Greek location of the
“enemy”—the cause—of phthisis in qualities of the air determined by seasonal shifts placed it
outside of the reach of both physician intervention—the “art of medicine”—and individual
regimen: for the Greeks, human willpower, be it medicine or discipline, could not cure
consumption. 3
The ebb and flow of consumption is further determined by the “crisis day.” The “crisis
day,” a convention of Hippocratic medicine, attributes a natural, predictable, yet largely
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Yet where seasonal qualities catalyzed epidemics of consumption, they could also bring the mitigation of disease:
“And it seems to me natural that the coming on of summer should have been helpful. For the coming of winter
resolves the disease of summer, and the coming on of summer removes those of winter” (Hippocrates 1923, XV).
Spring acts as an “enemy,” promulgating consumption; winter and summer are accorded the capability to
“resolve” and “remove” those traces of disease that remain. Seasons, with their accompanying weather patterns,
are the waxing and waning of the epidemic disease process: given the general explanation of all types of phthisis
leading to eventual death, the observation of the “resolve” of the disease suggests remission rather than outright
cure or eradication.
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uncontrollable rhythm to diseases. On certain “fixed dates,” laid out in detail by the
Hippocratic author, the intensity of the sickness is expected to peak. On such days, the internal
suffering of the individual becomes exacerbated by an external crisis—the ravaging drama of
weather and disease—as consumption wreaks its havoc inside the body. The potential for
physician intervention is minimal—he can anticipate these days and “be attentive” to crises that
occur without warning on non-crises days; but primarily, he and the patient must weather the
storm (Hippocrates 1923, XXVI).
The physicality of the disease inside the body—the humoral descending of an excess of
phlegm from the head to the lungs and the corresponding rot of the humor—thus seems
secondary to the external forces: the determining forces of season/weather, and crisis/intensity.
Yet, importantly, both internal transformations and external forces acting upon the body are
described similarly to the extent that they operate as limitations on human mastery and
individual willpower. While those forms of disease caused by regimen are treatable, even
curable, through physician prescribed and individually pursued changes in regimen, the
Hippocratic epidemic, generally, and consumption, specifically, materialize as diseases that
cannot be subjected to human will—the Greek consumptive can do little to help him or herself;
he or she cannot choose to be healthy in the face of natural limitations on the human mastery
of phthisis.
Lawrence Flick’s crusade to cure and eradicate tuberculosis thus emerges, in the late19th-century, as a distinct challenge to the Greek medical production of the disease as a
categorically incurable force of nature. Where Flick claimed that previous human incarnations
of science and medicine had lacked the knowledge, and thus contributed to an “unwitting”
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allowance of the disease to spread, he does not reckon with an important facet of the Greek
production of the constellation of human will, medical expertise, and the nature of disease:
humans were, in spite of their knowledge, technology, and willpower, simply incapable of
controlling some natural forces. This reckoning bears on the underlying production—in
discourses and practices of the treatment of phthisis—of the interaction between humans and
nature: for the Greeks, humans remained subjects of consumption. Flick and his
contemporaries, in pursuing the cure and eradication of tuberculosis in the late 19th century,
would produce an inversion in this relationship as tuberculosis would increasingly be seen as
subject to human willpower. Over the intervening fifteen hundred years, the consumption of
the Greeks would be remade from an epidemic disease to a disease of regimen—from an
uncontrollable-external-force-of-nature to an internal parasite that could be starved by sick
individuals, helping themselves, cultivating immunity through the application of individual
willpower to the pursuit of a disciplined set of habits.
This re-making takes shapes through the shifting materiality of the disease. In Flick’s
late-19th century, this materiality was constituted by an increasingly microscopic knowledge of
the nature of tuberculosis, generated within the bacteriological laboratory. The bacteriological
re-making of tuberculosis as a disease of regimen was constituted by changes in the very
physicality of the disease: an increased identification of the disease as a product of the
pathological material known as the tubercle and the microbe, the tubercle bacillus. Where the
Greeks had identified the tubercle, the linking of this entity with consumption did not occur
with any certainty until the 17th century when physicians, aided by the mainstreaming of
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autopsy, increasingly looked toward internal bodily material and processes in an effort to
specify the etiology of tuberculosis.
From Climate to Tubercle: The Emergence of the Self-Governing Consumptive
The Greek production of consumption as a force of external nature—the weather,
seasons, air—would reappear in various guises over the next 1500 years. For much of the 19th
century, Western physicians viewed miasmas—“bad air”—as the cause of the disease. In both
Europe and the United States, climate was invoked as both a potential aggravator of and
remedy to consumption. Well into the early 20th century, many physicians maintained that the
tubercular benefitted from dry climates and access to clean air. Flick traveled from
Pennsylvania to the Western United States—a primary destination for those seeking a
climatological cure to tuberculosis—in the early 1880s in search of precisely such air and such a
climate to rid him of his sickness (Bates 1992).
Failing to find his cure in the reputedly good air of the Southwest and California, he
returned to his father’s farm in Carolltown, Pennsylvania where he overcame the disease.
Convinced that the emphasis on climate as a cure was overblown, he would, in the coming
decade, forge his “crusade” against the disease in opposition to those physicians who held onto
the belief that bad air was a determining if not the most determinative factor in the onset of
the disease. Rather than sending sick Philadelphians west for a cure, Flick’s interest lay in
treating the sick in clinics and sanitaria in Pennsylvania, and prescribing regimens to enable
individuals to manage the internal tissue of their bodies.
While he was seeking his cure in the western United States, histologists cast their lenses
toward this internal tissue and, more specifically, to the pathological tissue affected by the
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tubercular process, to study its structure beneath the microscope. In December of 1880 and
January of 1881, M. Jaccoud, Professor of the Ecole de Medecine, Paris, a recognized authority
on consumption of the lungs, lectured on his belief in the curability of tuberculosis. Evoking
the work of the histologist Grancher, Jaccoud writes of the formers’ observation of the
“frequency of a healing process which can arrest the development of tubercle at any moment of its
evolution, and whether of large or small size…transform it into an innocuous product having
thenceforth no action upon the organism or neighboring parts” (Jaccoud 1885, 14. Italics
added.). This late-19th century-medical-movement into the human tissue of the tubercular body
was accompanied by the positing of an empirically observable “healing process” born of the
“arrest[ing]” of the material development of the tubercle and neutralizing of its pathological
qualities. This new understanding of the interaction between the soil of human tissue and the
material tubercle stood in stark contrast to the fatalistic Greek elaboration of consumption as
external-natural force taking root through weather, air, and seasons: “spring…the worst enemy.”
And it was this scientific movement into the minutiae of human tissue that Flick would couple
with his own interest in tuberculosis to proffer a vision of sick individuals wittingly cultivating
tissue that would provide immunity to the disease.
Flick notes this significant change in medical understandings of the nature of the
disease: “In ancient times [physicians] knew relatively little about the changes in the tissues set
up by the disease and [they] did not even dream that changes might be set up in the tissues of a
human being by a living thing which came into the organism from without and which had the
power of producing in its own body a poison so intense that it could destroy life” (Flick 1925).
It was precisely the identification of these “changes in tissue”—changes in the material state of
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the tubercle—and the corresponding production of the individual as capable of “arrest[ing] the
development of tubercle…transform[ing] it into an innocuous product” (2) that would set the
stage for Flick’s contention that the sick, through cultivation of proper-internal-bodily soil,
should be capable of helping themselves in matters of health and sickness.
Yet this move would not come without debate. The linking of the materiality of the
disease—the tubercle—with a potential “healing process” sits within a more long-standing
Enlightenment debate in the history of the study of tuberculosis: while physicians from the 17thcentury on recognized a “healing process,” the source of the bodies capacity to arrest the
tubercle was debated. Was it some force of nature that caused tubercles to end their
pathological assault? Or was it what physicians referred to as “the art of medicine” and the
willpower of the sick individual that arrested the tubercle?
Autopsy and the Self-Governing Individual: The Re-Making of The Tubercle
The movement away from notions of seasonal changes and imbalanced humors as
causes of consumption to an internal material cause—the tubercle—was catalyzed by the
technology of human autopsy. The scholars and physicians responsible for the Hippocratic
texts produced their knowledge of phthisis and the pathological body through minimal
autopsy. They were the product of a moment defined by a general Greek distaste for human
dissection; a distaste born of cultural views on the state of the body and soul after death. The
mutilation of the body threatened the ability of the spirit to “participate in an afterlife”
(Prayson 2007, 31). Damaging the human body “impeded a peaceful death” (Arikha 2007, 19).
Beyond this broad cultural resistance to autopsy, some of the more pragmatic physicians
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opposed the practice on the grounds that knowledge of dead bodies could not adequately
substitute for knowledge of live bodies. (Lloyd 2006, 119). 4
In the absence of consistent human autopsies, animal dissection served as one means
of producing knowledge about the internality of bodies. Aristotle, whose philosophy was woven
with anatomy, performed “countless dissection on animals” (Arikha 2007, 19); similarly, Galen
of Pergamum, the famous Greek physician and elaborator of the humoral system of disease,
strongly influenced Western medicine by using animal dissection—particularly the autopsy of
apes—to establish, by analogy, the anatomy and physiology of the human body (Lloyd 1973,
119). Galen, in spite of his lack of access to human bodies, nevertheless managed to forge the
idea that postmortem symptoms of illness and disease are mirrored in the “affected part of the
deceased” (Prayson 2007, 33). This notion that the material of the deceased human body could
yield knowledge about disease processes in the living would provide the framework for the 16th
and 17th century elaboration of modern human anatomy and pathology.
The medical sphere in the Renaissance was constituted by the detailing of the internal
body through the “dissecting of bodies of dead patients” (Dubos 1952, 72). Cultural
acceptance of autopsy was increasing as evidenced in 16th century medical schools requiring
that students perform dissections of dead human bodies. Vesalius’ 1543 publication of his
famous De Humani Corporis Fabrica Libri Septem (The Seven Books on the Structure of the Human
Body) supplanted Galen’s fifteen-century-reign over anatomy (Vesalius 1998). His “accurate
documentation of human anatomy” challenged the human body of Galen’s texts—a body based
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The ancient Roman city of Alexandria permitted the practice even as the surrounding Empire did not
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upon the observation of animal anatomy. In addition to the elaboration of a standard human
body, the Fabrica contains “an early cataloguing of pathological processes” (Prayson 2007, 34).
In this context, physicians began to add to this “early cataloguing” by producing
detailed studies of dead tubercular bodies—studies that both drew from empirical observation
of dead bodies and used Galenic humoral theory to explain the pathological matter they
encountered. In the 17th century “at autopsies, now becoming more numerous, small, hard
nodules were discovered in various tissues, which were called tubercles” (Brown 1941, 11). This
increased isolation and study of the tubercle and its habits led to conjecture on the relationship
between this form of matter and the onset of consumption. Though the precise development
of these tubercles was still being determined, physicians began to notice their repeated
appearance in cases of phthisical pathology: the small, hard nodules were present in all dead
consumptive bodies. 5
The Tubercle as Cause of Consumption
Franciscus Sylvius (1614-1672) used his findings at autopsies to speculate on the
relationship between tubercle and phthisis. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, he was one
of a number of physicians who produced post-mortem knowledge about the dynamic quality of
the tubercle—its capacity to soften and suppurate. 6 Drawing his insights from empirical
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The wielding of the anatomical knife and the observation of dead bodies on the table were increasingly written
up and these written records came to constitute this new knowledge of the tubercle in the human body. This new
knowledge produced by autopsy benefited by the increased print circulation of medical observations amongst
physicians—those who wrote on their observations of the pathologized dead body also engaged in those dissections
reported by others.
6
Hippocratic writing on the changing state of matter of the tubercle establishes what will become a recurrent
theme in the discussion of a “healing process” related to tuberculosis: namely the observation of the varying
capacities of both “nature” and the “art of medicine” to intervene in the changing state of the tubercle.
The Hippocratic texts identify the tubercle as resulting from an imbalance in bodily phlegm or bile and the
subsequent rotting of these humors. Once the tubercle has formed within the body, it evidences the capacity to
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observation in numerous “anatomical dissection[s],” Sylvius characterizes this transformation
as such: “I found more than once, large and small tubercles in the lungs, which during
anatomical dissection, showed pus. I believe that these tubercles later become purulent and I
maintain that cavities form from them, they being closed by a thin membrane. From these, I
maintain, phthisis often originates” (Castiglioni 1933, 30-31). Where the Greeks and Romans

assume varying states: soft, hard, rupturing. The author then links the presence of this tubercle to the symptoms of
the patient: “so long as this remains hard it produces a light pain and dry cough”; here, the author begins to
address something about the quality of the tubercle that will ultimately bear on 19th century perceptions regarding the
curability of the disease: here, the tubercle “remains hard”; but, as the author notes, this form of pathological matter
also has the capacity to change its states, becoming softer: “but when it has ripened, the pain becomes quite acute
both in front and in the back and heat and a severe cough seize the patient”; not only does the tubercle possess
the capacity to change its state, but here, the author notes that the softening—this ripening—changes the quality of
the pain: the patient’s discomfort is no longer “light”; now it is “quite acute” and the cough, “severe.”
The achievement of this change in the material state of the tubercle—to “mature,” to “ripen” from hard to soft,
to “rupture” into pus—occurs, according to this Hippocratic physician, through two methods: 1. “spontaneously”;
or 2. “through the application of remedies.” (Flick 1925, 16). The Hippocratic author links this changing material
state of the tubercle to the patient’s capacity for recovery. So long as the change from hardness, to softness, to pus
occurs 1. in a “prompt” manner, and 2. so long as this change is accompanied by “the pus find[ing] a way out”
through expectoration, and 3. so long as “the cavity which the pus has formed contracts and dries up,” then the
sufferer “get completely well” (15-16).
Here, then, the “healing process” can occur through an act of nature—“spontaneously”—or physician
intervention—“through the application of remedies.” Yet the will of the patient—his or her capacity to bring about
changes in the tubercle—does not shape this process; the patient remains secondary to the shifting materiality of
the tubercle
Furthermore, this promptness in the change of state of the tubercle does not guarantee recovery: the precise
manner in which the tubercle changes state determines the patient’s capacity for overcoming the condition. If the
cavity fails to “dry up completely” and if “the tubercle furnishes pus on its own”—as opposed to producing pus as a
result of physician intervention, “the case is fatal.” The writer attributes this failure to numerous material
circumstances: the rotting state of the phlegm; the subsequent spitting of pus; “the looseness of bowls”; the closing
of “all the veins of his body.” He then offers the following: the fatally occurs due to “the duration of the disease,
the severity of it, the virulence of it in the beginning and the complications which have arisen.”
The Hippocratic author does carve out a niche for the “art of medicine” in intervening in the changing state
of the tubercle. Yet even if the physician facilitates the prompt rupture of the tubercle, the further conditions—the
expulsion of pus from the body and the drying of the cavity left behind—must take shape as well. In the Greek
treatment of tubercle, the capacity for the physician to craft a cure exists—but in a severely circumscribed manner.
What is circumscribing the potential of the physician to cure the condition? The patient does not get in the way;
in fact, the patient appears as relatively incidental to the changing state of matter of the tubercle. It is the disease
itself that seems to largely dictate the conditions: death form the tubercle is attributable to something largely
beyond human control—to a humoral imbalance that materializes in the excess of phlegm or bile that rots and
produces this form of matter known as the tubercle.
In Hippocratic writing on the tubercle, the capacity of the individual seems ignored, if not dismissed. The
seeds of such a shift are sown on the 17th century autopsy table; yet even this nascent focus on the interaction
between the tubercle and the self-governing individual that appears, most robustly, in the work of Richard
Morton, maintains a sense of limitation on the human capacity to master tuberculosis.
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recognized cavities in the body, Sylvius used autopsy to draw a consistent link between
tubercles and the cavities in the dead bodies of those individuals who exhibited phthisical
symptoms in life (30-31). 7
The tubercle and the ulcers and cavities it produced were increasingly recognized as
“occur[ing] in all sizes and exhibit[ing] many varied characteristics. Tubercles could be hard as
cartilage, as bone, or even appear to be made of chalk. In other cases they contained pus-like
material of different degrees of softness—‘like suet or like honey’” (Dubos 1952, 73). While
such observations were not distinctly different from the Greeks who also observed the capacity
of the tubercle to be soft, hard, or in a state of rupture, this data on the dynamic tendencies of
the tubercle, gathered over the autopsy table, begins to articulate, in the work of Richard
Morton, with his insight that is seems possible to “arrest the development of tubercle at any
moment of its evolution” (Jaccoud 1885, 14).
To the extent that tubercles were present in all cases of phthisis, and to the extent that
the form of this devastating nonhuman entity could be influenced, the possibility of human
intervention in the tubercular process—the intervention of the art of medicine and the will of
the sick individual—surfaced. In Morton’s 17th century recording of his observations of
tubercles on the autopsy table in his well-known tome, Phthisiologia (Morton 1694), he
elaborates on the treatment of consumption through intervention in the “development of
tubercles” by theorizing a place for both “nature” and “art,”—both the capacity for spontaneous
7

Note that historians of tuberculosis contend that Antoine Portal was the first physician to unequivocally state the
tubercle as the cause of consumption. Antoine Portal conducted autopsies and practiced medicine at the turn of the
19th century. ““With what facts…could one speak better than with the riches which I found in my possession! I
would seek the benefit of opening bodies to learn the nature of this disease...I would not be afraid to consult
death to learn how to prolong life; and what light would not be shed on the nature of our disease by anatomical
research?”” (quoted in Flick 1925, 257).

63

healing and for healing through an individual's art of self-government—in bringing about the
“arrest” of the disease. The re-making of the materiality of the disease and the identification of
the dynamism of the physicality of the tubercle would simultaneously re-work the willpower of
individuals through the emergent possibility of individuals influencing the state of the tubercle
by practicing proper habits and cultivating immunity.
Richard Morton and The Vanishing Tubercle
Where the Greeks located phthisis primarily in relation to the lungs, Richard Morton
treats consumption as a disease of the “whole habit of the body.” He reveals an indebtedness to
the Hippocratic authors and to Galen in using the humoral theory to deduce certain qualities
of consumption, including the physicality of the tubercle. He explains the material of the
tubercle through reference to an imbalance of bodily fluid—here, an excess of blood (Webb
1936, 61); and he claims that this humoral imbalance—the “run[ing] off” and wasting of
necessary humors—results “either by nature or art” (Flick 1925, 91). I will continue to develop
Morton’s tendency to contrast “nature” with “art” as his distinction bears on the making of the
individual.
Morton compliments his humoral-based inquiries with autopsies that allow him to
investigate the materiality of the tubercles in the bodies of dead consumptives. In observing
autopsied bodies, Morton muses on the tendency for tubercles to “vanish.” He writes, in the
following passage, of the tubercles as “swellings”: “[W]ithout doubt the breeding of these
swellings is so frequent and common, that a consumption of the lungs would necessarily be the
common plague of mankind, if those swellings did not vanish or were not removed by art, as
easily as they are bred at first” (quoted in Webb 1936, 60). Morton thus suggests the possibility
64

that pulmonary consumption would be even more deadly if not for some arresting of the
process of tubercle formation. He suggests two potential agents in this arresting: the tubercle
can vanish” by some act of nature, or else, it can be “removed” through human endeavor—“by
art.”
Morton offers a nascent sketch of the articulation between the material state of the
tubercle and the corresponding capacity for “nature” and “art” to effect a cure. In autopsying a
young patient named Mr. Davison, Morton reports on having opened the body, finding, “all
the lobes of the Lungs here and there bespattered with Tubercles of a various magnitude; some
that were small and newly bred; others that were inflamed and exulcerated, containing in them
a purulent matter that was of the consistency of Honey. This I took to be…Consumption of the
second sort; that is, Hot and active” (quoted in Cummins 1949, 44).
Morton thus differentiates between types of tubercles—those “small and newly bred”
and those “inflamed and exulcerated.” He focuses on this latter type, noting the honey-like pus
within them. He then equates this inflamed tubercle with phthisis “of the second sort.” Hence,
we see here, Morton’s relating of a particular stage in the “development of tubercles” in
Davison’s body to a particular type of phthisis. This “Hot and active” expression of the disease
is, according to Morton, an instance of acute consumption as opposed to a more chronic form
of the disease that he has also observed.
The acute form of the disease, produced by a tubercle that has assumed a “hot” and
“inflamed” state cannot be cured. Morton claims that once “those tubercles, growing very
large, begin to be inflamed and to turn into apostemes,” the breaking of these apostemes—these
“bags”—produces the pathological matter that proceeds to tickle the windpipe, yielding a
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constant cough. Once this stage has been reached, Morton suggests “the patient [cannot] be
ever freed from this cough by any art till death effectually stops it” (quoted in Flick 1925, 105.
Italics added). Here, the acute form of the disease acts like the epidemic consumption of the
Greeks, thwarting the capacity of “art”—the willful effort of the physician or the patient—to
intervene.
This bleak prognosis is contrasted with his cautiously optimistic understanding of the
chronic form of the disease—a form that emerges when the “Matter” of the tubercle “is
concocted and hardened into a chalky or steatomatous substance.” In this state, the tubercles
are not hot and “they are very slow and almost insensible” in turning into pus. He thus relates
the specific-material-form of the tubercle—the inflamed or the hardened—to the type of
consumption that results (Cummins 1949, 44). Importantly, in linking this “concocted and
hardened” tubercle to the manifestation of this chronic consumption, the possibility of curing the
disease takes shape through attention to the quality of the tubercle. According to Morton, there is
hope for those suffering from the chronic form: those living sufferers harboring the hardened
tubercles “may be preserved from any dangerous and Fatal effects” (quoted in Cummins 1949,
44).
In linking the state of the tubercle to an acute or chronic stage of the disease, and in
seeing a potential for a cure in the chronic form of the disease, Morton begins to depart from
the Hippocratic understanding of consumption as an incurable epidemic. He observes that the
chronic consumption that results from those hardened tubercles that slowly turn to pus is not
necessarily lethal: “These people may be preserved from any dangerous and Fatal effects even
without Physic” (quoted in Cummins 1949, 44). Here, then, Morton identifies the possibility
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of recovery from the disease without medicine—without “Physic”—in chronic cases. He thus
evokes the possibility of “nature” affecting a cure in suggesting that “people may be preserved”
without the hand of the physician. Yet his observation is ambiguous enough to suggest that
they might also be cured with the art of medicine.
Importantly, Morton’s understanding of the disease—and more specifically, with the
shifting pathological matter of the tubercle—reveals his overall caution toward the attribution
of too much agency to art—to the skill and willpower of the physician and sick individual—in
curing the disease. Morton’s consumption remains a force of nature, akin to the Greek
phthisis, confronting individual willpower with limitations. Yet he begins to open up this
medical conversation—why and how do tubercles “vanish”?—by suggesting that phthisis is,
partially, a disease of regimen. Hence consumption, in the work of Morton, is partially subject
to the “art” of the physician’s skillful prescription of regimes of behaviors and the concomitant
art of self-governing as pursued by sick individuals. He specifies this pursuit—this regime of selfcare—as the “government of the patient” (quoted in Webb 1936, 63).
Morton claims that a “skillful physician” will recognize a prescription of a regime of
self-care as equally important to the prescription of “medicines”: “a skillful physician ought in
this distemper to give directions about the air, eating and drinking, the passion of the mind,
and the other things which belong to the government of the patient, with as much care as
about the medicines. For without a careful ordering, and a cautious use of them, the most
notable remedies signify nothing in the cure of consumption.” The “cure of consumption” lies,
then, for Morton, in the care of the physician in “ordering” the habits of the consumptive,
and, as he will elaborate on below, in the consumptive’s “cautious use,” or hewing, to such a
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regimen. The “government of the patient,” in Morton's words, thus involves the “skillful”
intervention of physicians and of the care of the sick individual in disciplining him or herself.
Yet again, Morton is cautious, as he argues that this government is not a certain cure;
rather, such regimens are not so much cures as they are preventative measures against the disease:
Therefore in the preventing of a Consumption (which is very much easier than the cure
of it) [the important approach is] to take all possible care that no error be committed in
those six things that we call “non-natural.” For in this so slippery a state of Health they
are wont, upon every little occasion to fall headlong, into a Fatal Consumption. As, for
example, they ought to be prudent in choosing their Meat and Drink that the Chylous
may be made to abound with good juice and that the Nourishment may create very
little trouble to Nature in digesting and dispensing with it. (quoted in Cummins 1949,
37)
Morton continues, enumerating, in addition to diet, the five other practices where individuals
must exercise prudence if he or she is to avoid “fall[ing] headlong” into consumption: getting
enough sleep and establishing proper sleeping patterns; “moderate exercise; avoidance of
“strong Purges”; the avoidance of worrying (38); and the pursuit of adequate fresh air (37-38).
Hence, Morton’s program for treating consumption is one of prevention: through a
combination of the art of medicine and the art of self-government, individuals can discipline
their body so as to aid themselves in preventing the disease altogether, or in mitigating the
chances of its recurrence by cultivating, with foresight, a regimen of conduct based upon the
avoidance of “non-natural” behavior and, thus, a “slippery state of health.”
Ultimately, Morton concedes that even this approach is beset by limitations. The
chronic quality of the disease—and its tendency to go into periods of remission only to
virulently remerge—makes such self-care a Herculean effort. In explaining the role of selfgovernment, Morton notes that consumption presents a problem to the extent that the disease
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will linger in spite of the appearance of its having been cured: “Every consumption, though it
be cured, is apt to return” (quoted in Webb 1936, 62). Such regular government of habit is
thus required even when it would seem that an individual has gotten better so as to maintain a
check on the aptness of the tubercles to linger and develop even after having gone into a state
of remission. Morton writes, “even after the most perfect cure of a consumption, there is
reason to suspect that there are some crude tubercles yet remaining, which at length may, by
often meeting with an occasion, be inflamed, and ripen into “aposthemes,” and so become
ulcers” (quoted in Webb 1936, 32). Once an individual has been afflicted, the lingering
tubercle, with its capacity to change its state, to inflame, to ripen, to suppurate remains a
perpetual threat. This quality—the capacity of the disease to return, even after a cure—places an
extra burden on individual vigilance, for “he that has once been in a consumption, unless he
governs himself very regularly, falls back into the same condition” (quoted in Webb 1936, 32
Italics added). Hence the proclivity of consumption to act chronically hails the sick into a longterm relationship with the tubercles in their bodies—a relationship of vigilant self-government
in an effort to avoid a recurrence of “the same condition.” The materiality of the tubercle—its
dynamism—and its ingenuity—its capacity to remain alive even as patients were engaged in anticonsumptive habits, was productive, in the work of Morton, of individuals as capable, through
the exercise of discipline and willpower, of disease mitigation. Yet, in contrast to Flick's
proclamation of a cure for the disease, for Morton, such mitigation has limited effectiveness in
the face of the chronic proclivity of consumption.
Even in light of his reflections on the role of self-government in reducing suffering, if
not preventing the disease, he is careful, if not fatalistic when speaking of limitations in the
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face of the capacity of these tubercles—these glandular “swellings”—to remain a threat. Morton
writes, “when I consider myself how often in one year there is cause enough ministered for
producing these Swellings [of the lungs in consumptives], even to those that are wont to observe the
strictest Rules of Living, I cannot sufficiently admire that any one, at least after he comes to the
Flower of his Youth, can die without a touch of Consumption” (quoted in Cummins 1949, 41
Italics added). Here, Morton does not claim that all die of the disease, but he is rather
pessimistic about self-government—“the strictest Rules of Living”— as a means of entirely
eliminating tubercles, and thus the lurking danger of consumption. Morton’s consumptive
individual thus emerges as a prudent manager of his or her long-term health—caught in a
constant, vigilant struggle to adhere to an art of self-government that will arrest the tubercle; an
exercise of willpower that might extend the life of the sick, but one that will not cure or
eradicate the disease entirely.
In spite of Morton’s caution in positing limitations to the will of physicians and
individuals in curing the disease, his sensitivity to the various forms of matter assumed by the
tubercle, as observed through autopsy, provided him with an empirical foundation upon which
to think through the disease as mutable—its physicality capable of being arrested, reversed,
made to vanish. While he is unequivocal about the capacity of “nature” to make the tubercle
vanish, he remains cautious about the degree to which the habit of the pathological body—the
tubercle-infested tissue—will follow the habit of the individual under supervision of the art of
medicine. 8

8

Morton routinely refers to the “whole habit of the body” to describe human physiology as an interlocking
system. This invocation of the physiological functions as a system of habits will take on increasing importance in
his discussion of the relationship between individual conduct and the formation of tubercles in the consumptive
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By the late 19th century, in the work of Flick and other physicians, this co-production of
the materiality of tuberculosis and the willpower of the individual was predicated upon the
formulation of modern medical science as an enterprise that, in the field of medicine, broadly,
and tuberculosis treatment, specifically, knew no limitations. Modern medicine and public
health, through the anti-tuberculosis “crusade” of the 1890s, would begin to profess and pursue
a sentiment, familiar throughout the 20th century: given the appropriate human endeavors—the
requisite medical research and technology, resources and means for treatment, and the witting
participation of the patient—diseases could be eliminated. Flick and his peers would, without
the hesitations of Morton, remove the “art of nature” from the equation, locating the capacity
to “arrest the development of tubercles” squarely within the space of clinic in the interaction
between physician and patient: in the interaction between the “art of medicine” and the selfgoverning capacity of the individual. This move would underscore much of the late 19th
century remaking of tubercular individuals as sowers of their own health—not only capable of,
but responsible for helping themselves.
An Internal Disease With No External Symptoms: The Clinical Need for Early Diagnosis
The autopsy had allowed for the production of knowledge about both the internal body
of dead tubercular subjects and the tubercle—a form of dynamic pathological matter
increasingly associated with the severity of the disease. Yet such knowledge, from the
perspective of Flick and other historians of the disease, proved limiting: autopsies afforded no
knowledge of the tubercular body in life (1925, 260). Methods to gauge the state of the tubercle
in the bodies of patients—the identification of the early stages of the development of the
body: through the self-government of one’s habits, the individual will manifest agency in governing the “habit of
the body” as well.
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tubercle—remained elusive. Even if the disease could be prevented or mitigated through strict
self-government, the physician was at a loss in identifying the presence of the tubercle when it
was new to the body and, as yet, a minor threat. Morton and his contemporaries gestured
toward the importance of early diagnosis but they “knew clinically only a late stage of the
disease” (Brown 1941, 13). Hence, much of the clinical attention given to consumptives prior
to the 19th century was administered to those suffering from an advanced stage of the disease
and thus, fated to die. The prognosis for enlisting the art of medicine to bring about the
vanishing of well-established-tubercles remained bleak.
The famous 17th century physician and friend of John Locke, Thomas Sydenham
posited that a bleak “two thirds of the patients with phthisis died” (14). Gaspard Larent Bayle,
working at the turn of the 17th century, only to die young of tuberculosis himself, “thought
phthisis absolutely incurable” (14). As late as 1815, the English physician and scientist Thomas
Young assessed the grim prospect of recovery from consumption claiming that “Not one
patient in a thousand recovers without assistance…and with all known assistance only one in a
hundred recovers” (14). Young, himself, was one of those lucky one in a hundred.
Morton’s Rules of Living as elaborated in the Phtishiologica called for prudence—for the
foresight of physicians in prescribing regimens and the foresight of patients in governing their
bodies so as to achieve the state of health necessary to arrest the disease: prudence as a means
of prevention. Yet the difficulty of detecting the disease produced a corresponding limitation
on prudence—a limitation noted a century before Morton in Machiavelli’s The Prince:
The Roman on this occasion did what ought to be done by every wise prince, whose
duty it is not only to provide a remedy for present evils, but at the same time anticipate
such as are likely to happen; by forseeing them at a distance, they are easily remedied;
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but if we wait till they have surrounded us, the time is past, and the malady is become
incurable. It happens then as it does to physicians in the cure of consumption, which
in the commencement is easy to cure, and difficult to understand; but when it has
neither been discovered in due time, or treated upon a proper principle, it becomes
easy to understand, and difficult to cure. The same thing happens in state affairs, by
forseeing them at a distance, which is only done by men of talents, the evils which
might arise form them are soon cured; but when, form want of foresight, they are
suffered to increase to such a height that they are perceptible to everyone, there is no
longer any remedy (9-10)
Machiavelli’s comparison of the prince's governing of a state—“state affairs”—and the physicians
governing of consumption, takes shape through the practice of foresight, thus articulating with
Morton’s linking of the practice of prudence with the art of self-government. And the author
of The Prince, in assessing the downside of failing to identify consumption in its early stages,
underscores the cautionary tone of Morton’s explication of self-government: even if the disease
was treatable through strict self-government and observation of the “Rules of Living,” the
physician and patient were at a loss in identifying the presence of the tubercle when it was new
to the body. This incapacity to foresee the “disease at a distance” made Morton’s goal of
prevention difficult to attain.
Indeed, part of the difficulty or slipperiness of the disease—what Flick termed its
“protean nature”—emerged from physician and patient confusion in identifying the onset of
the disease. From a late 19th century perspective, diagnosing tuberculosis through the
observation of symptoms proved misleading, for these “subjective conditions” failed to paint a
portrait of the entire course of the disease. In optimistically arguing that the disease was
curable and in advocating new methods of prevention and treatment of tuberculosis, Flick
would touch on the tendency of tuberculosis to fool both physicians and patients through this
its capacity to exist and develop internally without manifesting externally: “tubercles could exist
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before symptoms” (Brown 1941, 17). While coughs were often an indication of the early stages
of the disease, if a physician assumed that every patient who had a cough was a consumptive,
they would often be in error and thus waste time and energy treating a condition that was not
there.
To the extent that the disease remained incurable, but theoretically preventable,
physicians were mired in clinical-diagnostic-deficiencies catalyzed by the ambiguity of patient
symptoms, and the confusing tendency of the disease to ebb and flow through chronic and
acute phases. The clinical capacity to discern the development of the disease in the patient
through the collection of “physical evidence” could be used to corroborate the “subjective
symptoms”—and such physical evidence could aid physicians and patients in identifying the
disease in its early stages, approaching it with the necessary foresight to effect a regimen in the
hopes of a cure. 9 These diagnostic deficiencies would receive a boon in the early 19th century
with the innovations of Renee Laennec.
Hearing the Tubercle: Percussion, Auscultation, and the Stethoscope
In describing his perception of Renee Laennec’s contribution to the study of
tuberculosis, Flick writes of the French physician’s success in “looking beyond subjective
symptoms for physical evidence of disease in diagnosis” (Flick 1925, 359). Given that
consumption could exist without manifest symptoms, or with symptoms that appeared
indicative of other diseases, then physicians seeking to treat the disease needed a routine
9

Bayle’s work contributed to an early 19th century re-making of consumption, by broadening the study of the
disease to include those disease processes—like the formation of tubercles—that pre-existed manifest symptoms. He
recognized that “‘patients who are not yet subjected to fever, who are not losing weight, whose sputum is not
purulent, may yet be regarded as tuberculous; it is sufficient if the lungs have a lesion that tends to disorganize and
ulcerate them’” (quoted in Castiglioni 1933, 43). This highlighting of the presence of the tubercle in the body—the
lesion that threatens to ulcerate—as a condition of the disease, rather than a condition that preexists the disease,
constituted the new consumption: a disease of stages.
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clinical method of verifying the internal states of the body—a method to clarify potential
internal manifestations of pathological matter—the tubercle—and pathological tissue changes
inside the bodies of their patients. Through Laennec, the clinical diagnosis of tuberculosis took
on a new form—one geared toward the adoption, by the physician, of practices allowing for a
more “objective” diagnosis through the gleaning of “physical evidence of disease” in the bodies
of patients.
Working in the early 19th century, Laennec discerned the utility of a more accurate
clinical diagnosis in recognizing that “in opening dead bodies,” a multitude of instances of
disease were found that had been mistakenly “overlooked” while the patient was still living.
The challenge for medicine was the development of clinical methods to avoid overlooking
these pathological conditions in life. As such, he experimented with tapping and listening to
the chests of patients for evidence of internal pathology.
Laennec considered “percussion of the chest,” developed by the physician Auenbrugger
in 1761 10 to be “one of the most valuable discoveries with which medicine has even been
enriched” (quoted in Flick 1925, 359). The method enabled clinicians to diagnose abnormality
in the chest of patients by “knocking the human thorax” and assessing the “variation on
reverberating sounds” (173). Despite the utility of the percussive method, prior to Laennec, it
was not routinely used. He not only used Auenbrugger’s methods, he contributed to their
popularization by translating them into French. 11

10

The discovery was published in a “modest pamphlet” entitled “A New Discovery of Percussion of the Human
Chest for Detecting the Sings of Obscure Disease of the Chest Cavity.”
11
Despite the utility of the percussive method, prior to Laennec, it was not routinely used. He not only used
Auenbrugger’s methods, he contributed to their popularization by translating them into French.
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While employing Auenbrugger’s techniques in his practice, Laennec ran into a problem
in 1816, while examining a young woman “who presented general symptoms of heart disease”
(359). Accustomed to tapping on the chest and applying his ear to patients to examine the
acoustics of their chest cavity, Laennec found himself limited as both he and his patient
“objected to a human head being placed immediately on her breast” (Cummins 1949, 119).
Working off his knowledge of an “acoustic phenomenon”—that “if one applies the ear to the
end of a beam once can very distinctly hear the scratch of a pin at the other end”—he
improvised an instrument made out of a tightly rolled visit-card (quoted in Flick 1925, 359). He
placed one end of the paper cylinder on the area of his patient’s heart and placed the other
end to his ear: “‘I was quite surprised to find how satisfactorily I could hear the heart beats,
better, more clearly and more distinctly than I had ever done by immediate application of the
ear’” (359). With this insight and this rudimentary tool, Laennec achieved the first instance of
“mediate auscultation”; over the coming years, he would develop this tool into the stethoscope,
the commonplace modern clinical instrument for diagnosing pathologies of the chest. While
the discovery of the stethoscope is attributed to Laennec, it was thus made possible by the
presence of a woman's body, and both a medicalized and gendered code of conduct that
determined the appropriateness of contact between doctors and patients, women and men.
Importantly, Laennec would use percussion, auscultation, and the stethoscope to map
the changing state of the tubercle in the bodies of living patients. Experimenting with his
instrument “on the numerous chest cases that were gathered under his charge at Necker
[Hospital],” he began to identify consistent sounds that reflected specific conditions inside the
body—sounds that reflected the state of the development of the tubercle in the body of his
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patients. These sounds—this “physical evidence”—of the state of the tubercle took shape
through the application of the physician’s ear to the patient chest; the state of the tubercle
could be discerned through two methods. First, percussing—tapping—the patient’s chest area—
and listening to and gauging the resonance. Second, assessing the sound of the chest by
listening to patient coughs. When tubercles, still hard, would group together “at the apex of
the lung,” Laennec identified a “decrease in resonance” when percussing “over the clavicle.”
Similarly, hard tubercles “at the root of the lung and in the bronchial glands” produced
decreased resonance—the hard tubercle could be identified but what Laennec termed a “diffuse
bronchophony” (Flick 1925, 394).
A similar sound accompanied the softening of the tubercle. Yet the diffuse
bronchophony was accompanied by a second element—an indication of the softening—a
“rattling” apparent when listening to the chest as his patients coughed. With the increased
breaking down of the tubercle, “the rattling becomes more liquid, more like a mucous rale, and
the cough, having become cavernous, conveys the impression that an excavation has been made
in the tissue of the lung” (395). The movement, in the bodies of the living, from hard tubercle
to soft tubercle to the dangerous stage of “excavation”—when cavities began to form—could thus
be identified as the stages materialized into sound. With the “increasing spread of the cavity,”
the sound would shift to from the diffuse bronchophony to a “pectoriloquy” (394): the
emergent vomica—the pus-filled cavities—producing changes in the breathing, with a more
“cavernous” breathing taking shape relative to the size of the cavity.
Laennec’s clinical method for the diagnosing of the stage of the disease thus served as a
tool for taxonomizing the various states of the tubercle and the size of cavities in relation to the
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resonating of the body achieved through percussion and through auscultation. This allowed for
a sketch of the various stages of the disease—those early stages in which the tubercles were still
small and hard, and those advanced stages when the tubercles had suppurated, leaving cavities
behind—in the living human being. In the clinics of France, thanks to Laennec and the
appropriately modest woman he treated, the tubercle had been made to speak.
The Power of Nature and The Power of Art: The Tubercular Diathesis and The Limitations
on Medicine
This capacity to identify the material development of tuberculosis in the bodies of the
sick served, in Flick’s estimation, as a step forward in the movement toward a cure. By the late
19th century, the potential for intervention in the development of the material condition of the
tubercle would constitute the foundation of what Flick termed the “healing process.” And this
healing process would increasingly become medicalized through discourses of immunity and
individual responsibility. Both the healthy and the sick would be encouraged, by the antituberculosis movement, to cultivate tissue—a soil—that arrested the development of the
tubercle; a soil rich in those nutrients that retarded the tubercle; a soil that isolated the
tubercular matter, rendering it harmless within the body.
Yet the optimism of the late-19th century stood in contrast to that of Laennec and his
contemporaries. Laennec was cautious, even contradictory, in linking his work—and the art of
medicine—to the potential curing of the disease. While his clinical diagnostic methods had
made an inroads, in speculating on a cure, he leaned heavily on the capacity of the “power of
nature” to heal, while granting little agency to the “power of art”—to medicine. Laennec
claimed that “‘the possibility of curing phthisis in the first stage is an illusion’” (quoted in Flick
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1925, 384). He saw the initial deposit of tubercles as leading, inevitably, to consumption. He
expressed his belief in the limited role of medicine in slowing this inevitability: “‘Crude
tubercles tend essentially to enlarge and soften. It may be in the power of art to slow up their
development, to hold in check their rapid progress, but not to make them retrograde’” (quoted in
Flick 1925, 384; italics added). Hence, human intervention—here expressed as the “power of
[the] art” of medicine—is capable of retarding the tubercles tendency to “enlarge and soften”;
but it cannot reverse or cure the consumptive process.
Laennec continues, attempting to understand the capacity for physicians and sick
individuals to shape the consumptive disease process vis-a-vis the stage of the disease. He writes,
“‘But if it is impossible to cure phthisis in its first stage, a fairly large number of facts has
proven to me that in some cases a patient may get better after having tubercles in the lungs
which have softened and have formed an ulcerous cavity’” (quoted in Flick 1925, 384). Here,
Laennec’s positing of the potential for a patient to get better involves letting the tubercles run
their course—not retarding their development—resulting in softening and the formation of
cavities. Having largely dismissed the “power of art” to cure the disease in its first stage, he sees,
in this process of healing after suppuration, the work, not of physicians and sick individuals—
not of willpower—but, rather, of the “healing power of nature” (Flick 1925, 391).
Laennec explains this “power of nature” in producing a protective “membrane” around
the cavities: “‘in consumptives in whom the disease has existed for an extremely long time,
many years for example, one quite commonly finds some of the cavities empty or nearly empty
of tuberculous matter and completely lined by a semi-cartilaginous membrane.’” He explains
the “formation of the semi-cartilaginous membrane on the surface of tuberculous ulcers” “as
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an effort of nature to cure” (quoted in Flick 1925, 384). Laennec, reporting on autopsied
individuals who had experienced this lining of scar tissue—this formation of cicatrix—claims that
“‘[m]ost of the individuals, about whom I have spoken above, died of diseases which one in no
sense could attribute to [tuberculosis]. All had lived a more or less large number of years in a
state of fairly good health’” (quoted in Flick 1925, 385). Indeed, Laennec would claim that
“‘after their softening has produced an ulcerous cavity in the interior of the lung, recovery may
take place’” (quoted in Flick 1925, 390). Thus, in spite of Laennec’s innovations in the realm
of diagnostics—his improvement on methods of early detection—the physician, the practitioner
of the art of medicine, is largely incidental to the “healing process.” The tubercle is not
arrested, rather it is allowed to run its course; it is the “effort of nature” rather than art that
affords the individual “fairly good health.” As Laennec writes, “‘I have already shown that
recovery from pulmonary phthisis is not beyond the powers of nature; but I at the same time
confess that as yet art possesses no certain way of accomplishing this end’” (quoted in Flick 1925,
396; italics added). 12
Laennec’s dismissal of the role of the art of medicine in curing tuberculosis took shape
in a broader climate of biological determinism in French medicine—an “essentialist medicine”—
founded on the belief that disease in general (and tuberculosis in particular) was part of a
person’s biology—their essence (Barnes 1995, 27). He and his contemporaries largely subscribed

12

Laennec expressed a further concern—namely the capacity for individuals to develop “secondary eruptions of
tubercles” during or after the softening and suppuration of the initial tubercles. Hence in describing views on the
potential for a cure—on a cause for “‘hope…of real recovery or at least of a suspension of the symptoms”—he
suggests, rather pessimistically, that the “the patient can be restored to a condition of health sufficiently perfect to
enable him to perform the functions of civil life for many years before the development of the [secondary]
tubercles, still in a state of crudity, brings on a new and last attack of phthisis’” (quoted in Flick 1925, 392; italics
added).
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to a fatalism regarding consumption—a fatalism that took shape through the location of the
cause of tuberculosis in the temperament, in the character, in the biology of the sufferer: the
tubercular were destined to suffer by their constitutional predisposition—by what came to be
known as their tubercular diathesis: “the body’s proclivity to suffer from a particular type of
disease” (Haller 1981, 25).
An article entitled “Diathese,” authored by Pariset and Villeneuve and published in
1812 in the Dictionnaire des sciences medicales defined diathesis as “that state of the body which
makes it acquire certain disease” (Ackerknecht 1982, 321). Prominent French physicians
studying tuberculosis, including Bayle and Laennec, “adhere[d]…to this notion” of the body’s
inherent capacity to acquire disease (321)—Laennec claimed that “only the tuberculous
diathesis” caused the disease (Brown 1941, 18). 13 In this sense, physicians in the early-to-mid19th century reproduced consumption as a force of nature; yet in contrast to the external nature
of climate, bad air, and bad breath described by the Greeks, Laennec's phthisis was a product
of an internal nature, predisposed to be flawed.
This view on biological predisposition and tuberculosis is important to the extent that
it also constituted a clinical attitude and approach to treatment founded on the propensity of
certain types of bodies to acquire the disease; in other words, the tubercular diathesis, in
attributing the onset of the disease to predisposed types, left little room for the individual as
agent in preventing, avoiding, and helping him or herself to overcome tuberculosis. The sick
13

This view on tuberculosis as rooted in a “constitutional predisposition” (Barnes 1995) had a precedent in the
Greco-Roman medicine. In Epidemics I, one group suffering from consumption is described by the Hippocratic
author as being “‘predisposed to it by their constitution.’” (quoted in Flick 1925, 20). Galen translated the
humoral system into a taxonomy of biological “temperaments”; the use of Galenic temperament as a guide to
medical prognosis proved useful “[f]or more than 1500 years.” These temperaments or “krases” “play[ed] the role in
pathology that diathesis [and] constitutions” would assume in the early 19th century: attributing the cause of
disease to something innate in the biology of the sufferer (Ackerknecht 1982, 319).
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subject was subsumed by the natural tendency of the biologically predisposed body to “acquire”
the disease. The “powers of nature” to heal where checked by the even stronger “powers of
nature” to determine an individual’s biological susceptibility to tuberculosis. Wide-19th-century
cautiousness and skepticism regarding the role of medicine and the individual sufferer in
willfully retarding the break-down of the tubercle took shape through the tubercular diathesis—
through the medicalization of the predisposed biological tendency to be tubercular. 14 The will
of individuals—both physicians and the sick—was dwarfed, in Laennec's France, by
consumption as a force of nature.
When, in 1908, Flick claimed that a patient of his Henry Phipps Institute ought to be
“restored to a condition of health in which he can help himself” (Bates 1992,127), he had spent
twenty years locating himself within a socio-medical movement that he viewed as part of a
progressive-Western-medical narrative: medical science had moved beyond the conservative
proclamations of Laennec; beyond the hedging of Morton; beyond the insufficient knowledge
of the Greeks. In substituting the “power of art”—both the art of medicine, and the exercise of
individual will through an art of self-government—for the “power of nature,” Flick not only
argued that tuberculosis was curable and eradicable: he posited the sick individual as the
primary agent in the materialization of these goals. Flick’s notion of self thus took shape in
contrast to, and in refutation of the notion of diathesis.

14

By the late 19th century, the notion of a tubercular diathesis was reworked into discourses of heredity. While the
word “diathesis” was not as prominent, the underlying premise that consumption subjected those individuals who
were naturally predisposed was reworked to address the movement of disease in families: heredity was the method
of transmitting susceptibility (Ackerknecht 1982).
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He drew on Koch’s discovery of the microbial cause of tuberculosis—the tubercle
bacillus—to support his challenge to the notion of biological predisposition. 15 It was precisely
this challenge to two-thousand years of fatalism regarding the ravages of consumption that
allowed Flick to place the locus of responsibility for health and disease—for getting better—
within the individual sick subject. The late 19th century tubercular individual constituted
through Flick's anti-tuberculosis “crusade” would be an individual, no longer subject to the
forces of diseased nature; but rather, one capable of helping him or herself through the
cultivation of immunity—the nourishing of a bodily soil hostile to the disease—tissue capable of
denying the affinities of the newly discovered material cause of tuberculosis, the tubercle
bacillus. For Flick, the pursuit of individual immunity was the most important means of
combating the disease and it was through discourses and practices of immunity that the
individual would increasingly take shape as possessing a will capable of controlling, not only
physiological processes, but the quality of his or her own tissue and, as a result of such control,
control of tuberculosis. 16 And he addressed this pursuit using metaphors of soil and seed;
metaphors that emerged from the work of the bacteriological laboratory. Indeed, the very
language and practices of control of scientist over the bacillus, achieved in the bacteriological
laboratory, would translate, in the labor of Flick and the anti-tuberculosis movement, into
language and practices of individual control over the disease in the body.

15

Note that beyond the discovery of the bacillus, Koch and others had speculated on the contagious nature of
tuberculosis. Physicians and scientists in the last two decades of the 19th century began to explore and experiment,
in earnest, to establish that the disease was contagious—a movement I will take up in detail in Chapter 2.
16
Indeed, where most historians of tuberculosis characterize Laennec as having pronounced the disease incurable,
Flick sees the contradictions in his orientation toward a cure as evidence of Laennec’s optimism: “his great service
to humanity was the restoration of hope and confidence in the treatment of tuberculosis by putting the evidence
of its curability before the world in such a convincing way” (Flick 1925, 391).
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“A Certain Staining Procedure”: Robert Koch and The Scientific Production of Microbial
Affinities For Certain Colors
The laboratory discovery of the tubercle bacillus, in the early 1880s, articulated with an
emergent clinical understanding of bodily tissue as soil, and of the individual as sower of this
soil. Bacteriological practices—the experiments and experimental methods of Robert Koch—
designed to individualize and cultivate the material cause of tuberculosis, the tubercle bacillus,
constituted a broad traffic between the laboratory and the clinic. The individual as sower—as
witting cultivator of bodily health and immunity—took shape through the popularization of
this traffic.
On March 24, 1882, some three months before Lawrence Flick returned to his father’s
Pennsylvania farm in an attempt to recover from the Great White Plague, Robert Koch all but
brought his laboratory with him to lecture before the Physiological Society in Berlin. Beneath
the glimmer of yellow gas lights he had arranged “his microscopes, test tubes with cultures,
Erlenmeyer flasks, small square glass boxes containing cultures, [and] slips of dead human and
animal tissue preserved in alcohol” (Ryan 1992, 11). Flick, reflecting upon Koch, spoke of the
latter with a praise that is common to scientific history—a praise that assumes the progressive
nature of scientific discovery, heralding those individuals that add to the canon of scientific
knowledge as innovators, geniuses, fathers.
Poised to present a lecture entitled “On Tuberculosis,” Koch had divulged little in
advance to the public of the content of his talk. His audience of scientists, including the elder
Rudolph Virchow, a noted cellular pathologist, sat, listening to Koch’s slow, somewhat hesitant
speech as he patiently worked toward his conclusions—toward what would be seen as the
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groundbreaking news that he had “discovered” the tubercle bacillus, and proven it to be the germ
responsible for tuberculosis (Brock 1988, 128).
The tubercle bacillus took shape as an object of knowledge precisely because of Koch’s
unique use of laboratory materials. In presenting his discovery to his peers, the bulk of Koch’s
presentation was a precise description of his experimental method—the method through which
he had made visible this new form of “nature”; and the praise from scientists that would be
conferred upon Koch in the coming decades was largely founded on the perception that he was
innovative in his methods and in his manipulation of the conditions and instruments of the
laboratory.
This innovativeness, detailed in his demonstration of his conclusions in his May 24th
lecture, was preceded, in his laboratory, by failures that spread in blues, browns, and reds (Ryan
1992, 10-11). Using chemical dyes in an attempt to stain the microscopic bacillus, Koch, like
the broader Western scientific community, generally believed in the existence of an entity
responsible for tuberculosis—a microbial agent; yet he lacked experimental proof of its
existence.
Speculation on a type of microscopic matter responsible for tuberculosis emerged as
early as the 17th century in the writings of the physician Benjamin Marten. Marten had no
access to a microscope, but he knew of this new technology, and he proffered a theory of what
the eye, enhanced by such a tool, might find. For Marten, the cause of consumption was the
presence of animalcules—small animals. He proffered “some certain Species of Animalcula or
wonderfully minute living creatures that, by their peculiar Shape or Disagreeable Parts are
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inimical to our Nature; but, however, capable of subsisting in our Juices and Vessels” (quoted
in Cummins 1949, 57).
Marten’s thoughts on parasitic living matter “subsisting” on the human body was not
well received in his time. Indeed, it was not until the mid-19th century and the fermentation
experiments of Louis Pasteur that the notion of living matter, foreign to the human body,
began to assume a primary place in standard medical doctrine of disease etiology. Alongside
Pasteur’s demonstration of the microbial cause of disease—the underpinnings of the germ
theory—physicians set about theorizing and seeking out the specific germs responsible for
specific diseases. Tuberculosis was no exception.
Jean-Antoine Villemin (1827-1892), a French military surgeon, had pushed the
scientific discussion of tuberculosis toward the realm of microbes by suggesting that the disease
was brought on by a morbid agent—“‘an agent of determination’”—“‘a kind of germ destined to
play the role of provocative agent’” (quoted in Flick 1925, 587). Villemin’s germ and the
broader scientific interest in discovering agents of disease shifted the study of tuberculosis
etiology from belief in a cause that took shape spontaneously within an organism—a force of
nature—to the search for an external entity—a “foreign” germ—that found its way into the bodily
“economy” (Flick 1925, 587)(Brown 1941, 23). In shifting scientific inquiry toward this foreign
germ as “agent,” Villemin contributed to a late-19th century personification of disease: these germs
as agents had a quasi-human quality in their capacity to act—in their capacity to be the agents
responsible for bringing on the consumptive disease process.
Villemin’s personification of the disease bears on Koch’s work, for, first, as I show
below, the latter’s experiments would continue to contribute to this humanization and
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individualizing of the microbe. Secondly, the importance of Koch’s laboratory materials, and
his use of experimental method as a persuasive gesture in bringing his discovery of the tubercle
bacillus to light, owes much to a broader shift within the scientific-medical community
embodied by Villemin: the valorization of experimental data as the backbone of medical facts.
Where medical science had long debated the facts of bodies and disease through “dialectics
and quotations from the classics” (Castiglioni 1933, 25)—particularly the works of Hippocrates
and Galen—Villemin and his peers worked in a climate that valued reproducible experiments
to forge the facts of disease processes.
Villemin conducted a number of inoculation experiments, to establish that tuberculosis
was sown from the transference of foreign pathological material from one source to another.
Yet he fell short of isolating the specific microbe responsible for the disease—of making the
specific germ visible. This entity remained speculative, transparent, a non-entity: “But in vain
the scientist peered through his microscope,” writes Flick, reflecting on the work that preceded
Koch: “he could see nothing to which he could ascribe life or powers such as must be possessed
by an organic substance capable of producing the symptoms of tuberculosis. The trouble was
that he was looking right through the organism, for it was transparent” (Flick 1896, 640).
Thus, the problem confronting Koch as he presented his evidence to his peers on
March 24th, 1882, did not concern the existence of an organism responsible for tuberculosis;
rather, he faced the technical problem of how to turn a suspected “nonentity into an entity.”
The resolution, for Koch, required him to learn and cater to the “affinities,” the “preferences,”
the idiosyncratic desires of this evasive, as-yet-transparent microbe. This catering would take
shape in the laboratory through the development of a “certain staining procedure” designed to
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make visible the microbial cause of tuberculosis; and in doing so, Koch would give hope to
Flick’s anti-tuberculosis crusade: “The clue,” according to Flick, “of how to [eradicate
tuberculosis] came with Koch’s discovery of how to stain a microscopic organism (640).
Late 19th-Century Technologies and The Staining of the Tubercle Bacillus
Where Marten had no microscope to view his speculative animalcules, Koch’s
procedure would have been unthinkable without the 19th century commitment, in medical
science, to the new frontier of microscopic landscapes and minuscule bodies: “the but recently
explored land of the bacteria, the dark continent of infection” (Burt 1890, 2). Peering through
the microscope, Koch “supplemented the natural limits of his vision,” observing an
“undistorted high-level magnification of the bacteria” (4).
In the latter half of the 19th century, the nascent science of bacteriology took shape
around the microscopic study of bacteria, achieving new levels of clarity with improvements in
lens technology. Koch took advantage of these emergent technologies, especially the oil
immersion lens, an innovation introduced in 1878 and 1879 (Rothstein 1972, 264). By
submerging the objective lens of the microscope and the specimen in an immersion oil, Koch
was able to view bacteria at a higher resolution.
Yet even with specialized lenses, the sputum of a tubercular patient would be teeming
with other non-tubercular microbes. To the eye of a scientist looking through a microscope,
microbes remained undifferentiated from the broader field of tissue and competing microbial
life in which they sat—“the various bacilli are at the first glance very much alike, often so much
alike as to be indistinguishable” (Whittaker 1883, 153). Koch’s work thus proceeded in an
attempt to solve the technical problem of contrasting the germ he sought from those other
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microbial bodies that cluttered the microscopic field of vision. Koch set about the task of
individualizing the microbe responsible for tuberculosis.
The mid-to-late 1870s included a spurt of technical innovations in the field of staining.
One of these was a market innovation as the German dye industry began manufacturing
aniline dyes—“chemicals to stain the bacteria to make them visible” (Rothstein 1972, 264). A
key technical innovation for the “discovery” of these minute forms of living matter was thus the
practice of staining the bacteria to isolate the individual “species” of germ from the other
bacteria. Using these aniline dyes and his oil immersion lens, Koch became an innovator of
new staining methods. His solution to this technical problem—how to make one form of
microscopic nature stand out, in its individuality, from other forms—took shape through his
attentiveness to the manner in which the various microbes “differ widely in their chemistry.”
The germs, as Koch observed, manifested preferences for different chemical dyes (Whittaker
1883, 153). He would thus design an experiment to cater to the affinities of the as-yetspeculative microbial cause of tuberculosis.
Months after Koch’s lecture, in a presentation to the College of Physicians of
Philadelphia in September of 1882, James T. Whittaker, a professor of the Theory and Practice
of Medicine, having visited Koch’s laboratory and observed his experiments, described this
capacity for microbes to manifest preferences as he summarized Koch’s staining method—the
“color tests”:
which brings us to speak at once of the color tests; for the action of the coloring
matters [the dyes] upon the bacilli is an expression of their chemical affinities. And here we
find very great differences among the different bacilli. Pretty much all the micrococci
can be tinted of any color indiscriminately, blue or red or brown, etc. but the bacilli show
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marked preference for, or perhaps only become visible with, the use of certain hues. (153;
italics added)
Where microbes are so similar “at the first glance” as to seem “indistinguishable” they become,
as Whittaker suggests, individualized, when stained with particular dyes—they become
classifiable through their “chemical affinities” or their “preference for…certain hues.” Scientists
employing staining methods could thus “distinguish different forms [of bacterial life] by their
affinity for certain [chemical] colors” (Whitaker 1882, 192).
Within this context of nonhuman—microbial—preferences, Koch set about his work:
designing a staining procedure and manipulating the material of the laboratory to cater to the
inclinations of this transparent non-entity. The task would prove difficult for, as it turned out,
the “properties” of the germ he sought “ma[d]e it extremely difficult to work with” (Brock
1988, 125). A series of laboratory failures preceded Koch’s successful demonstration of the
presence of the bacilli—failures that were bound up with the confusing preferences of this
sought-after microbe. The tubercle bacillus was confusing precisely because, as he would soon
recognize, it lacked an affinity for “the use of any one color” (Whitaker 1882, 192; italics
added). Unlike other germs that became visible with a single stain, the germ responsible for
tuberculosis desired, as Koch would demonstrate to his Berlin audience on March 24, multiple
colors.
Koch’s employing of his laboratory materials—his cultures, beakers, and flasks—
reinforced the technical character of his “discovery”: his first achievement of interest that
night—the making visible of the tubercle bacillus—was lauded for its experimental
innovativeness. This “certain staining procedure” (Ryan 1992, 10-11) was, in fact, a
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counterstaining procedure employing two colors, designed to cater to the bacillus’ preference for
multiple colors (12). Whitaker describes Koch’s execution of this counterstain. 17
Koch began by taking a “minute fragment” of sputum with a “platinum hook or wire”
and spreading this sputum in “a thin almost invisible, film over the whole surface of a cover
glass.” He then applied a flame for ten seconds to fix the sample upon the glass. With the
sputum fixed and thus prepared to be colored, Koch proceeded to stain it twice: first, with
methyl violet; and then, a half-an-hour later after the violet had set in, with vesuvin brown. The
violet saturated the entire sample, coloring everything. When the sample was subsequently
exposed to the second color—the counterstain—the non-tubercular germs and the tissue turned
a light brown: they were “decolorized,” losing the violet hue.
And there they appeared, the tubercle bacilli, violet against the “brown field.” Against
the decolorized background of competing microbes, the germs responsible for tuberculosis held
onto the methyl violet, unwilling to “let go of all the coloring matter” (Whitaker 1882, 193).
The speculative, transparent non-entities, had transformed into motionless, rod-shaped
organisms: these microscopic life forms responsible for the Great White Plague, stretching no
longer than 1/1200 of an inch (Whittaker 1883, 152). In applying the brown counterstain, the
agent responsible for tuberculosis was visually isolated, individualized, “wholly freed from [the]
complicating material” of competing germs and tissue (Burt 1890, 2-3).
Flick was impressed by the work of Koch and the post-Koch capacity to make the
“physicality” of the disease visible beneath the microscope. In part, his impression was related

17

Note that Whittaker’s observations are taken from his visit to Koch’s laboratory some three months after the
Berlin lecture. He was not present at the lecture but the experiments he observes are those that Koch employed at
the lecture.

91

to the diagnostic method that grew out of the lab work: the emergence of the sputum test
allowed physicians to stain a patient’s spit to determine if they had the bacillus in their blood.
Yet for Flick, the freeing of the bacillus from its “complicating material” assumed importance
for a broader reason: it gave society a clear, identifiable enemy against which to wage a
“crusade.” The work of Koch thus produced, for Flick, one of the primary weapons available
for the subjection of tuberculosis: knowledge. The “crusade” would initially be waged through
the “study [of] the habits of this vexatious little organism…what it needs for its maintenance,
how it gets it, [and] why man has served so well as its host” (Flick 1896, 640). Indeed, according
to Flick, “the knowledge that has been gained in the laboratory about the life-history of the
tubercle bacillus” led, inexorably to “the great truth” (641) of “how it can be staved, how it can
be destroyed, in short, how it can be stamped out of the world” (640). The “intelligent effort”
of “civilization,” buttressed by an intimate knowledge of the “habits” and “needs” of this
pathological form of nature would surely find a way, in Flick's Enlightenment narrative, to
prevent the disease.
Insights into these “habits” were further generated through Koch’s next experiment—his
culturing of the tubercle bacillus. Importantly, the metaphor of individuals as sowers cultivating
their bodily soil would emerge through Koch’s witting cultivation of an optimal soil in which to
grow the bacillus in the lab. In the translation of Koch’s laboratory culturing methods, into the
clinical treatment of the tubercular body, the modern consumptive individual would be remade. The tubercular subject of the early 20th century would be capable of choosing to
cultivate a soil that facilitated the life of the disease, or a soil of immunity, one that isolated
and nullified the parasite in his or her own body. The prevention and treatment of
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tuberculosis, in the late 19th-century would increasingly become a matter of the individual will,
and individual responsibility—a disease overcome by an individual's adoption of regimen; by
disciplined, responsible agents; a disease that took the life of those who failed to help
themselves.
Koch and the Culturing of the Tubercle Bacilli: The Laboratory Cultivation of a Microbe’s
Preferred Soil
As Koch lectured to his Berlin audience on the discovery of the tubercle bacillus, he
made it evident that the making visible of the bacilli did not prove a causal relationship
between the bacilli and the onset of tuberculosis. The visual individualizing of the tubercle
bacillus from the broader field of germs was but a first step. To make this causal connection—
what Koch referred to as a “direct causal relation to the disease” (quoted in Lechevalier 1965,
96)—he set about designing an experiment to inoculate guinea pigs with the newfound bacteria.
Yet in order to prove that the disease that developed in the guinea pigs resulted solely from the
pathological qualities of the tubercle bacillus, his inoculation experiments would require a
second isolation: the isolating of tubercular material—a pure culture—through cultivation in the
laboratory: “to put the proof beyond dispute it was necessary to be able to cultivate [the tubercle
bacillus] by itself, apart from every other form of micro-organism” (Whitaker 1882, 192).
Given a competing field of microbial agents the onset of a disease could theoretically be
attributed to any of these various germs. Koch worked to produce a laboratory culture—referred
to by observers and commentators as a soil—and a series of techniques that would allow him to
isolate and grow colonies of the tubercle bacillus. Where he had visually individualized the
bacillus, Koch now sought to biologically isolate and reproduce this single germ. Such an
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isolation would allow him to introduce this “pure” culture—this single uncontaminated
species—into a guinea pig. The inoculation of the pure culture of tubercle bacilli would
guarantee that any emergent pathological effects in the test animal would be “incontrovertible
proof” of the tubercle bacillus as the disease-causing agent (quoted in Lechevalier 1965, 96).
The pure culture would thus serve as a means of producing scientific certainty about cause and
effect in the tubercular disease, establishing any pathological effects in the inoculated guinea
pigs as resulting solely from the tubercle bacilli. 18
The techniques for isolating the pure culture took shape, in metaphor and practice,
through an interaction between scientist and disease, premised on the capacity of
bacteriologists to exercise “control” over the disease in the laboratory. Koch’s efforts to find the
correct “soil” in which to cultivate the bacillus would constitute, as I show, not only the
discourses and practices of the bacteriological laboratory, but the space of clinical treatment as
well. The capacity to wittingly cultivate a laboratory soil capable of nourishing the tubercle
bacillus paralleled a concomitant notion, applied to the human body, of the capacity for
individuals to wittingly cultivate a soil—blood, and tissue—that was immune to, or capable of
isolating the disease, thereby rendering it harmless. The making of this model for interacting
with and understanding disease in bodies involved, for Koch, a further discerning and catering
to the preferences of the tubercle bacillus.
These microbial affinities were rooted in a laboratory methods of culturing germs—
methods explained through metaphors of soil, seed, and cultivation. Whitaker, observing
18

Perhaps more importantly, the pure culture was a technique that allowed for the control of variables in the
laboratory—in the bodies of animal test subjects: if a scientist were to inoculate without a pure culture, the onset of
any morbid processes in the test subject would not be indisputably traceable to the specific bacteria in question—
the microbial cause of the disease would not be proven.
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Koch, suggests that while the aforementioned color tests provided an initial map for
distinguishing “different forms” of bacteria “by their affinity for certain colors,” the latter’s
work with pure cultures serves as a “better distinction.” The individualized bacteria take shape
through “the kind of soil in which they will grow” (1882, 192). For Koch, the nature of a
microbe was determined through its preference for a particular type of culture medium—a
particular type of soil. Koch describes his attempts to culture the tubercle bacillus as an act of
“cultivation” (Lechevalier 1965, 96).
In 1881, Koch had published a report that argued for the “need of improvement,” in
the field of bacteriology, in techniques for preparing such soils—for “the preparation of pure
cultures” (83). In the emergent field of bacteriology, the scientist thus increasingly pursued a
means to constructing preferred soils where “the bacteria [are] to be grown” (quoted in
Lechevalier 1965, 97). The culturing of the disease required the “implant[ing] and fix[ing]” of
the bacillus and the “tillage of the specific bacillus” (Burt 1890, 9) in “its own nutrient soil”
(Whitaker 1882, 192)—in other words, in a laboratory-manufactured soil that closely
approximated its needs.
The discerning of a type of nutrient soil that would best cater to the preferences of the
parasitic tubercle bacillus required, on the part of Koch, the resolution of a further set of
technical problems in the laboratory, once again yielding a number of failures along the way.
JTW, observing Koch’s laboratory practices in culturing the tubercle bacillus, describes how
Koch went about working through “the various substances used and rejected as unfit soils for
the growth or sustentation of individual germs” (Whitaker 1882, 189-190). Such unfit soils
included the surface of potatoes and gelatine-bouillon (191).
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Koch’s work to discern and cater to the preferences of the tubercle bacillus by
cultivating this proper nutrient soil led him to modify pre-existing culturing methods, guided
by the notion that “Each parasite has its own soil, like the vegetable world of larger growth”
(191). The particular soil in which to sow the tubercle bacillus needed, according to Koch, to
meet certain requirements. First, Koch selected a solid culture medium over a liquid medium
citing the former as “more reliable and convenient” (quoted in Lechevalier 1965, 96). This soil
should “possess the necessary nutrients” to sustain bacterial growth; remain solid “with
prolonged incubation at body temperature”; and be transparent (quoted in Lechevalier 1965,
97). The bacilli’s preferred “soil or substance was finally found” after much “patience and
persistence” “in blood” (Whitaker 1882, 192). Koch had determined that the tubercle bacillus
showed an affinity for solidified blood serum. 19
Having successfully cultured the bacilli, Koch proceeded to demonstrate, to his peers,
his successful inoculation of guinea pigs with the pure culture of bacilli thereby establishing a
causal relationship between the species of tubercle bacillus and the onset of tuberculosis. The
results of Koch’s use of the solidified blood serum as soil and the recognition that he had
successfully produced a pure culture of the disease was consequential in that his labors enabled
scientists to grow colonies of bacilli—pure cultures—for use in other animal inoculation
experiments allowing for the further production of knowledge about the effects of the disease.
But more importantly, in successfully isolating and propagating the microbes responsible for
19

As Whittaker comments, these preferences for certain soils become taxonomic indicators of the biological
species to which various bacteria belong: “Each form or family of parasite requires or develops best in a particular
soil, and the discovery of the particular soil best suited for each form is the object chiefly aimed at” (1882, 189190). According to Koch, culturing served as a tool for the classification of species of bacteria. Koch writes, “‘Great
stress should be laid on pure culture. If, in serial cultivation, the same form of bacterium is obtained, this
organism must be accepted as a species’” (quoted in Lechevalier 1965, 82).
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The Great White Plague, Koch was viewed as having mastered tuberculosis, disciplining the
disease and demonstrating power over its life and death in the laboratory. This laboratory
control resonated with anti-tuberculosis reformers like Flick who increasingly invested in an
optimism over the capacity of sick individuals to practice a similar mastery over the disease in
their own bodies.
From The Laboratory to The Body: The Individual as Sower of Personal Soil
In 1896, Flick, gesturing toward Koch’s laboratory mastery of the bacillus, would write
that “Science has given us…power over the great white plague of consumption” (639). Yet in
spite of the renown of Koch’s innovative experiments, his discoveries were initially seen by
many physicians as lacking direct relevance to clinical treatment. The use of the sputum test to
analyze patient expectorant for the bacillus often produced unreliable results and required
laboratory facilities—facilities that were, in the late 19th century, uncommon for the everyday
physician. Furthermore, merely identifying the bacillus in sputum did not equate to an insight
into treating and curing the patient. How, then, did Flick and his peers translate Koch’s
insights into an optimism toward and a program for the cure of the disease?
By the beginning of the final decade of the 19th century, physicians, citing the centrality
of discovery of the bacillus in their work, were starting to challenge the notion, so strong
amongst Laennec and his early 19th century colleagues, of the tubercular diathesis. This
medical model that biological constitution determined those who would suffer from
consumption, made types out of people: there were those that were predisposed to tuberculosis
and those that weren’t. New elaborations on Koch’s work on the bacilli, microbial preferences,
and the nascent research on immunity challenged the model of diathesis by positing a more
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individualized relationship between the organism and its host: a parasitic interaction between
these two bodies through the “soil” of human blood and human tissue. New York physician
and professor Stephen Smith Burt, speculating on the relationship between the bacillus and
individual constitution remarks, “all tubercle is the outgrowth of a microscopic, diseaseproducing germ known as the Bacillus tuberculosis [sic]. Without this parasitic plant, however
depraved the constitution, there will be no tuberculosis, and also, fortunately with this
morbific agent there will be no phthisis unless the vitality of the tissues is impaired” (Burt 1890, 4;
italics added).
This positing of an interaction between the “morbific agent” and the quality—the
vitality—of human tissue surfaces across the writings of many physicians who elaborated on
Koch’s work. As Burt notes here, the bacillus alone is not enough to cause the disease; rather,
phthisis acts upon tissues that are already “impaired”—in other words, the parasite requires
tissue that has already been compromised and, conversely, it is retarded by healthy tissue. The
recognition that the disease required a certain type of compromised material articulated with
understandings of the disease’s chronic tendency—its propensity to remain with the sick
through acute periods and periods of remission. To the extent that the quality of an
individual's tissue could vary over the course of lifetime, tuberculosis seemed to respond to
these changes, announcing itself in times of individual physiological weakness. Flick thus
found himself, in the late 1880s and throughout the 1890s, elaborating on the applicability of
Koch’s work by authoring medical pamphlets on tuberculosis that addressed the treatment of
this interaction of body and germ as a long term parasitic relationship.
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In an era that predated the discovery of “the immune system,” Flick set about outlining
a cure for this long term relationship—one that hailed the individual sick into the practice of
making themselves healthier. The solution lay in building individual immunity, or, as Flick
writes, “immunity must constitute the basis of all treatment” (1898, 4). Immunity to the disease
could seemingly be achieved, intentionally, if individuals would only pursue a lifestyle that
allowed them to cultivate healthy tissue. The foundational practices for achieving this
immunity were those of regimen: the physician prescription of long-term behavioral strategies
and the corresponding individual commitment to following these strategies in a disciplined
manner so as to manage one's own bodily soil.
Amidst the shifting field of late 19th century bacteriological and histological inquiry
into tuberculosis, a story began to emerge—a story that ran counter to two thousand years of
medical ambivalence and pessimism toward a cure for tuberculosis: individuals—regardless of
their inherited constitutions—could willfully cultivate vital, resistant, healthy tissue so as to
intentionally arrest, reverse, or ward off the disease. One might be born with a compromised
immunity, but in pursuing proper nutrition, rest, avoidance of stress, and access to fresh air, an
individual could combat their susceptibility to tuberculosis. With knowledge of the preference
and affinities of the bacillus, the sick could manage their own internal soil so as to achieve a
bodily vitality that would starve the disease. This story materialized, most popularly, in The
Parable of the Sower. Attributed to William Osler, Chair of Clinical Medicine at the University
of Pennsylvania (1884-1889), it was originally told in 1892.
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The Parable of the Sower
Osler recounting The Parable of the Sower in an essay in the 1903 Annual Report of The
Henry Phipps Institute, gestures toward the wide circulation of the tale—based upon the Biblical
parable, as uttered by Jesus to his disciples—by suggesting that the parable, with its metaphors
of individual as sower, body as soil, and tuberculosis as seed, had been reiterated with such
frequency as to have become “hackneyed” (Osler 1903, 146) He begins by equating the
potential for immunity to the disease in the quality of tissue: “That we do not all die of
[tuberculosis] is owing to the resistance of the tissues; in other words, to an unfavourable [sic],
i.e., the rocky soil on which the seeds have fallen.” Thus, Osler begins the parable by
establishing that human tissue is a soil and that such soil, to the extent that it is “rocky,” proves
resistant to growth of the seeds of tuberculosis. He continues, noting three possible outcomes
in the interaction between human tissue and tuberculosis.
The parable of the sower sets forth in an admirable way the story of the disease...The
seed that falls by the wayside are [sic] the bacilli that reach our great highways, the air
passages and intestines in which they are picked up by phagocytes, representing the
birds of the air, or they are trodden under foot by swarms of contending organisms.
The seed that falls on stony places is that which reaches the lymph-nodes of the bronchi
and mesentery, and though it springs up and flourishes for a [sic] while, there is no
depth of earth, and, lacking moisture, it withers away into cretaceous healing. And that
which falls among thorns represents the bacilli which effect a lodgement in the lungs,
the kidneys, or elsewhere, where they thrive and grow and produce extensive changes,
but the thorns...grow up also, and in the form of delimiting inflammatory processes
and of contracting fibrosis, choke the seed, and recovery ultimately takes place. (146)
Here, then, Osler notes the way that healthy tissue can resist tuberculosis: the bacilli might
enter the body and yet fail to establish roots, thus, falling by the wayside only to be engulfed by
phagocytes. A less healthy body with its tissue of “stony soil,” might allow the disease to take
root for a time—it “springs up”–only to eventually starve the parasite, thereby suggesting the
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manner in which tuberculosis was observed to affect some subjects “for a while [sic]” only to
disappear. He concludes with a third scenario in which the bacilli effectively occupy the body—
taking root in the thorns, where they “grow and produce extensive changes.” Yet even this
scenario can, in Osler's estimation, result in recovery to the extent that the thorns, through an
anti-inflammatory process, resist the bacilli by choking the seed.
He contrasts these scenarios of healthy tissue resisting the bacilli with an example of the
seed taking root: “But falling on good ground, the seed springs up, increases and brings forth
fruit come thirty, some sixty, and some a hundredfold, which may be taken to represent the
cases of chronic, subacute, and acute tuberculosis” (Osler 1903, 146-147). Here, then, “good
ground” is that unhealthy soil or tissue that allows the seeds to reproduce. Osler links the scale
of this reproduction to the type of tuberculosis that manifests, suggesting that those cases
wherein the seeds reproduce an excessive amount of “fruit” are those regarded as acute cases.
Osler, departing from two thousand years of consistent medical pessimism in the face
of natural limitations on a cure for the disease, offers, in The Parable of the Sower, an optimistic
theorization of the manner in which tubercular bodies can cultivate immune soil. The Greeks
posited phthisis as an external natural force, subjecting its victims on the whims of wind and
season. For Morton, the disease touched all, thwarting human effort, killing its sufferers, save
those lucky enough to be saved by “nature.” Laennec and his contemporaries professed the
incurability of the disease, subscribing to a fatalistic medical model of the biologically
determined consumptive. For two thousand years, physicians hedged on the “power” of the art
of medicine and the capacity of individuals to overcome consumption through a witting
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regimen. Yet in Osler’s parable, tuberculosis has become a simplified, recognizable, and
manageable form of nature—a seed—susceptible to the intentions of the sower of the bodily soil.
Yet notably absent from Osler's rendering of the parable is any mention of this sower—
any mention of the individual sick subject. Indeed, recovery from tuberculosis and resistance to
the bacilli are rendered, in Osler's words, as natural processes that occur outside of any human
intention or will. It is only in his conclusion to the parable that the role of the individual sower
become apparent. “We are beginning to appreciate,” wrote Osler, “that the care of the soil is
quite as important as the care of the seed” (146-147).
Emerging from this vision, then, are not only the metaphors of soil, seed, and sower,
but, more broadly, an individualized method of treatment: “the care of the soil.” Where the
theory of tubercular diathesis suggested that those with the disease got sick due to a
constitutional tendency toward the disease, Osler initiates his Parable with a distinctly different
notion: all are exposed to this disease and all are potential victims. The defining factor in
separating victims from victors in combating the disease—the factor that ensures “we do not all
die”—is an individualized “care of the soil”—a matter of the willful-disciplined cultivation of a
“stony” “dry” soil with “no depth of earth”; or a thorny soil that, while allowing the seed to
“thrive and grow,” nevertheless “grow[s] up” to eventually “choke the seed.”
Key to Osler’s method of treatment, then, is his suggestion, like Burt, that the threat of
the disease process does not lie exclusively with the bacillus; rather he emphasizes the capacity
for the individual to determine—through cultivation of a certain soil—their vitality of tissue.
And this vitality of tissue corresponds, in turn, to the potential severity of the tuberculosis—
“chronic, subacute…acute.” The solution, then, to containing the threat of the bacillus—
102

indeed, the very cure for the disease—involves the cultivation of a soil that maximizes individual
immunity by avoiding an internal physiology that caters to the parasites desires. Osler's parable
of the sower thus provides a model wherein individuals are produced as subjects with the
capacity to exert their will over their internal body, cultivating immunity by influencing their
physiology and their tissue through the practice of caring for their soil.
Natural Immunity and the Disciplined Individual
In the 1890s, Flick, a professional contact of Osler’s, drew on the now familiar
continuum between the art of medicine and the healing powers of nature, advocating both in
elaborating a program for the development of individual immunity aimed at the “destruction
of the bacillus tuberculosis…by medicine or by nature’s conservative measures” (Flick 1890, 4).
He proposed the notion of “natural immunity”–an individual’s “resisting power to disease”
(Flick 1898, 5)—to describe the process through which the human body could be disciplined so
as to maximize its capacity for the prevention and arrest of the disease. The object of treatment
would thus be directed at achieving and maintaining a “normal standard” of bodily health:
“Could the natural immunity of the individual be maintained at a normal standard, a very
large number of cases would undoubtedly recover” (6-7).
Natural immunity required individual cultivation of a “certain soil” through the
disciplined pursuit of correct practices. According to Flick, two of the primary practices are
“[a]bsolute rest” and the pursuit of proper “nutrition.” He cites both of these as tools for the
sower to take responsibility for his or her own body and health. In the desire to maximize
proper circulation and digestion so as to develop one’s tissue into an inhospitable
environment, rest allowed for individuals to achieve an economic expenditure of physiological
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processes by preventing individuals from wasting the “force” they need to “maintain the
normal standard of health” (7). Absolute rest, according to Flick, increased the overall
“resisting powers” of the individual, including the maximizing of the “nutritive powers” of the
body (7). Furthermore, he advised generous amounts of milk and fruit and vegetables with a
single meal of meat a day and supplements of cod-liver oil to achieve this optimal nutritive state
(1890, 11). He further specifies that those individuals “who do not overburden [their stomachs]
with too much improper food” will increase the probability that they “will not contract
tuberculosis” as such a diet will ensure that “the nature of the soil” is not “congenial” to the
tubercle bacillus (Flick 1889, 7-8).
Where rest and nutrition were hardly novel approaches—they were prescribed by the
Greeks as treatments for disease of regimen and they made up elements of Morton’s “Rules of
Living”—what was novel is the manner in which Flick and his contemporaries linked the
individual pursuit of disciplined habits with the capacity to shape internal, microscopic bodily
material: the blood and tissue of the tubercular were becoming objects—a part of Villemin’s
“bodily economy”—subject, like one’s assets, to the prudential practices of the individual.
Through witting management of this bodily economy “responsible” and “worthy” individuals
could help themselves by cultivating a soil imbued with the power to resist the bacillus.
Flick elaborates on this process by which the internal body shifts out of the realm of
“powers of nature” and is brought within the “powers of art”—the realm of individual will—
through attention to the articulation of resistance, blood, tissue, and individual habit. For the
individual to contract the disease, the tubercle bacillus must successfully “run the gauntlet of
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the phagocytic power of the blood” (1889, 3). Indeed, he terms the blood a “gauntlet” for he
identifies that it is the primary medium of resistance, for healthy blood breeds healthy tissue:
protective power lies in the blood. We certainly do know from clinical observations that
in proportion to the excellence of nutrition, which is best indicated by a healthy
condition of the blood, the system is capable of obstructing the inroads of
disease…Persons whose nutrition is at par seem to have the power to resist the
tuberculosis under ordinary exposure; and persons who have fallen victim to the
disease seem to be able to cast it off or to resist its encroaches if their digestive and
nutritive powers can be readily restored. (1890, 9-10)
Flick thus develops the pursuit of nutrition through a disciplined diet as evidence of the
capacity of the individual to manage bodily material by wittingly cultivating the “condition of
the blood” so as to strengthen tissue and deny the bacillus its preferences. He frames this
management in prudent economic terms: “The largest amount of nutrition with the smallest
amount of labor to the digestive tract should be the golden maxim which every article of diet
should be judged” (Flick 1898, 9). The purview, indeed, the responsibilities of the classical
liberal subject—a rational agent, managing his or her limited resources with prudence, and with
an eye toward maximization of profit through the “smallest amount of labor”—have been made,
in the discourses and practices of the treatment of tuberculosis, to encompass the physiological
processes and internal resources of the human body.
Conclusion
In denying milk to the patients of the Henry Phipps Institute in 1908, Flick
accompanied his actions with his critique of those who could not help themselves to get
better—who failed to sow a soil that was inhospitable to the tubercle bacillus. He had, by then,
incorporated and developed the premise of individual immunity into his rhetoric, practice, and
administrable endeavors at various tuberculosis hospitals and sanatoria. Like Osler, Flick
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viewed an individual’s cultivation of a “certain soil” as a key technique in pursuing his goal of
curing and eradicating tuberculosis. Importantly, the procedures of this individualized clinicalmedical dialogue and method for treating the disease were, themselves, a product of the
laboratory practice of Koch. The emergent liberal individual of the turn-of-the-century is no
longer simply expected to be productive; he or she is increasingly held responsible for the
quality of his or her tissue. The laboratory identification and mastery of the tubercle bacillus
produced a liberal individual that was required to help him or herself through the exacting of a
similar mastery of the bacillus in the body.
In particular, like Koch’s conclusion that the bacillus had preferences and affinities for
certain laboratory cultures—the solid culture medium through which he was able to derive a
pure culture of the disease—Flick approached the internal conditions of the human body as a
controlled and controllable medium. Koch’s reputed success in designing this soil—a pure
culture of solidified blood serum—in which he had seemingly mastered the cultivation of
tuberculosis by catering to the preferences of the tubercle bacillus, took shape in the clinical
sphere, in a similar materialization of control: the individual as designer and master of a
personal soil, hostile to the affinities of the microbial parasite. According to Flick, the
tubercular could not only shape the soil of their bodies, but they had a responsibility to do so.
The cultivation of a “congenial soil” that catered to the preferences and affinities of the
bacillus—resulting in an exacerbation of the disease—was thus coded, at the Phipps Institute, as
a failure of the sick to help themselves. Conversely, the nourishing of a “stony” soil that, as
Osler suggested, resisted these microbial seeds constituted the successful individual as
prudential manager of bodily health. The emergent late 19th-century individualized treatment
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of tuberculosis thus required, for many physicians like Flick, the production of “worthy”
patients as managers of their own bodily resources.
Throughout the 19th century, the internality of the tubercular body—cells, blood, and
tissue—had taken shape as a province to be cultivated, a resource to be managed, a biological
economy: the tubercular body had become subject to the witting individual and the
responsibility for overcoming what was formerly a force of nature was increasingly placed, by
physicians and institutions, on the individual sick. The responsibility for one’s own tissue
would be a matter of individual discipline and will. The art of medicine could prescribe
regimen, drugs, and guidance, but the cure for tuberculosis ultimately required individuals
capable of helping themselves.
Yet Flick faced a challenge that materialized in the form of these uncooperative
individuals that failed to get better. The various cautions toward and material limitations upon
cures that characterize medical production of tuberculosis prior to the late 19th century made
space for failure in the face of consumption as an incurable force of nature: Greeks died of
phthisis; the 17th century English died of consumption, the 19th century French suffered the
fate of the tubercular diathesis. As Flick, in administering the Henry Phipps Institute,
encountered bodies that would not get better, he attributed this, not to the nature of disease in
interaction with human bodies, but to the failure of individuals. What stands out in this late
19th century of individualism, scientific mastery, and the treatment of tuberculosis is the sense
that the art of medicine had overcome two thousand years of perceived natural limitations of
the prevention of tuberculosis. In what follows, I want to broaden the discussion to entertain
the possibility that those who, in Flick’s view, had failed to help themselves embodied a new,
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early 20th-century formation of nature and culture: a reworking of a natural limitation on the
healing potential of the art of medicine as a problem of discipline.
In other words, as I will continue to argue in the following chapters, Flick’s encounter
with patients who seemingly would not help themselves is, in fact, the production of yet
another material limitation on the cure and eradication of tuberculosis in a vocabulary that
assumes the mastery of nature. Flick translates the uncooperative material—the nature—of the
human body that succumbs to tuberculosis into a discourse of failed discipline—the culture. I
will develop the premise that the important point here is not related to failure. Rather, what
matters is the manner in which the attribution of failure to individuals was both produced by
and productive of a broader elision of the continued and persistent role of the nonhuman—
disease as a force of nature—in the making of the 20th-century articulation of the human body
and tuberculosis. Bodies that will not heal are evidence, in part, of a continued natural
limitation on the “power of art” to cure and eradicate disease.
This limitation remains in evidence in the 21st century as multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis suggests, not only the staying power of infectious disease, but the capacity of
microbial life to adapt and strengthen itself in the face of prior human “successes” in curing
and eradicating the disease. Much of the contemporary debate, as I explored in the
Introduction, continues to hinge on matters of individual discipline: the failure of individuals
to take their medicine consistently and for the entire physician-prescribed period. Where Koch
seemingly successfully disciplined the disease in the lab, the disciplining of the tubercular body
continues to resist medical mastery as it requires constant surveillance by the physician: “the
patient has now the power of living with tubercular lesions that can no longer be injurious...He is cured;
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though the cure, I allow, is relative, and its persistence can only be insured by watchful and
unremitting medical attention” (Jaccoud 1885, 15; italics added).
I will explore this need for “unremitting medical attention” further in Chapter 4 as I
analyze the disciplinary procedures of the Phipps Institute. Indeed, it is the “relative” quality of
this potential for “cure” that Flick would take up, for the “watchful and unremitting medical
attention” would be difficult to achieve. The more a physician could produce the conditions—
and the will—within his patients to pursue the cultivation of the correct soil, the better the
chance the patient had, according to Flick, of helping him or herself. Yet the capacity of the
individual, in matters of health and disease, to do as he or she ought is, as I will continue to
argue, not entirely the product of human will and intention. Having detailed flashpoints in the
history of the making of the disease, I will, in Chapter 2, move into the almshouses and
hospitals of 18th and 19th century Philadelphia and in-and-out of the empty pockets of the
impoverished and ill to explore the how this responsibility, indeed, this capacity, to overcome
disease in one's own body was further produced, through the articulation of a liberal political
economy of care, charitable aspirations, and a nagging overabundance of sick bodies that
simply would not do as they ought.
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Chapter 2
Valuing the Tubercular: Almshouses, Hospitals, and a Political Economy of Care in 18th-and
19th -Century Philadelphia
An Acute Epidemic of Influenza and the Chronic Epidemic
of Consumption: Philadelphia, 1889
The typically harsh winter of Philadelphia proved especially vicious when, in 1889 and
1890, an epidemic of influenza crossed oceans and time zones to take up residence in the
bodies of the unfortunate. From St. Petersburg to Vienna, Paris to London, the afflicted
flocked to hospitals filling beds with their weakened bodies (Davis 1890, 75). In contrast to
Philadelphia's consumptives—mired in the various stages of chronic phthisis—those with the flu
suffered from acute symptoms. It was this very contrast in the nature of the two diseases—the
contrast of acute and chronic—and the corresponding medical urgency accorded to the
treatment of the former, that linked sufferers of consumption with suffers of the grippe.
Indeed, over the coming year, many of Philadelphia's consumptives would find their
unfortunate fates intertwined with the more fortunate fates of those with the flu.
From the first recognition of the influenza scourge on December 23, 1889, through its
“culmination in the week ending January 18” (Dulles 1890, 296-297), mortality in Philadelphia
totaled over one thousand, “largely due to the prevalency [sic] of the influenza” (126).
According to reports, “probably one half the [city’s] inhabitants...suffered with it.” (53). By
February 8, Charles W. Dulles, editor of The Medical Bulletin, suggested that “1,500 deaths may
be attributed [directly] to the malady” (298).
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Reporting, after the fact, on the ravages of the grippe, Benjamin Lee, Secretary of the
State Board of Heath of Pennsylvania, noted the misplaced glee with which Philadelphians
welcomed it to the States—a glee that belied the dangers of the “pandemic.” Having observed
the disease developing overseas, “[p]eople appeared to look forward to [the appearance of the
flu] on this side of the ocean as an experience, which, on the whole, would constitute a mild
amusement, rather than an occasion of suffering, distress, terror and death” (Lee 1891, 366).
Lee continued, noting that within a few weeks, this glee was met with the harsh reality of
widespread sickness as “both the public and the [medical] profession [recognized] that
influenza meant a good deal more than a bad cold in the head” (366). In Lee's approximation,
it was “probable that not a single individual entirely escaped [the] pernicious effects” of the
influenza (367). Extrapolating from data attained from 265 physicians reporting their statewide
cases, Lee estimated that 1,120,000 of the six million residents of Pennsylvania were ill enough
to seek treatment or observation from physicians due to the pandemic. A writer trying to bring
humor to the grimness wrote of the effects of influenza on the body as “one large, burning,
lachrymose, damp, and weary sneeze for a few days, and then you will be in shape to enjoy the
sufferings of those about you with tolerable equanimity” (Davis 1890, 69).
While the influenza in Philadelphia was only “a mild disease,” it was still necessary to
treat the sick in hospitals, for the disease became “dangerous if neglected,” resulting in deadly
relapses (75). Hospital treatment could facilitate recovery by ensuring that sufferers received
minimal exposure to cold. But in the absence of clinical oversight, such exposure, along with
“imprudence” on the part of the sick could cause a relapse of the flu—a potentially deadly
relapse that consistently occurred on the eighth day of sickness (75). Given the acute nature of
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the disease, and the clear effectiveness of hospital treatment in ensuring recovery by helping flu
victims move beyond the dangerous eighth day, Philadelphia officials placed a premium on
making space for the flu victims. Sufferers of the acute flu were afforded hospital beds over
those with chronic diseases—especially those with consumption.
At the height of the epidemic, The Philadelphia Hospital required some three hundred
beds to house influenza cases. To make the space available to accommodate these sufferers of
the flu, in December of 1889, forty-five “poor consumptives” were “hurried off,” likely to the
cold beds of the almshouses. 20 Months later, in the fall of 1890, an observer reported an
absence of consumptives in the wards of The Philadelphia Hospital—an absence due to the
“great” mortality recently suffered by the hospital’s former tubercular population (Curtin 1890,
318). While the precise fates of these forty-five poor consumptives remains ambiguous in the
writings of this observer, it is evident that, during the influenza epidemic, a number of
consumptives died, after having been moved out of their beds at the Hospital to accommodate
flu victims.
On February 3, 1890, with the influenza epidemic waning, Lawrence Flick gave a paper
on the need to establish hospitals designed specifically to care for the tubercular. In delivering
his talk, entitled “Special Hospitals for the Treatment of Consumption,” Flick claimed that,
while an admirable amount of charitable appeals were met in Philadelphia, such aid had
“failed to spur us on to practical alleviation of the consumptive poor.” “We have hospital
provision,” said Flick, “for every form of human misery and suffering, except that which
appears under the garn of the hectic flush and the racking cough” (1890, 64). Indeed, as
20

Precisely where they were hurried off to remains vague—likely the almshouse hospital.
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evidenced in the displaced consumptives of the Philadelphia Hospital, the poor tubercular had
few options in Philadelphia to obtain treatment or charitable aid. The tubercular subject,
according to Flick, submits “frequent applications for admission to our general hospitals,
where he is either denied entrance, or, if admitted, is simply given quarters to die in” (64-65).
Consumptives, with their chronic-incurable symptoms were routinely spurned by both public
and private charity as aid and space were reserved for those who, like the flu victims,
manifested acute symptoms, and a significant chance of recovery.
In a city renowned for its medial treatment and abundance of hospital beds, how, in
1889, had consumptives in Philadelphia come to occupy such a marginal value in the eyes city
officials, philanthropists, social reformers, and physicians? How had hospitals, charities, and
physicians come to accord more “worth” to sufferers of the flu than sufferers of tuberculosis?
And how, in the decade of the 1890s, would Philadelphia's chronic consumptives be remade as
subjects “worthy” of charity and of hospital beds?
As I argue in this chapter, the treatment of the victims of influenza during the outbreak
of 1889-1890 was the product of a well-established political economy of care practiced within
the nexus of Philadelphia hospitals and charities. This political economy of care that produced
the subjects of acute disease as more “worthy” of aid than the “unworthy” sufferers of chronic
disease was, in Flick's estimation, a product of the sympathy of his peers: “Our sympathies go
out strongly to every form of suffering that is brief; but our hearts are hard as stone toward that
which is long drawn out” (1890, 65) Yet, as I show below, while sympathy did play a role in the
evaluation of potential subjects of medical charity, the judging of the worthiness of those in
need of medical assistance were, at their foundation, economic calculations: rational113

institutional schemas and operations designed to treat the greatest number of poor and sick in
the most efficient, cost-effective, and prudential ways.
In what follows, I show that the pursuit of practices and discourses of reform by liberal
philanthropists, officials, reformers, and physicians, within these Philadelphia institutions were
produced by and productive of a notion and embodiment of “worthy” liberal individuals ablebodied, and thus capable of being independent and productive—laboring for a living. This
liberal individualism takes shape in Philadelphia through the 18th-century suspicion that
poverty is not a matter of circumstance—the result of an unwanted disease, for instance—but
rather, a failure of individual will: individuals worthy of charity, in the eyes of reformers, were
capable of bettering themselves. The process of bettering oneself involved moving away from
charity and independently pursuing a productive future. The “unworthy” took shape as a
population of failed individuals, purposefully incapable of bettering themselves, and
perpetually and contentedly dependent upon the largesse of the public. As I show below, this
very suspicion would continue to haunt liberal reformers throughout the 19th-century, and
color Flick's efforts to gauge the will of his own tubercular patients to move beyond charity, and
lead lives of independence. Most importantly, this orientation and embodiment of liberal
individualism was complicated by the remaking of tuberculosis: to the extent that the disease
remained a force of nature, and its victims, incurable, the tubercular remained marginalized—
incapable of being productive due to their biological condition—within the system of liberal
charity. Only with the post-Koch possibility of a cure for tuberculosis, and the re-making of the
tubercular as curable, and thus as capable of able-bodiedness, would consumptives come to be
valorized as worthy subjects of liberal charity.
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I locate the emergence of this late 19th-century-tubercular subject in relation to the
historical development and application of this political economy of care through an analysis of
the various iterations of Philadelphia's almshouses and almshouse hospitals. First, beginning in
the 17th-century, I analyze the emergence, in England, of a vocabulary for evaluating the
“worth” of subjects in the sphere of charity. Within this system of evaluation, “worthy”
individuals take shape as victims of circumstance—subjects whose poverty is the product of
elements beyond their will. In contrast, “unworthy” subjects are those whose lot in life is
deemed to be the product of some failure of character. I then follow the translation of this
system of evaluation into the almshouses of 18th-century Philadelphia.
Through a description of the 18th-century Philadelphia almshouses and almshouse
hospitals, I establish the centrality of these discourses and practices of evaluation—this political
economy of care—as a constitutive, and defining element of pre-revolutionary liberal
individualism in Philadelphia. In detailing the various almshouse managers' pursuit of
economy in the execution of caring for the poor, I trace the articulation of “worth” and the
elaboration of practices of reform—poorhouse labor, for instance—designed to “better,” or
reform the subjects of charity. I show how these practices are tailored toward the production of
a specific form of liberal individual that is assumed to able-bodied and thus capable of being an
independent and productive subject. I analyze the articulation of this form of liberal
individualism with the efforts, on the part of the managers, to spend public money in the most
efficient and prudential manner possible: aggregating all subjects of charity in a single location,
investing in only the worthiest poor, and disciplining the poor so as to insure their bettering or
reform.
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I then explore the manner in which the bodies of the sick poor—especially those
suffering chronic illness including consumption—in their biological incapacity to labor,
materialized as an impediment to this cultivation of economy and individualism. I establish the
manner in which chronic incurables, including consumptives, confronted reformers, managers,
and philanthropists with subjects that could not realize the idealized independence of liberal
individualism. Insofar as the circumstances of chronic sickness proved inimical to the
“bettered” individual sought by almshouse managers, consumptives and other incurables took
shape as hopeless bodies and “unworthy” subjects that, over the course of the 18th- and 19thcentury, translated into their consistent devaluation.
In continuing to analyze the space of the almshouse hospital in Philadelphia, I trace the
limits of the worthlessness of the consumptive body into the 18th-century. I show the manner in
which the value of consumptives was greater in death than in life due to the utility of autopsied
bodies. I contextualize this worthlessness within the context of the continued efforts to
actualize a political economy of care, in the midcentury, in the management of Philadelphia's
infamous Blockley almshouse and hospital. I address three 19th-century critiques of the
operations of Blockley—critiques levied at a political economy of care that would fail to
differentiate the specialized needs of various populations of sick poor. The critiques of Dix,
Ray, and Flick made evident that, in this failure, the almshouse produced the very dependence
it sought to erase from its inmates. I show the manner in which these critics reproduce a
political economy of care invested in a notion of worthiness, yet introduce a new sense of
liberal responsibility toward caring for and treating those chronically-sick poor whose neediness
has come about through biological circumstances beyond their control. This responsibility is
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underwritten by a challenge to the operational political economy of care in the Blockley
almshouse: these critics advocate a more discerning system of evaluation founded upon a
differentiation, in social and institutional practice, between the capacity to better oneself by
becoming independent and productive and the need to get better by overcoming disease. This
distinction is partially made possible, as I show, by the rise of late-19th-century optimism
regarding the possibility of cures for consumption and chronic diseases.
I locate this sense of responsibility in relation to the sustained devaluation of the
chronically ill in late 19th-century Philadelphia. In a moment of overabundant hospital beds, I
trace the continued stigma that follows consumptives, and the recognition, by critics of the
stigma, of hospital beds as places where the tubercular were not treated, but rather, were places
where they went to die. I conclude by noting the manner in which Flick's plea for special
hospitals for consumption gains traction, resulting in the establishment, in Philadelphia, of the
first hospital in the United States to specialize in the treatment of consumptives. In a context
wherein most physicians, civic leaders, and the general public viewed consumptives as fated to
die, Flick's success in establishing a “special hospital” for consumptives served as a
materialization of the process by which tubercular subjects were remade as individuals capable
of getting better and, perhaps, leading independent lives. The late-nineteenth-century
tubercular individual, possessing the capacity to help him- or herself overcome the disease and
pursue of future of independence thus emerges from this genealogy of the articulation of
worth, almshouses, chronic illness, and liberal individualism.
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The Bettering House, Philadelphia Hospital, and The Reform of the Sick Poor: Worth,
Unworth and the Emergence of an 18th-Century Political Economy of Care
The population of poor sick that Lawrence Flick sought to treat in the late-19th century
did not exist on the same scale when Philadelphia was founded in 1682. A “small seaport
town” at the beginning of the 18th-century with some 2,300 inhabitants “liv[ing] within an area
less than a mile square,” the city's meager population found itself, over the ensuing halfcentury, drawn into a broad web of global economic and political forces. This transition would
include “a series of economic fluctuations, with steepening recessions, [that] plagued the city”
leading to both increased (yet concentrated) wealth, and increased destitution (Nash 1977, 71).
The forces of the new market and the related shifts in city life included “occupational
specialization, redistribution of wealth, spreading commercialization, decay of familial
institutions, [and] legitimization of personal interest” (82, 62). These economic changes were
produced by and productive of a growing population—reaching 30,000 by 1775. The influx of
immigrants to Philadelphia included a large percentage of skilled laborers who, “caught up in
[an] increasingly impersonal and unpredictable market-oriented world,” found themselves, in
spite of their skills, without a job (Nash 1976, 30). 21
Prior to these 18th-century shifts in population and economics, the care of the poor was
primarily a matter of family and kinship ties. Furthermore, explanations of the causes of
poverty accounted for the “ill chance” experienced by the poor: indigence, like phthisis to the
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“By 1772 the economic malaise had spread so far that about three-fifths of Philadelphia's mariners, one-quarter
of the labourers and weavers, one-fifth of the carters, porters, breechesmakers, bricklayers and cordwainers, and
one-eighth of the gardeners, blacksmiths, barbers and joiners were identified as poor in the records of the
Pennsylvania Hospital for the Sick Poor, and of the Managers of the Almshouse and Workhouse, in the tax
reports of the county commissioners, and in church and charitable society records” (Pendelton 1946, 66).
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Greeks, was as likely to be viewed as the product of circumstances beyond individual control as
it was likely to be seen as a product of individual failure (Nash 1977, 64). However, shifting
attitudes toward poverty and individual responsibility materialized, in 1713, with the
establishment of Philadelphia’s first poorhouse—the privately run Quaker Friends’ Almshouse
(Pendelton 1946, 161) 22 The forging of a link between poverty and individual failure, and the
concomitant stigmatizing of the poor individual as responsible for his or her own poverty took
shape, during this period, through the municipal practice of marking indigent bodies by
stitching a red- or blue-cloth symbol upon the clothing of Philadelphia’s poor.
This practice, instituted through a law passed in 1717, required those “receiving relief
from the overseers of the poor,” a committee of municipal commissioners, to “wear upon the
right shoulder of the upper garment a large Roman P, together with the initial of the county,
city, or place of which the pauper was an inhabitant...” (Scharf and Westcott 1884, 1450). 23
This practice of visually marking the bodies of poor subjects with a “P” to designate their status
as paupers, established a prominently-displayed-visual-link between benevolent city officials—the
overseers of the poor—and subjects of charitable aid. This branding of the dependent poor
hailed these subjects into a system of public surveillance. Importantly, the establishment of this
system of surveillance, in requiring poor individuals to wittingly don the badge of stigma upon
venturing into public, materialized liberal expectations regarding the choices of poor
individuals and their future successes or failures. The poor were expected to participate in this
practice—to exercise a modicum of responsibility—in donning the identifying mark, lest they
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And with the 1732 establishment of the city’s first public almshouse.
On overseers of the poor and Philadelphia government by committee in the 18th century, see (Warner 1968,
10).
23
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suffer the disciplinary consequences: “Every poor person who should neglect or refuse to wear
such a badge was liable to the suspension or withdrawal of the relief, and also to whipping and
keeping at hard labor for twenty-one days” (1450). This branded population of indigents was
thus granted a conditional form of welfare, and their value—their worth—in the eyes of the
public and the overseers of the poor, hinged upon their witting and disciplined identification
as paupers through the donning of the letter.
This convention of marking the bodies of those requiring public aid, and disciplining
those who failed to do so, had roots in 16th-century-English-efforts to ensure the prudential
expenditure of public funds on the poor. These efforts included a poor tax—the earmarking of
public money for the care of the indigent. English critics of the tax expressed concern that such
a tax be used to support only the “worthiest” of poor subjects. The distinction between those
“worthy” poor deserving relief, and those who were “unworthy” of aid appears clearly as early
as the 16th- and 17th-century English writings and statues. These “semantics of poverty” were
outlined by William Harrison, the 16th-century English writer, who used three categories or
“degrees” to classify the poor based upon their worth (Jütte 1994).
The first two of these degrees include those poor who fall into the category of victims
of circumstance, or what Harrison terms “[t]he poor ‘by impotency’” and “[t]he poor ‘by
casualty’.” According to Harrison, the poor “ 'by impotency' ” include “the fatherless child,”
“the aged, blind, and lame,” and “the diseased person that is judged [sic] to be incurable. The
poor “ 'by casualty’ include “the wounded soldier,” “the decaied householder,” and “the sicke
persone visited with grievous…diseases.” In each of these cases, the indigent subject is
considered worthy of public aid to the extent that their lot in life—their poverty—has been
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caused by that which is out of their control. Importantly, the sick are included, in Harrison's
taxonomy, as worthy subjects of aid. To the extent that “the sicke persone visited with”
consumption was suffering poverty, he or she was “worthy,” as his or her state was attributed to
circumstances beyond his or her control (quoted in Jütte 1994, 11).
In contrast, a third degree of undeserving or “poor ‘thriftless’” are described as “the
riotour that hath consumed all,” “the vagabond that will abide no where,” and “the rog[u]e and
strumpet” (quoted in Jütte 1994, 11). This latter category of indigence classified a population of
poor individuals, deemed “unworthy” based upon the belief that they had brought about their
own indigence through idleness, vice, or bad habits. The bad habits suggested by Harrison—
drinking excessive alcohol, the idleness of the vagabond, and thieving and prostitution—were
considered to be behaviors that subjects could control. Lack of control over such habits was
thus perceived as a personal choice and as a failure of individual will. For critics of the poor
tax, this class of indigent—those who indulged such habits and thus, willed poverty upon
themselves—was unworthy of aid: the public, in the eyes of critics, was penalized in having to
support subjects who engaged in such irresponsible behavior. The emergent political-economic
considerations in 16th- and 17th- century England thus established the worth of potential
subjects of aid through an evaluation of the degree to which they had willed their poverty on
themselves. The value of the poor, vis-a-vis this political economy of worth, hinged upon the
degree to which a needy subject was perceived as committed to helping him- or herself.
Harrison's distinction between those poor deserving aid and those undeserving of aid
buttressed the formation and development of a prominent discourse and practice of 18thcentury liberal-individualism in Philadelphia: a political economy of care that operated through
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the assessment and classification of the worth of would-be-subjects of public charity—the poor
and the sick. These categories were not merely theoretical—rather they served as key
components in a rationale through which municipal and private charitable groups could
calculate and pursue the most efficient distribution of limited public and private funds,
avoiding wasted money by investing in what they perceived as the most “worthy” subjects of
aid. Yet rather than hewing to a binary evaluation of the poor as worthy or unworthy, the
implementation of this political economy of care took shape, in 18th-century Philadelphia
through the prerogative of reforming the poor and sick—a prerogative that posited that all
subjects could, through the almshouse as a reformative institution, achieve worthiness by
bettering themselves. This rationale was central to the mid-century establishment of both the
Philadelphia Hospital for the Sick Poor, and the successor to the Quaker Friends’ Almshouse—
the Bettering House. Yet in the operations of these institutions, Harrison's notion of poor
subjects of circumstance—especially those suffering from sicknesses—would be marginalized by a
political economy of care that valued able-bodiedness and productivity. Indeed, to the extent
that those suffering from chronic diseases had to first overcome their disease as a precondition
to becoming independent and productive, such incurables would find themselves devalued,
throughout the 18th- and most of the 19th-centuries, by the institutional effort to better the
subjects of charity.
The Philadelphia Hospital for the Sick Poor
In February 1752, The Pennsylvania Hospital for the Sick Poor opened its doors from a
rented house on Market Street to treat the still small, yet growing population of impoverished
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Philadelphians. 24 For the most part, the city was able to care for its poor with an “annual threepenny poor tax...occasional donations and a few hundred pounds in fines” (Nash 1976, 6).
With expanding mid-century economic conditions, jobs were available and the city was initially
able to accommodate a record number of immigrants from Germany and northern Ireland (6).
Nevertheless, the rise in poverty, however small, worried civic leaders who were loath, amidst
public resistance to taxation, to increase the three-penny poor tax.
The founding of the Hospital, due in large measure to Benjamin Franklin's advocacy,
was a direct response to the “growing dissatisfaction of the middle and upper classes with rising
poor rates” (7). At the time, Philadelphia's poor relief was based on the allocation of public
money to care for indigents both in the limited space of the almshouse, and through
outpatient relief—money given to poor people residing in their homes. Both of these methods
were managed by Philadelphia's overseers of the poor. Much like the English response to the
poor tax, critics called into question the efficiency of such management and the success in
translating the relief into the production of independent individuals. Franklin's advocacy for a
hospital spoke to these concerns—to the desire to see a more efficient method of managing the
sick poor; a method that did not waste public money on supporting the “unworthy” and
furthering a population of dependents.
Franklin “waged a shrewd newspaper campaign” to raise money for the hospital; his
support for the Hospital was based, in part, on his desire to use charitable institutional space
to care for the sick poor, but also to reform such subjects by helping them progress from
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The number of poor ranged from 80 to 100 a year during the early part of the 1750s. During its first five years
of operation, the Hospital averaged 53 sick poor a year. In its next five years, the number grew to 106 patients
(Nash 1976, 6).
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dependent and idle to independent and productive. The Hospital, according to Franklin,
would enable sick and suffering laborers to “‘become useful to themselves, their families and
the public for many years after’” (quoted in Nash 1976, 7). The association between charity,
sickness, and reform was thus focused, in Franklin's estimation, on producing a capacity,
within individuals dependent upon public aid, for future independence. Hence, Franklin
focused, not on the cure of sickness as the ultimate aim of the Hospital, but on the process of
restoring the sick to a life of labor—a productive life beyond their dependence on charity. This
life of productivity began within the Hospital through the practice of “keep[ing] the laboring
poor at their benches” engaged in tasks designed to combat idleness. The “less was done [for?]
them,” argued Franklin, “the more they did [and would continue to do] for themselves”
(quoted in Nash 1976, 18).
Franklin's vision and the Hospital goals of remaking these sick poor into productive
individuals reflected English sentiments on the disciplinary purpose of hospitals: as an English
advocate stated, the role of hospitals was not simply the treatment of sickness, but rather, “‘to
give the poor in general grateful and honorable sentiment of and inspire them with proper love
and reverence towards their superiors and by consequence promote that harmony and
subordination in which the peace and happiness of society consists.’” (quoted in Nash 1976, 8).
Hospitals, then, while ostensibly focused on curing the sick and caring for the disabled, were
also about thwarting idleness through forced labor, and disciplining the poor into an
appreciation of their subordinate place in a hierarchy, thus ensuring their reverence for those
“superiors” whose charity had enabled their reform.
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This desire to discipline the sick poor into independent individuals articulated with a
broader 18th century-political-economy-of-care that sought efficiency and thrift in the allocation
of public resources. Emerging from the vision of Franklin and others amongst Philadelphia’s
civic leaders, and influenced by the English-poor-tax and workhouse movement, was a
prudential calculus founded on the notion that charitable investments in the bodies of the
poor should yield a return, to investors, in the form of a reformed individual, a productive
individual, an individual capable of helping him- or herself to move past dependency into a
state of independence: a bettered individual. At The Pennsylvania Hospital, this attitude
materialized in the practice of requiring discharged patients to sign statements attesting to “‘the
benefit they have received in [the] hospital’” (quoted in Nash 1976, 8). Such a document
located the discharged subject in a broader web of personal responsibility and liberal
expectations: by acknowledging such a “benefit” in writing, the recipient of aid attested to the
success of the Hospital in having done its job. The implicit subtext of such an admission was
that any future poverty encountered by the discharged was attributable to a failure of the
individual. Once discharged, within the operational political economy of care, the poor bore
the responsibility to help themselves materialize a future of independence and productivity.
The requirement that the sick labor at their benches to repay their benefactors,
underscores an element in the emergent political economy of care that would continue to
constitute Philadelphia's attempts to provide for the sick poor over the coming century:
sickness, in 18th- and 19th-century Philadelphia, was increasingly remade as a phenomena that,
while often circumstantial in nature, could be overcome through the pursuit of correct
regimen: through an individual's prudential management of their own physiological economy.
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Yet this equation, as will become evident below, was fraught with ambiguities with regard to
recovery from chronic diseases like tuberculosis. For sufferers of chronic consumption, the goal
of the emergent political economy of care—the pursuit of independence through hard-work—
could, in fact, exacerbate the state of their disease. Indeed, the chronically-ill body was, by its
diseased nature, a material impediment to a political economy of care seeking to efficiently
reform the sick poor into productive individuals. Far from being resolved through more
efficient hospital and almshouse management schemes, consumptive subjects would remain,
throughout the 18th- and 19th-centuries, ambiguously constituted by bodies that would not get
well—by bodies that required dependence. The material circumstances of the consumptive
subject were inimical to a liberal-calculus of value that failed to account for the possibility that
productivity could exacerbate the disease. The emergent political economy of care established
through The Pennsylvania Hospital thus threatened to reproduce the very dependency that
civic leaders sought to mitigate by requiring productivity from sick bodies that needed rest—that
needed to be idle. This ambiguous articulation of poverty, sickness, charity, and labor rematerialized in the 1760s when a group of Quaker merchants, reacting to a rising poverty rate,
and seeking to limit the poor tax, set about the establishment of what they hoped would be a
more efficient almshouse: “The Bettering House.”
The Bettering House
An oncoming crisis for Philadelphia's poor solidified with the snow of the unusually
cold winter of 1761-1762, shaping both the material conditions of and attitudes toward the
impoverished. A wartime inflationary trend had driven up the price of wood, “reduc[ing]” the
poor “to great Extremity and Distress,” in the absence of fuel for heat. (Nash 1976, 12). The
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inflation was accompanied by an end to the full wartime employment as “contracts for
uniforms, weapons, and provisions evaporated” (11), and by an influx of immigrants in need of
work. These wartime immigrants included a group of nearly five hundred impoverished
Acadian neutrals from Nova Scotia and others from Scotland and northern Ireland. During
this very period of economic depression—as “hundreds of able-boded Philadelphians could not
raise themselves above the level of bare subsistence” (12)—negative sentiments toward the poor
took shape. Where economic fluctuations had been used in the past to explain increases in
poverty, as poor rates rose, critics fixated on the notion that inflated taxes were the result of
“more and more persons...becoming content to live the life of the idler, the profligate, or the
street beggar rather than pursue an honest trade” (16). The stereotype that the poor were
impoverished due to a self-chosen idleness caught on amongst Philadelphia philanthropists and
civic leaders. The use of economic circumstances to explain both poverty and high poor-taxes
gave way to characterizations of individual deficiencies and failures—of indigents choosing to be
poor.
The Bettering House materialized as an anecdote to these rising costs as Philadelphia's
elite scrambled, between 1762 and 1766, to cut costs by ostensibly improving upon the city's
system of poor relief. The founders of the Bettering House were a group of Quaker-merchantcivic-leaders, who, critical of the city's increasing poor-tax, submitted themselves and their
resources “to replace public authorities and administer the city’s welfare system” (Clement
1985, 40). While these merchants did espouse “benevolent concerns” toward the impoverished,
they also “distrusted the poor.” This lack of trust was founded on the impression that most
poor, given the choice, would rather receive public aid in perpetuity than work for their money.
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They questioned the political economy of care that had yielded increasing poor taxes. The new
administers of welfare saw the increased expenditure of public funds on the indigent not so
much as evidence of genuine need amongst the lower classes, but as evidence of individuals
taking advantage of the public: “more citizens were loafing and begging instead of working
steadily” (40).
Inspired by the “English public-workhouse movement,” and reflecting the goals of the
Philadelphia Hospital, the Quaker merchants' new system of welfare was founded upon a
desire to reform these subjects by linking the receipt of aid to a poor inmate's capacity to
labor. 25 While Philadelphia had been institutionalizing the indigent in various poorhouses—the
private Quaker house of 1713, and the public poorhouse of 1732—the merchant's rationale for
the Bettering House differed. In the eyes of the founders, the increased public expenditure on
the poor was having a paradoxical effect: the more spent to alleviate poverty through the higher
poor tax, the greater the poor population. In order to dissuade the impoverished from
choosing idleness and dependence, the merchants sought to further elaborate upon the liberal
principle of hard work by making the receipt of charity dependent upon labor and individual
reform.
25

“As Dorothy Marshall has shown, English attitudes toward poverty underwent a fundamental change in the
eighteenth century. Abandoning the earlier view that economic recessions and depressed wages were the main
causes of indigency [sic], social thinkers began to blame the poor themselves for their plight. Some writers also
attacked the lawmakers who passed well-intentioned relief statutes that only had the effect of cultivating
dependency and encouraging sloth in the lower class. Out of this new climate of thought came the public
workhouse movement. Throughout England in the first half of the eighteenth century the poor were taken off
outrelief and placed in workhouses where they were set to such labor-intensive tasks as linen weaving and oakum
picking. It was thought that through hard labor the poor would help pay for their own support and regain a taste
for the rewards of industry and frugality. Between the i69os and the I730S English writers also suggested that by
transferring the management of the poor to private corporations the poverty problem could be solved and the
investors even turn a profit. The English workhouse thus became a cultural artifact of the early eighteenth
century, an institution built on a moral analysis of poverty and committed to reducing the taxpayers (16) load in
maintaining the impoverished. In I723, when workhouses were operating in almost every sizable English town,
entry into these institutions became a condition of obtaining relief” (Nash 1976, 16-17).
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In 1766, the city of Philadelphia accepted the merchant’s offer: in return for the latter’s
resources and initiative, the city granted the merchants the authority to both “determine the
amount of the poor tax” and to build “a new and larger almshouse” (40). Modeled after the
Hospital for the Sick Poor, the Bettering House—formally named the Philadelphia Almshouse
and House of Employment (Nash 1976, 15)(Pendleton 194, 162)(Hunter 1932, 315)—would
serve, in both name and purpose as an institution of reform. Key to this reform was the
stipulation that the able-bodied-poor work for their care: “The prospect of hard labor in the
[almshouse] workhouse...would keep the itinerant poor away from the city and instill in
outpensioners, who were now to leave their neighborhoods and go to the Bettering House, new
incentives for finding employment or other sources of support” (Nash 1976, 16). Key, then, to
the expansion of the almshouse into a larger Bettering House, was the assumption, on the part
of the merchants, that out-pensioner aid was an inefficient method of spending public funds: if
the poor wanted resources, they were required to leave their houses, to stay in the Bettering
House, and to work, all as a means of proving that they were not “idle” or “profligate,” through
an engagement in productive practices. The Bettering House “would rehabilitate the ablebodied poor who would not work” (19).
The articulation of labor and reform of character materializes in the efforts of the
Bettering House to enlist its inmates in the almshouse Workhouse: “the poor of the city were
employed at weaving, picking oakum and other simple tasks” (Hunter 1932, 318), including
cobbling shoes, manufacturing nails, and weaving cloth stockings (Nash 1976, 20; Nash 1976,
27 on stockings). Putting the poor to work ostensibly actualized several objectives in the mid18th century political economy of care: it would yield revenue for the almshouse—the items
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manufactured and food harvested by inmates would allow the poor to pay for the costs of their
care. It would discipline the poor into good work habits. Inmates of the almshouse did not
simply work to generate revenue; rather, they worked “in an effort to improve their condition”
(Nash 16). And the requirement that the able-bodied work for aid would serve as a disincentive
to those who had formerly received outpatient pay: the rationale was that poor out-pensioners,
cut off from public funds, would rather seek a job than be condemned to living and laboring
within the Bettering House's workhouse (Nash 16). Key then, to the development of poor relief
and charity in 18th-century Philadelphia, was the move toward greater efficiency—treating all the
poor in a single space—and toward the institutionalization of practices intended to parse out
“unworthy” character traits by providing aid to those subjects who willingly reformed
themselves into productive individuals through the pursuit of workhouse labor. The ideal
product of the new almshouse was thus a worthy individual committed to bettering him or
herself by demonstrating progress—through participation in Workhouse labor—toward a state of
independence and productiveness.
In spite of the efforts of the Quaker merchants to produce productive individuals, the
Bettering House, like the rest of Philadelphia, suffered through economic depression and its
utility to the dislocated was questionable. Unemployment remained high—indeed, “[i]t was
not...unwillingness to work, but economic dislocation, that had filled the roads into
Philadelphia with itinerant poor and left hundreds of new immigrants and resident
workingmen without jobs in the city” (20). As intended by the founders, the reputation of the
Bettering House amongst the poor was that of a daunting institution. The merchants believed
that the cultivation of such a reputation would serve to dissuade idelenss—more poor would
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seek employment on their own so as to avoid being condemned to labor in the Bettering
House. However, the resultant effect was far more grim as evidenced when, “[i]n 1768 and 1769
[the overseers of the poor] informed the Bettering House managers that many of the poor in
their wards, ‘when Urged to go in [to the Bettering House] for Relief, declared in a Solemn
manner that they would rather perish through want than go in’” (16). The overseers suggestion
that the poor saw their options as a choice between laboring at the Bettering House or
succumbing to death, suggests both the bleak economic circumstances, and the bleakness of
the almshouse, that continued to produce a population of impoverished individuals who could
not, due to the circumstances of economic depression, find employment—individuals that, in
the manager's cynical estimation, preferred death over labor.
In spite of the general dislike for the Bettering House, the institution proved incapable
of accommodating all the needy, its ranks routinely spilling over into the Philadelphia
Hospital, where “[a]dmissions rose from an annual average of 228 from 1761 to 1765, to...358
from 1771 to 1775” (21-22). In 1772, with a total of 3763 taxable males residing in Philadelphia,
no less than 410 adult males resided, for a portion of the year, “in the workhouse, the
almshouse, or the Hospital for the Sick Poor, or received aid from private agencies of the
overseers of the poor” (28). In addition to one in every ten men circulating through
Philadelphia's charitable circuit, some 637 women resided in, or received aid from the same
institutions and groups.
Beyond the spatial limitations, while the labor of the poor within The Bettering House
did generate an income, it was not sufficient to cover the mounting costs of caring for such a
large population of poor inmates—a population that, far from “reforming,” would leave the
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almshouse only to return for aid at a later date. By 1775, the almshouse mangers
acknowledged, in their Minutes, that having received aid in the almshouse, the poor usually
“ran away, only to ‘return mostly as sick, naked, and buthernsome [sic] as at first, and proceed
this way with Impunity, as often as they please’” (27-28). Thus, the almshouse materialized
paradoxically, as a daunting institution for those who feared its disciplinary practices, and as a
revolving door for those who, “with Impunity,” came and went, all the while failing, in the eyes
of the managers, to reform. The almshouse struggled to care for this revolving cast of inmates,
and in spite of the efforts to curb spending, by the end of the year, its managers noted their
significant debt (28). By 1768, having failed to cut costs through the institutionalization of a
calculus of care based on the reform of the idle poor into productive individuals, the thwarted
Quaker-merchants found themselves forced to do what they had organized to avoid in the first
place: they raised the poor tax. 26
Within the walls of both the Philadelphia Hospital, and the Bettering House, a
political economy of care thus emerged to address the perceptions, of both civic leaders and the
middle class in Philadelphia, that public aid produced the very poverty—and impoverished
subjects—it sought to alleviate. And that charitable institutions could serve to lower public
expenditures on the poor and ensure that individual subjects were not receiving aid in
perpetuity through the indenturing of inmates in workhouses. Yet the Quaker merchant's
attempts to improve upon previous iterations of the almshouse proved no more effective than
their predecessors. In spite of these failures, the curious effect of these efforts was not to
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After the passage of legislation “barring the Quakers from management” the house is said to have failed
(Pendleton 1946, 162). The management of the Quaker merchant's ended toward the end of the century, with a
new group of managers taking over the Bettering House.
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engender debate on the structural conditions and circumstances shaping the shifting fates of
the poor; rather, the effect of the materialization of this 18th-century-political-economy-of-care
was a further reification of the “worthy” liberal individual as an independent subject capable of
laboring for him or herself and a continued stigmatization of the idle and “unworthy.” 27 These
results were further complicated by the confrontation with chronic illness, for incurables were
likely to require aid in perpetuity and to find the effects of hard labor to be exacerbating of
their conditions.
19th Century Reform: Illness and the Remaking of the 18th Century Political
Economy of Care
The Bettering House's implementation of this 18th century political economy of care,
based off of English taxonomies of the value of subjects of aid—worth and unworth—proved,
throughout the next century, inadequate to social reformers who found its black and white
classification of individuals to be an impediment to reforming individuals—especially the sick.
The almshouse's failure to differentiate between the various needs of the differing types of poor
seeking charity was clear in relation to illness. For inmates of both the Philadelphia Hospital,
and the Bettering House, the formula and goal of charity was to efficiently re-make the idle
dependent into productive-independent bodies. Yet the presence, in the poorhouse, of the
ubiquitous invalid—a subject formed through the articulation of sickness and poverty—posed a
challenge to an economic approach to charity founded upon bettering individuals. Indeed, in
practice, it was difficult to appraise the “worth” of a sick body and the precise relationship
between a subject's sickness and their destitution. For the 18th century, the difficulty of this
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On Bettering House failure to reform and financial troubles see (Nash 1976, 26-27).

133

appraisal was partially overlooked through the implementation of a calculus of efficiency—an
effort to spend public funds with prudence—based upon the gathering and servicing of all types
of poor beneath one roof. As a result, poor bodies in various states of sickness—both mental
and physical—and varying degrees of destitution were allowed to mix, indiscriminately.
However, there were some efforts to distinguish and treat the sick in a manner specific
to their ailment at both the Philadelphia Hospital and within the walls of the Bettering House.
While the precise nature of this traffic is difficult to discern, it is evident that the latter
institution developed its own medical wards and hired its own staff of physicians to care for the
sick who were “admitted [to the almshouse] on account of illness.” These wards consisted of “a
Laying in Hospital, where upwards of 30 poor destitute women in a year, are carefully delivered
and comfortably provided for in that extremity...a Hospital for Curables and Incurables of all
ages and sexes, and in every Disease and Malady, even to Lunacy and Idiotism...and very
generally an Institution for clothing the Naked, feeding the hungry, healing the sick and
administering Comfort and Relief to the Distressed of every kind in different ways” (Hunter
1933, 45). As such, the historical portrait of the almshouse is of a space that strived, in part, to
be a hospital and to specialize through the discerning and treating of specific types of
impoverished subjects.
Yet, in practice, such specialized treatment proved difficult to implement and tended,
like the treatment of the flu victims in 1889, to favor care for acute illnesses. This difficulty
was, in part, due to the sheer prevalence of sickness. So rife with sickness were both the bodies
of the poor and the air of the almshouse, that by the end of 1795, 114 of the 301 almshouse
inmates had some form of illness, including many with consumption (42). The overseers of the
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poor would attempt to identify “the more serious” but treatable cases, sending them “directly
from their homes to the Pennsylvania Hospital, when a hospital fee was to be paid” with public
funds (40). On other occasions, patients residing at the almshouse were sent to the
Pennsylvania Hospital as evidenced in the words “Sent to the Hospital” on records, thus
suggesting a movement between the two institutions—a traffic likely commencing when an
almshouse inmate was diagnosed with an acute, treatable illness (39-40). When the sick were
suffering from an acute disease, such subjects were more likely to be placed in a bed at the
Pennsylvania Hospital. Conversely, those sick subjects left to suffer in the almshouse hospital
wards were primarily those who were deemed beyond treatment, beyond recovery—destined to
die. Thus, in spite of the cultivation of space for the sick in the almshouse, those admitted to
the wards were often already chronically ill, or in a state of such illness that they “died in a few
days” (40). Through the Bettering House's routine bedding of chronic sufferers, the reputation
of the almshouse as a space where the sick went to die thus materialized.
Importantly, then, the institutions of charity and medicine in 18th-century Philadelphia
tended toward the conflation of poverty and chronic disease. Through the attempted
implementation of a political economy of care designed to efficiently manage the largest
amount of poor in the smallest amount of space, with the lowest expenditure of public
resources, the process of judging the worth and unworth of subjects articulated with distinctions
between acute disease and chronic disease. Yet such categories proved insufficient in
representing the realities of sickness and poverty: over time, most inmates would occupy a
shifting ground between health and illness. This was particularly pronounced with regard to
consumptives. Consumptives set uncomfortably at the intersections of the very intersections of
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acute and chronic—capable of experiencing acute symptoms and equally capable of
experiencing no symptoms at all, the consumptive subject proved vexing to the extent that they
rarely manifested a linear bettering. Rather, they moved in and out of suffering. The specific
circumstances of consumptives would prove, throughout the 19th century, incompatible with a
political economy of care undergirded by an assessment of progressive betterment. As a result,
consumptives would be not be valued—in fact, as late as the 1830s, they proved more valuable
in death than in life.
The 19th-century Almshouses: Blockley and the “Indiscriminate Mixing”
When Samuel Morton took up residence in the almshouse hospital in the late 1820s,
just prior to the erection, in the 1830s of the infamous Blockley Almshouse, consumptives
remained a population fated to die—victims of a dread disease that still had no cure. Morton, a
native Philadelphian, who would later garner notoriety for founding craniometry—the practice
of discerning supposed racial intelligence through the measuring of the human skull—began his
tenure when “in 1829, [he] received the appointment of physician to the Philadelphia Almshouse Hospital,” the institutional successor to the Bettering House (Morton 1837, viii). By
1833, he had taken charge of the medical wards and he devoted himself to a thorough study of
its consumptive inmates (62). Morton's tenure paints a portrait of the demographics of the
early 19th-century almshouse and of the value and fate of those suffering from phthisis.
Morton commented on the prevalence of chronic consumptives in the almshouse:
“The wards of this institution habitually contain several hundred patients; exhibiting almost all
the maladies to which man is subject, and especially those of a chronic nature, among which phthisis
may be said to predominate. The deaths from this disease alone are little short of one hundred
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annually” (viii; italics added). Morton thus observed a death from consumption nearly every
three days.
The worth of these chronically-ill consumptives in the early 19th century is evident in
Morton's writings. In the absence of a clear medical cure for the disease, almshouse inmates
suffering from chronic disease, generally, and from phthisis, specifically, seemingly had no
value in life; rather, they became valuable in death, as objects of scientific inquiry. Morton
relished the opportunity presented by the consumptive body in death: the chance “to avail
myself of every opportunity of comparing the opinion I had formed during the life of the
patient, with the appearances of the body after death” (ix). With productivity and
independence as the ideals pursued through the almshouse reform of its inmates,
consumptives faced an impossible situation to the extent that they had a low probability of
experiencing an independent-productive future. The consumptive awaited his or her death—
and subsequent autopsy—with the beds of the almshouse serving as mere receptacles for his or
her chronically-ill body. Living consumptive bodies thus took shape as material impediments to
a political economy of care based on the productive reformation of the sick-poor. Such bodies
held no productive value in life; rather they were fated to be a material drain on public
resources, only to become useful in death, on the cold edges of the physician’s scalpel and
autopsy table.
Flick's advocacy, in the wake of the 1889-1890 influenza pandemic, for “special
hospitals” for consumptives derived, thus, from this historical devaluing of the chronicconsumptive body within framework of a liberal political economy of care and through the
practices of the almshouse. Flick's concerns developed in reaction to the continued ignoring,
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by the management of the almshouses over the course of the 19th century, of the co-constitutive
nature of disease and dependence—a nature that produced idleness as an effect of sickness
rather than a self-chosen state of being. Flick's agitation for the special treatment of
consumptives would emerge from a broader 19th -century critique of the failure of the
almshouse to identify, separate, and treat the specific types of sick poor—to value them, in life.
The criticism was levied at precisely the incapacity of almshouse managers to distinguish and
organize in reaction to the specific needs of sick inmates and the resulting devaluing of ill
bodies in the almshouse. The critique was levied, most robustly, at the new Blockley
almshouse.
Blockley Almshouse: The Inevitable Mixing of Bodies
The interior of the Blockley almshouse with its “gray walls,” was dark—the
“embodiment of gloom.” With the passing of daylight, the inmates “constantly” burnt “oil in
small hand-lamps” to bring light to their surroundings. With a dim glow and dense smoke
ushering forth from the lamps, the black corridors reverberated with the incessant coughing of
consumptives, “soil[ing] the walls and the[ir] clothing” with sputum (Lawrence 1976, 201-202,
Rosenthal 1998, 2).
The almshouse exterior loomed large and square, an imposing mass of buildings spread
across ten acres of land on the west bank of the Schuylkill. Atop a vast swathe of otherwisepleasant-green farmland and meadows, its four interconnected buildings sat, contained within
a fence reaching high enough to discourage the intrepid from escaping. Spatially isolated from
the city proper, the Blockley almshouse cast its shadow across the meadows of West
Philadelphia, a grim specter of the city’s commitment to caring for those who seemingly could
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not care for themselves. As an isolated and harrowing structure, the architecture and location
of Blockley embodied a moral message. Much like its predecessor, The Bettering House, in the
minds of civic leaders and social reformers, the sheer presence of such an intimidating
structure, with its foreboding interior and reputed discipline-intensive-interior operations,
would act as a deterrent to those who were considering a life of self-chosen poverty, idleness,
and vice.
Constructed in 1834 in an effort to improve upon the aging Bettering House, by 1872
Blockley housed some four thousand indigents. The operations of the almshouse were
designed to actualize the aims of a familiar political economy of care: the allocation and use of
public funds to manage and care for the sick and poor in the most cost-effective manner.
Indeed, the principles of governance guiding this mid-19th-century iteration of the almshouse
harkened back to the visions and goals of both the founders of the Philadelphia Hospital and
the managers of The Bettering House. By attempting to gather all the city’s poor in one place,
almshouse progenitors sought, once again, to streamline both the expenditure of public money
and the resources—social workers, management, physicians—necessary to treat what they
perceived to be the problem of the poor. The almshouse, in its very design, operation, and
reputation, was touted as a prudent economic venture: to cut down on costly aid for the poor,
the treatment of poverty needed to begin, according to social reformers, by dissuading those
who would choose idleness and begging over laboring and productivity.
A place full of anxious “excitement, noise, [and] quarreling” (Ray 1873, 4), the inmates
were ostensibly sorted by their conditions. By 1872, the four buildings of Blockley were subdivided
into various wards to house subjects based on their condition—the men’s almshouse, the
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women’s almshouse, the combined workhouse, hospital and children’s and old women’s
asylum, and finally, a building for the insane (Clement 1985, 95). Blockley thus served as a
catch-all for all forms of poor and sick: from the sick who could not afford a private hospital, to
the orphans of the Children’s Asylum (Ray 1873, 12); from subjects possessed of “innate
shiftlessness” to those suffering a “feebleness” resulting, according to reformers, from their
pursuit of a life of vice (3). Included, as well, were the venereal patients and the prostitutes—
and paupers of all manner. And while the insane were crowded into their own ward, two to
three bodies to a room of six feet by ten (3), an over-abundance of such patients, coupled with a
lack of space, forced their overflow into the broader population of non-insane inmates. Indeed,
this overflowing of one type of inmate into a population of other types, was so typical of
Blockley as to be the standard. The ideal of using architecture to maintain separation amongst
differing classes of inmates failed to materialize in any systematic fashion.
Beyond the recognition of the various needs that had to be met before an impoverished
individual could become independent, the taxonomy of value established through the
application, within the walls of Blockley, of the 19th-century political economy of care, was
further challenged by the fluidity of the character and ailments afflicting various inmates.
Where the almshouse was ideally, in the blueprint of managers and officials, a temporary-onetime stop for indigents moving linearly from dependence to independence, in practice,
Blockley's doors were as revolving as those of the Bettering House. Indeed, contrary to this
supposed linear process of reform and achieving independence, the almshouse catered to the
far-more-frequent tendencies of the needy to move in-and-out of dependency. This circularity
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materialized in the almshouse designation of “regulars”–a named applied to those poor
subjects who came and went—those to whom the almshouse doors were constantly revolving.
Such was the case with the “regular” John Miller, a Scottish-born blacksmith who
passed away, seemingly suffering from consumption, in the almshouse in 1864 (Rosenberg
1992, 186). Miller was characterized by almshouse records as intemperate. And while he had
ostensibly been in good health, in mid-1862 the almshouse took him in “with cramps in his
legs which [were] attributed to a “debauch” and sleeping outdoors” (186). Miller's initial stay in
the almshouse was brief. And while the details of his leaving remain vague, he quickly failed to
actualize a permanent state of independence outside the walls of Blockley: four months later,
he sought re-admittance.
Importantly, a distinction was made, upon this, his second admittance: in attributing
his impoverished condition to his consumption of alcohol, the almshouse managers bedded
him in the drunkards’ ward. While the populations of Blockley inevitably mixed, the managers
attempted segregation by condition. This placing of Miller with the “unworthy” drunkards
rather than in the male-medical-ward devalued him. To be located amongst Blockley's
intemperate was to ostensibly assume the stigmatized status of an unworthy subject of care.
However, the alcoholic subject confronted civic officials and reformers with a difficult
subjectivity, “for [alcoholics] occupied a gray area between that of the legitimately (morally
neutral) sick and that occupied by the culpable offender. True, the alcoholic might not be
immediately responsible for his actions...but he was ultimately responsible for the decision to
drink, which over time, brought about his addiction” (189). Furthermore, as Rosenberg notes,
“[t]he alcoholic’s dilemma was physiological as well as moral; no medical man doubted, no
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matter what the drinker’s original responsibility, that delirium tremens could and often did
kill, and was especially dangerous to inmates thrown untreated and unattended into cells to
sober up” (189). Hence, Miller occupied an uncomfortable position somewhere between the
failed individualism of a subject whose poverty was the self-inflicted product of the choice to
drink, and the worthy subjectivity of one afflicted by a pitiable condition brought on by a
psychological and physiological need for alcohol.
Complicating matters, Miller did not last long in the drunkard's ward as he was
transferred to the medical ward “for a cough that hinted at incipient tuberculosis” (186). There,
he seemingly recovered—so much so, that in the spring he was moved from medical to the male
outwards. While housed in the outwards, he was put to work, manufacturing iron bedsteads.
His bettering was ostensibly complete, having moved through a state of unworthy drunkenness
and circumstantial consumption to a state of productive well-being. In August, a “bettered”
John Miller left the almshouse house “on liberty.” Within two months, however, Miller
returned “complaining of a severe pain in his leg. The Limb became livid and Miller died a few
weeks later” (186). The exact cause of his death was not determined.
Through Miller's fluid embodiment of various subjectivities along the politicaleconomic-continuum of value—debauched, drunkard, consumptive, bettered and free to leave—
poverty, sickness, and productivity articulate. To the extent that Miller was a “regular” of the
almshouse, his moving in-and-out of a state of dependency was not easily explainable—and was
surely not reducible to a flaw in his character. In fact, to the extent that Miller was suffering
some form of sickness—and possibly suffering from consumption—his very act of laboring over
iron bedsteads and pursuing independence, “on liberty,” beyond the high walls of Blockley
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might have contributed to the circumstances of his death. In other words, the foundational
goal of this political economy of care underwriting both the 18th- and 19th-century iterations of
the almshouse—the reform of the idle into productive subjects—was paradoxically at odds with
itself with regard to the reform of the sick. To the extent that the chronically ill actualized their
independence though labor, they ran the risk of exacerbating an illness that would incapacitate
them, thereby forcing them back through the revolving door of the almshouse. Miller's fate was
not idiosyncratic but rather “typical of that of the working men who filled so large a proportion
of Blockley's beds” (186).
The indiscriminate mixing of factors that were ostensibly within Miller's control—his
drinking—and those circumstantial factors that were beyond his control—his succumbing to a
sickness that was, if not tuberculosis, likely a chronic condition—underscores the manner in
which the political-economic expediency based on the calculation of the worth of would-bepoor-subjects of public aid was not, in many cases, so expedient. Given all the mitigating social
and biological factors contributing to Miller's need for public aid and almshouse care,
distinguishing failed willpower from unlucky circumstances proved impossible. Miller thus
embodied—though his ambiguous subjectivity and shifting bodily conditions—a material
challenge to the liberal-reformist practice of assigning value to the subjects of charity. And the
dynamism of his condition suggests the manner in which the sick and poor proved capable—
indeed, likely—of moving in and out of certain states and typologies. The very premise of
spatially separating the needy inmates by condition was thus undermined by a complicated
interplay of factors that included the vagaries of diagnosis, the confusions arising from the
relapse of chronic disease, and the capacity for individuals to suffer from social-structural forces
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that were beyond their control. Indeed, the difficulty of locating Miller on a continuum of
worth and the articulation between Miller's symptoms and his treatment within the almshouse
points to an element of inefficiency in the administration of Blockley: the almshouse sick were
often not cared for and treated in specialized fashions that catered to the specific natures of
their maladies. Such was the concern of reformers like Flick who argued that the bettering of
consumptives required that they be treated in a precisely arranged hospital environment—a
space designed to cater to their needs.
Lawrence Flick Poses as a “Blockleyite”
Prior to investing himself in the anti-tuberculosis movement, in 1879 and 1880,
Lawrence Flick served a year-long tenure as a physician at the Blockley almshouse-hospital.
Toward the end of his time at Blockley, he wrote a series of letters to the editor of the
Philadelphia Star. In these letters, Flick, assuming a sarcastic tone, pretended to be an almshouse
inmate—a “Blockleyite” (Flick 1944, 108). His remarks mocked the professed mission of the
almshouse as a space of reformation. Flick linked the institution's failure to reform with its
managerial failure to segregate the various types of sick subjects living within its walls. He
argued that the almshouse paradoxically produced the very vice it sought to eliminate in its
subjects, by allowing those “unworthy” subjects of vice to mix with the “worthy” and innocent.
He wrote,
Characters of every description, and every grade of degradation, are thrown
together...The comparatively innocent girl of fifteen, whose first unguarded moment
hurled her up with instant physical ruin, the over-confiding maid whose blind love
made her the pitiable victim of one of Satan’s satellites, and the heartbroken wife who
too late discovered that her hand was not sought for the rose in her cheek, have all to
mix with the hardened sinner in whom vice comes naturally and whose only ambition
throughout life had been to emulate her ancestry. The smooth-faced boy whom bad
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company led into sin, through the convivial influence of the social glass, must be in the
steady company of the lascivious rakes and unstrung criminals. What is the
consequence? This retreat for the relief of the worse than unfortunate and which ought
to be not only a reformatory but a protection to what innocence may be left, is a
hotbed of immorality. Every condition which can further the development of vice is
there, while no inducements are thrown out to the practice of virtue. The mode of
living, the surroundings and the company are all fraught with the most pernicious
tendency. (109)
To the extent that Blockley sought the reform of its subjects, Flick's incisive critique suggested
that the opposite was in fact happening. Innocent girls suffering from syphilis from but one
“unguarded moment,” and young boys who had fallen in with “bad company” and alcohol
were subjects, in Flick's estimation, with a degree of “innocence...left.” Yet, once in the
almshouse, they could not preserve their innocence, much less experience a reform of any
negative habits they had acquired due to the manner in which they were “thrown together”
with seriously degraded characters. For Flick, vice and immorality saturated the very air of
Blockely like a contagion—the very “mode of living, the surroundings” and the subjects of
charity were all an inducement to vice. Underlying Flick's description of the conditions of the
almshouse was a critique of the political economy of care, inherited from the 18th-century
almshouse managers, that thought it efficient and prudent to house and treat all types of poor
beneath one roof. In his estimation, the execution of such a rationale could only work against
the professed almshouse mission of reform: “‘Nothing can be done for their reform,’” he wrote,
“‘but everything can be done, and is done, to cast them deeper into the mire’” (quoted in Flick
1944, 110). 28 Flick's late-19th century concerns were predated in the middle of the century as
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other reformers took issue with the indiscriminate mixing of the subjects of charity beneath the
almshouse roof and with the failure of the institution to achieve the bettering it sought.
Blockley the “Mere Receptacle”
Such criticisms were evident in the observations of Dorothea Dix, a mid-century
reformer and advocate for the insane. Dix traveled through Pennsylvania, surveying the state's
prisons and Blockley as part of her broader effort to assess the conditions of inmates around
New England and the eastern states. In recounting her experience at Blockley, Dix, like the
almshouse managers of the 18th-century, expressed her desire to efficiently treat the sick poor.
She situated her observations within a broader concern for a political economy of care: “If
idleness is the nurse of vice and crime, it would seem consistent with the purest political
economy, to provide employment for all who are able to labour in the alms-house.” Thus, Dix,
in poetically proffering the capacity for “idleness” to act as a “nurse” for “vice and crime”
reiterated the oft-repeated rationale of using charity as a means of reforming idle bodies
through the requirement of almshouse labor. Yet key to her assessment was a qualification of
the notion that the almshouse was efficient or even successful in producing this capacity for
labor in all its subjects.
Dix's criticisms were twofold: on the one hand, the almshouse was not adequately
treating the sick. It served as a “mere receptacle” for sick bodies—beds to die in—rather than as
a curative or bettering institution. She wrote, “If an extensive alms-house is necessary to receive
the crowds, the thousands of sane paupers, surely a hospital on a curative foundation is also
necessary, and to be preferred to a mere receptacle” (Dix 1845, 250). Dix carefully documented
the relative neglect and sometimes disturbing treatment of the almshouse's insane population,
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arguing that the absence of a “curative foundation” at Blockley threatened to perpetuate the
very problem reformers sought to alleviate: the production of bodies idling, and thus needing
aid, in perpetuity.
Dix continued her critique, entertaining the interaction between circumstances and
individual failure that contributed to the destitution of the almshouse's insane inmates:
It may be argued by some, that many who are sent to this hospital, are the victims of
their own vices and indiscretions, and are undeserving the special care solicited. Many
of them are unworthy: in all probability the majority may have abused their
privileges...and impaired their health by indulgences and excesses...But shall not these
find mercy, and pity, and succour! [sic] You do not abandon the criminal in the jail; the
juvenile offender finds a “Refuge”; and the halls of your penitentiary echo to the voices
of those who, by earnest counsels and instruction, strive to reclaim the convict from
perverse and criminal habits, to rectitude and duty. Let not the erring, perhaps once
vicious insane, alone be abandoned. (250)
Here, Dix advocates for Blockley's insane population by complicating any easy taxonomy of
“worthy” and “unworthy” subjects with regard to an individual's future potential by suggesting
that even the “once vicious” are candidates for reform. If the insane were treated in a
specialized hospital, she argued, their reform—their “restor[ation] to reason and usefulness”—
might be possible. To the extent that an institution was simply a receptacle, it failed to reform.
Dix's critique was successful in convincing the state of Pennsylvania to establish an
institution dedicated to the treatment of the insane. Yet the problem remained unresolved and,
in the latter half of the decade, observers of the operations of the almshouse would not only
reiterate Dix's position on the inadequate treatment of the insane: they would add to the
critique by noting that the almshouse's failure to adequately separate the sick poor based on
their malady and their requirements for specialized treatment was resulting in further
inefficiencies.
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A More Efficient Political Economy of Care: Ray and the Need for Specialized Treatment of
the Sick Poor
In spite of Dix's expose on the conditions of Blockley, the almshouse still appeared to
be a “mere receptacle” almost thirty years later when by Dr. Isaac Ray, a psychiatric expert,
presented to the Social Science Association of Philadelphia on the need for poorhouse reform.
That March of 1873, Ray broadened Dix's critique of the institutions failure to rehabilitate the
insane. He opened up the conversation further by questioning the prudence of treating, not
just the insane, but all types of sick poor within the same institution and without specialized
treatment.
Ray proposed a charitable approach based on principles of “wise economy and an
enlightened humanity” (Ray 1873, 1). He noted the broad liberal advocacy for the provision of
public support for the indigent and celebrated that such social welfare had become “an
imperative duty of society” (1). 29 He then characterized the problem facing government
officials, reformers, and social scientists in the provision of such aid: how to provide public
support “to accomplish the greatest amount of good with the smallest amount of harm”: in
other words, how to achieve the care of the poor in the most economic and least costly manner.
In order to do the greatest good with the least amount of harm, the political economy of care
in Philadelphia, as envisioned by Ray, would need to take up the following considerations: “the
burden upon the tax-payers must be rendered as light as possible by a judicious expenditure of
money; the mode adopted must furnish no encouragement to pauperism; and, lastly, it must
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furnish relief in the most efficient and humane manner, thus ensuring, where it is possible, a
return at the earliest moment of the powers of self-support” (1-2).
Ray's 1873 articulation of the liberal imperative of welfare for the poor thus rearticulated a number of the tenants of the 18th-century Bettering House, including the efficient
production of reformed, “self-support[ing]” individuals. Welfare would only work, in his
estimation if the following conditions could be met: the public could not be heavily taxed;
their resources needed to be invested in practices that ensured that individuals did not become
perpetually dependent on assistance; and such resources needed to yield “humane” treatments
and lasting results that led to the independence of the poor and sick.
Yet echoing Dix's critique of Blockley, Ray saw no solution to the question of
efficiency—no obvious bettering—so long as the practices of the almshouse yielded an
indiscriminate mixing of all types of poor bodies within a single institutional space. “It is
impossible,” Ray suggested, “for any one person to administer the affairs of such heterogeneous
bodies as those which compose our almshouse.” The heterogeneous bodies undermined
attempts at “obtaining the best results of an efficient organization of the service” (14).
According to Ray, success in administering economic care would require scientific “principles
of management” (3). Such principles, for Ray, involved a re-evaluation of precisely what
constituted efficiency in caring for the sick and a corresponding implementation of specialized
space and practices of care.
Thus, in contrast to 18th-century poorhouse managers, Ray was sensitive to what he
perceived as a failure in the administration of the almshouse—a tendency toward overeconomizing by simply throwing all the needy together as a cost-cutting measure: “the problem,
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as Ray suggests, is that “economy [will be] carried too far for the best interest” (2). Ray noted
that, in practice, the ideal of treating all the poor in a single space did not translate into success
when it came to treating the sick within the almshouse. Drawing a distinction between the
management of the sick and the poor, Ray claimed that the almshouse hospital should not be
“managed in the spirit of a pauper establishment” because the political economic calculus
needed to be distinctly tailored to treat the symptoms of the sick inmates. The requirements of
the sick, according to Ray, differed from the requirements of the non-sick: “The paramount
consideration must be, not how cheaply the patients can be kept, but how speedily they can be cured,
and how far their sufferings can be alleviated” (10, italics added). This issue of carrying
economy “too far” was particularly pronounced in matters of sickness. This was particularly
evident with regard to the nursing staff at the Blockley hospital. He critiqued the practice of
using former almshouse sick as nurses, and not paying them well. He continues, “this kind of
service is the result of economical considerations proceeding from the natural principle of
saving the public from each and every expense that can possibly be dispensed with. I have not
fault to find with this [economically prudent] motive, but I doubt if the public are not, in the
long run, actual losers by the arrangement” (8). Hence, Ray argued that attempts by almshouse
managers to cut costs by hiring untrained nurses, while initially effective in lowering costs, and
thereby reducing the tax burden, had an inefficient effect in the long run: the untrained nurses
provided a lower quality of care, and thus patients who were slower to get better required
resources for a more sustained period of time. To the extent that the almshouse failed to invest
resources in the curing of the sick, the ill not only could not be expected to be productive in
the absence of a cure; rather, they would be a constant drain upon the almshouse coffers.
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The critiques of Dix and Ray thus established the need for a political economy of care
capable of distinguishing the process of achieving physiological betterment—getting over a disease—
from the liberal imperative of bettering poor subjects by reforming the dependent into independent
individuals. They thus challenged a political economy of care, developed through the various
iterations of 18th- and 19th-century almshouse management, that sought a blanket efficiency in
reforming all poor bodies, without regard for specific illnesses, into independent individuals.
Their re-thinking of the economy of care suggested that, insofar as the sick routinely made up a
large portion of almshouse inmates, such subjects required specialized attention and treatment
to ensure that their health was rehabilitated before they were subjected to the same
expectations. To not do so would be, in the long run, to incur greater costs as the sick would
only become sicker. And, paradoxically, to impose the same expectations of productivity upon
the reform of the sick was to potentially encourage dependence to the extent that labor proved
inimical to cures in so many instances. The sick, like John Miller, might very well suffer more
from being forced into productivity.
The mingling of pure and impure bodies, noted at various moment by Dix and Ray,
undermined the legitimacy of Blockley's hospital wards, as observed by Dr. Wood, a prominent
physician, in 1887. Blockley, according to Wood “‘is not worthy to be called a hospital. It is
nothing but a part of the Almshouse; its inmates are stigmatized as paupers; it is in improper
buildings and the pure and impure are mingled indiscriminately together.’” Dr. Horatio Wood,
whose resume included time at both the almshouse and the General Hospital, emphasized that
there was not a voluntary hospital bed in the entire city, “‘in which a poor man or woman,
without influence, can feel sure of being cared for in the hour of trouble’” (quoted in
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Rosenberg 1992, 194). Such was the case, in 1889, for the consumptives of Philadelphia
General Hospital as influenza crossed the Atlantic to dock at the ports of the east of coast of
the United States. Yet this lack of hospital beds for the tubercular was especially suspect as it
belied the general overabundance of such quarters in the city.
The 1890s and the Re-Valorization of Consumptives
In spite of the critiques of reformers, the specialization at Blockley did not happen.
However, in matters of health and treatment, Philadelphia did indulge in creating more
generalized spaces for the treatment of the sick. By 1879, the indulgence was so great that the
Philadelphia State Board of Public Charities claimed that the city “needs no more hospitals.”
Over the next few decades, this claim would continue to be repeated as city officials debated
the use of public monies to build new hospitals and to fund pre-existing ones. With “the
establishment of major hospitals in the 1880s,” the city experienced a phenomenon of “overbedding” (Stevens 1984, 474). Yet in spite of this overabundance, subjects of chronic disease
remained on the fringes of treatment as they still proved to be of little value—inimical to a
system of medical charity invested in treating subjects that manifested a propensity to get
better. 30 “The problem was not sickness alone, but chronic illness, for it was such cases that
private hospitals felt unwilling or unable to admit and which filled large numbers of long-term
beds at Blockley. As late as 1887, for example, the census at Blockley was 1,200, while the
Pennsylvania Hospital was treating only 164 patients” (Rosenberg 1992, 194). Consumptives
were included amongst these chronic patients being treated: “‘We have classes that the
Pennsylvania Hospital cannot receive for want of means,’” the Blockley authorities emphasized,
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“‘568 chronic or incurable cases, such as consumptives, paralytics, epileptics, and patients with
cancer’” (quoted in Rosenberg 1992, 194). It was within the context of precisely this
phenomenon—a city with too many hospital beds, yet too few to treat consumptives—and
Koch's work on the material cause of tuberculosis, that Flick began to advocate to his peers and
to municipal officials, for more beds, for a specialized hospitals, and for the possibility of a cure
for consumptives.
The problem then, for Flick, as he faced an audience of physicians, delivering his
address on “Special Hospitals for Consumptives” was a problem of value the late-19th century
consumptive. These chronic incurables, formed at the awkward intersections of circumstantial
misfortune—tuberculosis—and medical limitations—the lack of a consistent and widely available
cure—emerged as material impediments to attempts at efficient economy. At best, consumptives
simply took up space, lying in wait for their deaths. At worst, they both took up space and
disturbed or threatened to make other patients sick. The Boston City Hospital was clear in
stating the problem posed by chronic illness and in practicing a policy that mitigated the
uncertainties of resource expenditure and management that came along with the treatment of
chronic disease: the hospital “‘impressively forb[ade] the admission, into a hospital, of patients
who can be equally well cared for in an almshouse. The object of hospitals is to treat disease,
not to afford an asylum for the idle or decrepit’” (quoted in Rosenberg 1992, 195). Indeed, in
the absence of a clear cure, chronic consumptive bodies were not so much sick as they were
“idle” and “decrepit” and thus, a tax upon hospitals where the subjects of acute disease, in
their curability, received priority. The ease with which chronic conditions were exaggerated into
the language of the unworthy subject—the “idle or decrepit”—and the corresponding pursuit of
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hospital admissions policies designed to focus on the treatment of acute cases rather than
chronic cases underscores the problem posed by the gross materiality of the chronicallyimpaired body: a body that does not get well, or at best, is unpredictable in recovering; a body
that needs sustained care in the form of both physician attention and resource allocation; a
body that is idle, not giving back in the form of productivity. As Rosenberg notes, this is a
problem—chronically ill bodies—that does not, in fact, cannot be translated into a satisfying
economic calculus: “The stigma of charity and the burden of age and chronic disease were
never to be solved; even within the almshouse itself, the aged and helpless were the least
desirable. Just as the city’s private hospitals sent their chronic patients to Blockley, so the aged
and particularly feeble within the city hospital were transferred to the ‘insane department.’”
(195). In 1890, the tubercular were, by default of their biological condition, failed and
“unworthy” liberal individuals, lacking value in a political-economic scheme predicated on the
investment in bodies that were likely to get better—on independence and productivity. Yet, as
evidenced by the voices of reformers, the Blockley model, with its lack of specialized treatment
for various types of sick subjects, was increasingly seen as the materialization of outdated,
ineffective, and inefficient political economy of care.
When Flick delivered his lecture in February of 1890, neither space, nor resources
existed to provide this foundation for the pursuit of a cure amongst consumptives. Flick
agitated for an institution invested in the specialized care of the tubercular. He handed out “a
thousand reprints” of his “Special Hospitals,” targeting those he thought would be supportive.
His plea would be met with interest and backing from a number of local physicians. Within
months of the presentation of his paper, on September 15, 1890, the support materialized
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through the incorporation of the Rush Hospital for Consumptives and Allied Disease (Gould
1890, 698) The Hospital opened on Feb. 4, 1892 in Philadelphia, at the Northeast corner of
Twenty-second and Pine Streets was the first hospital of its kind in the United States—the first
space designed, not just to house consumptives, but to offer them the chance to pursue a cure.
The mission of the institution was to “provide a place where cases of pulmonary tuberculosis
can be received and treated exactly as other diseases are cared for in general or special
hospitals” (698). It thus gave the tubercular a place to go to live unlike the Blockley, where
“patients went only to die” (Flick 1944, 276). The presence of such a space, while small and
certainly unequipped to treat the majority of Philadelphia's tubercular population, valorized
consumptive subjects separating them, materially and symbolically from the almshouse and the
stigma of unworthiness that hung over its subjects.
Within a year of the incorporation of Rush, Flick split with the institution over
intellectual differences concerning the precise mechanism of tuberculosis transmission (see
Chapter 3). The Rush Hospital remained a small operation. In spite of its presence in the city,
Flick and others in the field of tuberculosis treatment returned to a similar conclusion: the city
needed a large-scale hospital for consumptives. While Rush valued the tubercular and afforded
consumptives a fighting chance of recovery, by the latter half of the decade, it's small size did
little to offset the manner in which most of Philadelphia's abundant hospital beds remained
cold to the tubercular. Indeed, in spite of Flick's agitation and advocacy, as late as 1898, the
problems of locating beds for the tubercular remained.
In 1898, Anders, in “Sanatoria and Special Hospitals for the Poor Consumptive and
Person With Slight Means” tabulated statistics on the demographics of the general hospitals in
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Philadelphia. In commenting on “[t]he almost absolute lack of proper facilities for the
treatment of the poor afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis,” he argued that the refusal of
consumptives was “a most potent factor in maintaining the enormous death-rate from the
disease” (177). Of the fourteen hospitals in Philadelphia, only six uniformly took consumptives.
Two other hospitals would admit consumptives in the winter to be used for educational
purposes. And only one hospital—the German Hospital—provided any “special provision”
beyond separating the tubercular. Of the six that took consumptives, two took only those with
an early, “incipient” form of the disease, leaving chronic sufferers with little bed space (163).
Anders concluded by advocating for “[s]pecial hospitals in which every hygienic detail can be
arranged with precision” for treating pulmonary tuberculosis (177).
In the absence of such a space, Flick negotiated the persistent lack of beds through his
leadership of the Free Hospital for Poor Consumptives. The Free Hospital, founded in 1895
was an organization rather than a space for treatment—a joint committee that sought out beds
around the city, paying five dollars a week to hospitalize, in Flick's words, “poor, helpless, and
deserted” consumptives (Bates 1992, 137); (Sr. Borromeo to Lawrence Flick, #121, March 12,
1900, Letters 1889-1908). Given the Free Hospital's limited resources and the city's limited
beds, the organization was also tasked with assessing the value of applicants so as to assure that
the provision of treatment went to, in the language of social reformers, the “worthy” or
“deserving” poor. Concerns over the capacity of an individual to become better—to move form
a state of infirmity, idleness, and dependence, toward a state of well-being, capable of labor,
and productive thus manifested, beyond the walls of Blockley, in Flick's efforts to secure
hospital beds for consumptives. Given the limited space available in the city and the sustained
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stigma regarding the tubercular as incurable resource sinks, Flick's job was not easy as he
lobbied his contacts to take in worthy cases.
From the inception of the Free Hospital through Flick's co-founding of the Phipps
Institute in 1902, one of his primary contacts and sources for beds was Sr. Borromeo of St.
Agnes' Hospital. The beds of the city were so limited and the bodies of consumptives, so
prevalent, that Flick was in routine contact, via letters, with Sr. Borromeo. She “bore the fiscal
responsibility for [St. Agnes'] hospital” (Bates 1992, 56) The payments of the Free Hospital to
St. Agnes for bedding the tubercular was significant: “By 1899, these payments accounted for
19 percent of the monies collected for patients’ board at St. Agnes and almost 10 percent in
total receipts” (56). Yet even with the economic incentive, Sr. Borromeo routinely rejected
Flick's requests. St. Agnes', too, had limited space.
In 1899, she penned a letter to Flick in response to his request for a bed for a
tubercular patient. “Dear Doctor,” she wrote, “You really are the biggest beggar giving” (Sr.
Borromeo to Lawrence Flick, #27, January 22, 1899, Letters 1889-1908). Some ten years after
he began advocating for special hospitals for consumptives, Philadelphia still had a paucity of
options—and those options that were open to Flick, were heavily taxed. Sr. Borromeo's
characterization of Flick, in her letter, as both subject in need—the dependent beggar—and the
philanthropist—the independent giver—reproduced the very paradox of individualism in late19th-century Philadelphia. Even the seemingly independent Flick remained dependent, in his
crusade to eradicate tuberculosis, on the charity, on the beds, on the space, of others.
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Conclusion: Contagion
The liberal institutional goal of reforming or bettering the subjects of charity—
transforming them from subjects of dependency into independent individual—was complicated
by the nature of the tubercle bacillus in interaction with the human body. Indeed, the chronic
tubercular body was a material impediment to the ideal of a charitable system that produced
bettered individuals. Such a political economy of care struggled to account for the possibility
that an individual might leave the almshouse, and become a productive-laboring body, only to
experience a physiological setback that sent them back to the almshouse. Indeed, in the case of
tuberculosis, such a setback could come unexpectedly, without warning, and in a manner that
would crush an individual's capacity to labor. Importantly, to the extent that a tubercular
individual was seeking to recover from such a setback, the proper course of action would be
rest—the opposite of labor.
As the tubercular found themselves returning through the revolving door of the
almshouse after having pursued a productive lifestyle, the return could hardly be attributed to
some failure of individual will. Rather, consumptive subjects and consumptive bodies
confronted Philadelphia's physicians, managers, and philanthropists with a form of nature
born of the interaction of human tissue and the tubercle bacilli—a form of nature that
challenged the assumption that poverty and sickness were the outcome of flaws in character of
poor individual choices. To the extent that a laboring individual experienced a recurrence of
their tuberculosis, they were, ironically, suffering due to their pursuit of the very selfdependency that, according to reformers, was supposed to save them.
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The confusing nature of the disease and its corresponding difficulty to both diagnose
and treat, was confounded by a generalized stigma against the chronically ill—and a more
specific stigma against the chronically ill tubercular. So long as consumptives were incurable,
they required space and resources to go and die. For most Philadelphia hospitals, such
chronically ill bodies competed directly with limited space that was seen as more efficiently
reserved for those suffering acute and treatable diseases. Flick thus faced this context—the
failure of the almshouses to adequately separate and treat consumptives and a general stigma,
in city hospitals, toward consumptives—when he proposed the need for “special hospitals for
consumptives.”
The breaking point, in remaking both tubercular individuals and the disease, curiously,
had little to do with traditional liberal arguments about “worth” and “unworth”; rather it grew
from the shifting scientific understandings of the transmission of tuberculosis. With the
increased acceptance of the theory of the contagiousness of tuberculosis at the turn-of-thecentury, Flick's appeal for special hospitals would take on new importance as the infectious
tubercular became threats to the healthy. Indeed, in the first decade of the 20th century, the
need to isolate consumptives would take on increased urgency, as much for the public health as
for the health of sick.
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Chapter 3
Contagious Tuberculosis and Liberal Responsibility: Corpses, Fomites,
and the Human-Non-human
In March, 1892, as physicians in Philadelphia debated the theory that consumption was
contagious, the corpse of a former consumptive was exhumed from its grave to have its heart
and liver burned by a community of Rhode Islanders. Amidst the hills and valleys of the state's
“south country,” between the ruins of factories, neglected mills and abandoned farms, such
ritualistic burnings were not uncommon in local lore and practice. The stories of the various
Rhode Island communities instructed the relatives of dead consumptives to dig up and destroy
the bodies of their contagious loved ones. The ominous tales warned that a community
member—a relative of the deceased—had to perform a ritual burning lest they tempt the spread
of contagious consumption: the failure to burn the dead consumptive would result in the
reanimation of the corpse, returning to the life in the form of a disease-spreading vampire.
Such was the case in the tale of two lovers—Mehitable and Isaiah: the last of the vampire
sightings in southern Rhode Island (Globe January 27, 1896, 5).
Mehitable and Isaiah lived in Exeter on the “western slope of Pine hill.” The two were
engaged, but before they were to marry, Mehitable grew ill and died from consumption. After
her death and burial, Isaiah’s mother heard a sound—a groan—from her son's room. Upon
investigating, she found the dead Mehitable, reanimated and vampiric, her mouth red and
dripping with the blood of Isaiah. With “a half-piteous, half-reproachful look” on her face,
Mehitable stole out of the room and vanished. Soon after, Isaiah died, “a victim” of
consumption—his heart, according to his mother, broken (5).
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Isaiah's mother's observations were corroborated by other local stories that emphasized
supernatural blood exchange as the means by which consumption spread: “Sometimes fresh
blood was actually discovered on their lips. What proof could be more convincing, inasmuch,
as was well known, the buried body of a vampire is preserved and nourished by its nightly
repasts? The blood on the lips, of course, was that of the victim of the night before” (5). The
consumptive vampires of Rhode Island did not simply drain the blood of the bodies of the
living as a normal vampire would; rather, they used their reanimated state to engage in a
contagious intercourse, exchanging the requisite fluids to ensure the propagation of the
disease.
Where physicians, like Lawrence Flick, argued over explanations of the means and
methods through which tuberculosis was transmitted, in the general lore of Rhode Island, and
in the specific story of Mehitable and Isaiah, the transmission of consumption materializes
through the supernatural vessel of the vampire. It takes shape vividly, through the acts of
vampires sinking their teeth into loved ones, through mouths red with blood, and through the
exchange of pathological material—blood and spit—from the dead to the living. The lore thus
explained the propagation of consumption from one body to another through the supernatural
permeation of the bodily integrity of the living.
Beyond the use of lore to explain the passage of contagious tuberculosis through
reference to the material practice of blood sucking, the stories also served to assign
responsibility for the containment or disinfection of contagious material through the
destruction of pathological bodily material, as in the tale of Mr. Stotson. When Mr. Stotson,
the father of two boys, lost his sons to consumption, the community recommended that he
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“take up the body and burn the heart” (Tribune March 27, 1896, 6). This ritualized use of fire
to disinfect the contagious material of the dead corpse required that “a stake [be] driven
through the chest, and the heart, being taken out, was either burned or chopped into small
pieces. For in this way only could a vampire be deprived of power to do mischief” (6). Upon
refusing to drive a stake through his son's hearts, Mr. Stotson took ill with consumption (6).
The Rhode Island tales of bloodied consumptive-vampires, spreading contagion after death to
loved ones thus assumed a cautionary didactic-tone, serving as instructional material to guide a
community in explaining, containing, and eradicating the danger. To not engage in a ritual
disinfection by driving a stake through the heart of the dead, one risked becoming
consumptive as was the case with Mr. Stotson.
The threat of a consumptive corpse propagating disease confronted Southern Rhode
Islanders with an obvious, yet nonetheless perplexing problem: to the extent that the dead
lacked willpower and intention, they could not be held responsible for their own vampiric
(contagious) potential. In evoking the supernatural to explain the contagious passage of the
disease from one subject to another, Rhode Islanders produced a lore premised upon the
agency of nonhuman forces in propagating disease. Rather than holding sick individuals
responsible for the transmission of the disease these stories of vampirism suggested that
contagion could be transmitted by forces that were extra-individual—forces that existed outside
of the realm of human will and intention. Yet these forces were also grounded in the material
of the body—the pathological hearts and livers—and they could be controlled through
community “disinfection” efforts—through burning. In the presence of such a force, and in the
absence of an individual sower of the seeds of the disease, the vampire folklore thus substituted
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community—familial—responsibility for individual responsibility in governing the spread of
consumption. The stories and the ritualistic exhumations made material both the generally
invisible process of consumption transmission, and the web of social responsibility required to
contain this spread—exhumation and burning—in the absence of a witting sower of the disease.
While Flick professed no belief in the supernatural, in attempting to persuade his
colleagues of the contagiousness of tuberculosis, he did profess a belief in the capacity for
consumption to outlive its hosts by haunting the dwellings, clothing, and linens of former
consumptives. Much to the ire of many of his peers—generally an older vanguard of physicians—
who remained convinced that tuberculosis was an hereditary disease, throughout the 1890s,
Flick wrote prolifically to promote his contagionist beliefs. He claimed that inanimate objects
like dust, clothing, or upholstery served as homes for microbes and thus, as vectors of
infectious disease. He advocated governmental intervention in the containing of tuberculosis
through the disinfection of the (former) homes and belongings of dead consumptives. It was
within this context that he was perceived, sarcastically, by a reader of his published material, of
believing in the supernatural.
In 1894, Flick articulated his position on the disinfection of the spaces formerly
inhabited by consumptives in an article entitled “Tuberculosis” for the New York World. Shortly
after its publication, Flick received a letter in reaction to his article. The author of the letter, a
medical student, writes, “Sir, I have read, with great interest your article on “Tuberculosis” in
this days New York “World.” In the second half of the concluding paragraph of your article you
[write of the manner in which] a consumptive moves out of the house after death” (Alfred
L'estoarge to Lawrence Flick, #389, April 8, 1894, Letters 1889-1908). The author continues,
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sarcastically questioning the extent to which Flick believes in the capacity of a dead
consumptive to move, “I, very respectfully, ask you if it is your experience that when a
consumptive dies he, or she, can after death arise, take up his, or her, bed and [sic] move. That
is the conclusion I allude [sic] to in your article but as the experience is a novel one to me and
my fellow students we wish to get confirmation from so eminent an authority as yourself that it
really is your experience.” While Flick, in his article, is obviously referring to another person
moving the dead consumptive body “out of the house after death,” the author of the letter, a
medical student, correctly highlights the vagueness of Flick’s grammar: his use of the dead
consumptive as the subject of the sentence mistakenly attributes agency—the capacity to “arise”
and move—to a tubercular corpse.
While the medical students' inquiry was not serious and while Flick was not trying to
attribute agency to the supernatural, this miscommunication was produced by and productive
of the struggle amongst both Rhode Islanders and medical professionals in the last decade of
the 19th-century, to explain the capacity of tuberculosis to spread in the absence of a witting
sower. Flick, following the work of Koch and Georg Cornet, believed that the contagious
capacity of tuberculosis was located in a hybrid assemblage of human and nonhuman—in a
mixture of human sputum, tubercle bacilli, and environmental objects like dust, cloth, or
corpses. This hybrid vector of contagious tuberculosis, capable of transmitting the disease in
the absence of a witting sower was known as the fomite.
In what follows, I trace the tensions in late-19th century Philadelphia that were
productive of and produced by that nature of the fomite, and its role in spreading tuberculosis.
I argue that it was through these very tensions—through the socio-medical production of and
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confrontation with the fomite—that tuberculosis would be remade as a contagious rather than
an hereditary disease. I trace the emergence of this confrontation through paradigmatic clash
between contagionists and anticontagionists—over the nature of tuberculosis transmission. I
show how this clash took shape through debates about the scientific truth of contagious
tuberculosis and through arguments over the preservation of the rights of individuals in the
face of an increased public health effort to reshape individual behavior in the interest of
interrupting the transmission of consumption.
Through the confrontation with the fomite as a primary vector in propagating a deadly
disease, liberal reformers organized around the containment of a force that was not reducible
to traditional notions of human intention, and, thus, a disease process that was not governed
by traditional understandings of individual responsibility. Indeed, the very materiality of the
disease—the way it spread, the manner in which it chronically lingered and recurred, and, most
importantly, its capacity to persist outside of the human body by attaching to dust, the pillows
in streetcars, and the dark corners of homes—produced a situation in which the reformers
increasingly lobbied the municipality of Philadelphia to take responsibility for the spread of the
disease by mandating citywide practices to contain fomites.
Efforts to involve the state in the regulation and prevention of fomites so as to
interrupt the transmission of consumption generated further tension evidenced in debates over
the proper reach of public health in preventing the spread of this nonhuman-human hybrid.
Questions and concerns arose over the right of public health officials to legislate the behavior
of the public, including the behavior of physicians, and the threat posed to the rights of
individuals in granting such powers to municipal authorities. The specter of the chronic
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tubercular, deemed a contagious threat by authorities, stigmatized, at best, and, at worst,
sentenced to a life of never-ending quarantine haunted the dystopic critiques of
anticontagionists.
I argue that the debates and practices designed to address the governing of potential
contagiousness of tuberculosis in late 19th-century Philadelphia, remade a daunting,
uncontrollable, and illiberal form of nature into a preventable disease. I show how this
remaking, which hinged upon the scientific establishment of the fomite as the primary vector
of the disease, paradoxically both undermined and valorized liberal individualism, producing
the liberal individual both as a subject of a process beyond his or her control and as a
technology for the mastering of the disease. I locate this dual remaking of the disease and the
individual in debates between contagionists and anticontagionists about the nature of the
disease's transmission, and through public health efforts to address the potentially illiberal
problems that emerged upon finding a chronic disease to be infectious. The resulting flurry of
policy debate, new practices, and new laws dramatized questions of individual and state
responsibility, and the limitations of the human will in the face of an agent—the fomite—
capable of acting in the absence of human intention. The theory that tuberculosis was
infectious provoked a broader liberal anxiety by introducing the possibility of a form of
contagious agency that, much like the supernatural agency of the reanimated dead, was not
subject to the will of the individual.
Where these questions resolved, for Rhode Islanders in the lore of the vampire, and in
the practice of familial exhumation and burning of consumptive corpses, Philadelphia officials
and physicians struggled with the manner in which the contagious consumption challenged
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notions and embodiments of liberal individualism. Contagion, in general, undermined the
presumed boundedness—the sanctity—of the individual by highlighting the manner in which
subjects were, in fact, implicated in a broader web of shared space, shared breath, and shared
bacteria. The sick could unwittingly infect others and the healthy could unwittingly expose
themselves to disease. Tuberculosis complicated this challenge to liberal individualism even
further because of its chronic nature. Where the threat of acute-contagious influenza was
treated and contained through a quick visit to a hospital bed, the possibility of chronic
contagion amongst the tubercular raised the specter of perpetually infectious bodies, the
perpetual expenditure of public money to contain such dangerous vessels of sickness, and the
perpetual isolation of the subjects of the disease.
Where the application of bacteriological and histological insights into germs and
human tissue had contributed to a foundation wherein individuals were increasingly seen as
capable of exercising their will over their bodies as a means of controlling their physiology and
thus, tuberculosis (see Chapter 1), the possibility of contagious transmission contradicted this
assumed control and refracted questions of responsibility onto the state, and, in particular,
onto the role of public health in intervening into the lives, homes, habits, and bodies of private
individuals. The remaking of contagious tuberculosis was thus, also, a remaking of the role of
the state—of the role of public health in policing and in enforcing controls on individual
behavior.
Where the recognition of contagious tuberculosis confronted physicians, reformers,
and city officials with a hybrid form of human-nonhuman assemblage and beyond the control
of individuals, over time, the reorganization of urban environments around the “fact” of the
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disease's contagious nature paradoxically produced individuals who were integral to the control
of this nonhuman force. By focusing on the material through which the disease was
transmitted—the fomite—and on engineering the behavior of the sick and the healthy to
intervene in the making of these fomites, reformers of the late-19th century contributed to a
remaking of liberal individuals as subjects capable of exercising control over contagious
tuberculosis.
I begin by situating these debates, tensions, and remakings within the context of
Lawrence Flick's appeals, in the early 1890s, for the disinfection of the former residences of
consumptions. I show how his efforts to combat tuberculosis through disinfection were
informed by his belief in the contagiousness of the disease. I then trace the tensions between
Flick and his colleagues over the nature of tuberculosis transmission—the debate between
contagionists and anticontagionists—through attention to Flick's appeals to College of
Physicians.
I establish the conservative anticontagionist orientation of the physicians of the College
and focus on the anxieties, as expressed by Dr. Thomas Mays about the illiberal imperatives—
draconian laws and overbearing state regulations—that would result from a recognition of the
disease as contagious. I then trace Western historical attempts to think through the contagious
potential of phthisis—the association of the disease with “bad breath,” “bad air,” and “seeds.” I
then describe the 18th century efforts of the Kingdom of Naples, to treat consumption as a
contagious disease. I explore the policies of Naples through both Flick and Mays readings of
the Kingdom's execution of a state-enforced preventative campaign. Where Flick used this
historical campaign as a blueprint for his preventative aspiration, Mays was equally invested in
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outing what he perceived to be the authoritative and illiberal practices of the Kingdom of
Naples. Both Flick and Mays project their conviction that social policy follows the nature of
disease—that the remaking of tuberculosis as contagious will necessitate certain social
arrangements.
I then focus on Flick's claims that the late-19th century science underlying this remaking
of tuberculosis is a better measure of reality than previous attempts to theorize contagion. I
explore this science through a detailing of Robert Koch's hypothesizing of the fomite as the
human-nonhuman assemblage that served as the vector for the transmission of tuberculosis.
His student, Dr. Georg Cornet, developed experimental evidence to support Koch's hypothesis.
I describe Cornet's inoculation experiments to reveal the manner in which the laboratory
forging of contagious tuberculosis took shape.
I conclude by addressing the evolving role of public health officials in investing in a
preventative mission, focusing on the controversial issue of quarantining chronic contagious
subjects. I then elaborate on efforts to police and discipline the public so as to prevent the
spread of tuberculosis, showing how even the outlawing of spitting proved difficult to enforce.
Within this difficulty, a method of educating the public in methods of self-help and selfprevention begins to take shape—a method whereby individuals are remade as tools of the
preventative campaign.
Cremation, Infected Corpses, and Public Health: Tuberculosis as a Nonhuman Hybrid of
Organism and Environment
While Philadelphia public-health officials cited no instances of vampirism, a similar
anxiety over the capacity for the dead to act as vessels of contagion materialized in the following
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warning, issued in 1888 by the Pennsylvania State Board of Health: “Don’t attend any funerals
from any of these [people who have died of infectious] diseases” (Lee 1888, 448). Indeed, the
threat of infectious corpses was brought before the State Board the same year by the Directors
of the United States Cremation Company. Advocates of cremation feared contamination of
water supplies by buried-contagious corpses (Cobb 1892, 51). In presenting their case to the
State Board of Health, the directors stated their mission as such, “We disapprove of the present
custom of burying the dead, and desire to substitute some mode which…shall render the
[human] remains absolutely innocuous…All who die of...contagious disease...should be
incinerated by the command of law” (Hyatt 1888, 341). 31 Cremation would ensure, in the
rhyming verse of an advocate, that “skeletons [will not] walk the grave yard [sic] fences at
midnight alone, to frighten people with their rattling bones” (342). Indeed, even in
Pennsylvania, evocations of the animate dead, “frighten[ing] people with their rattling bones,”
served to make material the menacing manner in which contagion ushered forth from
normally inanimate objects, seemingly spreading of its own agency, separate from individual
intent.
This advocacy for state legislation of the burning of corpses in the interest of the
containment of infectious disease took shape, in Philadelphia, in a city rumored for having “a
greater mortality from typhoid fever than any other city in the country” with close to one
thousand people dying each year (Cobb 1892, 48). Such mortality, argued Dr. Franklin Gauntt
to the Philadelphia Press, was caused by the interaction of corpses, cemetery soil, and river water.
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The movement for cremation—the consumption of dead bodies by fire—was rooted in the advocacy of the late
Sir T. Spencer Wells, one time President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England. Wells warned that
“[d]ecomposing human remains…so pollute the earth, air, and water as to diminish the general health and the
average duration of the life of our people” (Cobb 1892, 48-52).
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Typhoid, according to Gauntt, was spread by the contaminated Schuylkill River—“‘polluted by
the soakage and drainage from the cemeteries along the bank’” (quoted in Cobb 1892, 50).
Gauntt, continued, “‘These little drops of water, squeezed by ‘Father Time’ from the dead, are
loaded with sure death for the living who drink of it...I have heard professional men in
Philadelphia say, that when you drink Schuylkill water you are sampling your grandfather...[I]n
certain analysis made of this water traces of the oil of cedar have been found, and it came from
the coffins and cedar cases of those buried in Laurel Hill Cemetery’” (49-50). Cobb's
assessment that infectious agents leeched from the dead ancestors of Philadelphians, into soil
and waterways, only to re-materialize in glasses of city water, with a hint of “grandfather” and
tinge of cedar, underscored the scope of the problem: to the extent that disease could travel
from corpse, into soil, into water, into human bodies, the average-innocent Philadelphian was
threatened by an invisible and unregulated process that he or she could not mitigate, much less
contain. The threat of disease spreading, in the absence of a witting sower, through corpses and
river water suggested a need for some form of government intervention or regulation—or, in the
estimation of the Directors of the United States Cremation Company, disinfection through a
privately-run incineration effort.
The Directors' appeal took shape within a climate where state and city departments of
public health were already accustomed to enforcing municipal sanitary measures (sewage
systems, for instance), quarantines, and decontamination of infected space. In the 1890s, much
of the work of public health centered on concerns over mortality from contagious disease.
Where Rhode Islanders appealed to familial and community rituals to contain the threat of
the spread of disease, Pennsylvania reformers looked to public health officials to take
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responsibility for the safety of the urban environment by interrupting the transmission of
infectious disease. The Directors' desire to have the state mandate the burning of contagious
corpses thus echoed the recognition on the part of the Southern Rhode Islanders', that the
invisible and unintentional propagation of contagion required community-enforced
preventative efforts—the disinfection of the dead with fire—thereby arresting the capacity for
dead subjects to unwittingly propagate their contagion from beyond the grave. In the cities of
the late-19-century United States, public health discourses and practices thus emerged, many
focused on disinfection, to combat this technical problem: the capacity of disease to spread
seemingly of its own accord, through inanimate objects, and in the absence of any human will
or individual intent.
Overlapping Paradigms: Contagionism, Anticontagionism, and Tensions
at The Rush Hospital
Lawrence Flick was advocating for the disinfection of the former residences of
consumptives in February of 1892 when The Rush Hospital for Consumptives and Allied
Disease opened its doors. As an original incorporator of the Hospital and a promoter of the
contagious theory of consumption, Flick invested, with a number of his colleagues, in the small
operation—outfitted with a mere 14 beds—as an initial step toward the realization of his goal of
preventing consumption by creating environments to house and cure consumptives (Bates
1992, 22). 32 And this goal, for Flick, was increasingly bound up with his belief—still unpopular
at the time—in the contagiousness of tuberculosis.
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From the outset, the Rush Hospital was plagued by spatial and financial limitations. Within months of its
opening, on June, 16, 1892, institution Hospital Secretary Jenkins wrote Flick, claiming that “The financial
situation [at the Rush Hospital] is most serious” (#113, Letters 1889-1908).
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He argued his case for contagionism, in a paper published in May of 1892 entitled
“The Influence of The Doctrine of Contagion Upon the Death-Rate from Tuberculosis in the
City of Philadelphia.” In the paper, Flick attributed a declining death-rate in a number of cities
to both the “theory that [consumption] is contagious” and to the preventative efforts that had
taken shape to address this theory. “To what can this most fortunate reduction in our mortality
from pulmonary tuberculosis be ascribed,” he queried: “Upon the theory that the disease is
contagious” (6) For physicians like Flick, the remaking of tuberculosis as a contagious disease—a
process that was still far from complete—was important, not just as a matter of scientific
intrigue. Rather, to recognize the disease's infectious potential was to necessitate concomitant
public health interventions through the development and mobilization of preventative efforts.
For Flick, disinfection was precisely one of these necessary efforts.
However, in associating with his colleagues at the Rush Hospital, Flick encountered
resistance to the actualization of his preventative vision. Ironically, in contrast to the
contagionist beliefs of Benjamin Rush, the late Philadelphia physician, signatory of the
constitution, and the hospital’s namesake (Bowditch 1877, 5), the Rush Hospital was filled
with anti-contagionist sentiment—with physicians who did not believe tuberculosis to be
contagious. Thus, while Flick shared a desire with his colleagues to house and treat poor
consumptives, his broader goals and investment in the citywide prevention of tuberculosis were
not shared. He found himself marginalized amongst the community of his peers (Flick 1944,
277, 281).
Indeed, Flick's colleagues, in refuting his contagionism, hewed to the majority line.
Anticontagionism, founded on the assumption that consumption “was caused or promoted by
173

hereditary influences” was widely shared by physicians in the United States as late as the last
decade of the 19th-century (Teller 1988, 8) (Cassedy 1978, 451). As the advocates of cremation
made their arguments in 1888, only a minority of physicians in the United States believed that
tuberculosis was contagious. The evidence supporting this belief in the hereditary roots took
shape through empirical observations of the tendency of the disease to spread amongst family
members—“[t]he frequent appearance of the disease generation after generation in families of
sufferers, [and] the fact that sometimes a whole generation of family would succumb” (Teller
1988, 8). They furthered their observations on the manner in which the disease passed from
patent to child with the supposition that those with certain inherited physical characteristics—
like a narrow chest—were more susceptible to manifest the disease: consumption was a product
of “a fate...inherited from a weak ancestry” (8). Hence, one could be born with a constitutional
predisposition to consumption—with a likelihood of suffering from the disease. Importantly,
then, anticontagionists did not believe in an external cause of the disease. Flick, firmly
believing in the tubercle bacilli as the material cause of the disease, thus found himself on the
defensive, lobbying and fighting for the adoption of the theory that tuberculosis was
contagious.
Disillusioned with what he characterized as the “failure” of his colleagues at the Rush
Hospital, he quickly began seeking an alternative organization through which to publicize his
contagionist beliefs—“to bring the idea of the contagiousness of tuberculosis before the public”
(Flick 1944, 279). The debate over contagionism was not merely semantic; rather the
establishment of the contagious nature of the disease would, in his opinion, help catalyze the
belief in and pursuit of the prevention and cure of tuberculosis. For Flick, then, methods for
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the treatment of the disease grew naturally out of the nature of tuberculosis transmission:
admitting the disease's contagious potential would necessitate a series of governmental
interventions in the interest of the public's health—interventions designed to achieve the shortterm goal of disinfection, and the long-term goal of eradication.
Within months of the opening of the Rush Hospital on April 22, 1892, some 25
women and men—many of them laymen—met in Flick’s office to initiate a new venture to
pursue the prevention of tuberculosis through education. To directly counter his peers at Rush,
Flick ensured that this new organization “excluded” “[a]ll who were unwilling to accept the
theory of contagion” (Flick 1944, 279) (Bates 1992, 22). By May 6, with the election of officers,
Flick's vision materialized with the founding of the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of
Tuberculosis. The Society pursued its educational mission through the publication and
distribution of a series of tracts that summarized the contagious nature of tuberculosis and
instructed the public in procedures to prevent the spread of the disease.
Flick's general outspokenness—and his use of the Pennsylvania Society as a mouthpiece
for his advocacy for contagionism—was not lost on his colleagues at the Rush Hospital. Not
quite half a year after the opening of the Hospital, on November 11, 1892, President Ashman
of the Board of Trustees of the Rush Hospital called a meeting to discuss Flick's unpopular
stance on contagion. There, the “difficulties” between Flick and the Board were publicized: in
particular, the Board took issue with the unwanted publicity garnered through Flick's
publicizing of his contagionist views (Flick 1944, 281). 33 Faced with the frustrations of his
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“It was the publicity over Dr. Flick’s ideas about contagion occasioned by the tracts and the bitter arguments
following his paper at the College of Physicians which brought Rush and Dr. Flick into the conflict that ended in
his resignation” (Flick 1944, 281).
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colleagues and with the prospect of working alongside men with whom he disagreed on a
fundamental aspect of tuberculosis transmission, Flick resigned soon after (281). “‘My
aspirations,’” wrote Flick, “‘were strangled at birth by the men whom I had assembled with me,
none of whom, as it turned out, believed in contagion’” (quoted in Flick 1944, 277). In spite of
his resignation, over the coming years, Flick and his Pennsylvania Society would remain in a
continued-tense dialogue with these anticontagionists as they held onto their belief that the
disease was hereditary in nature. In 1890s Philadelphia, through debates and practices over the
nature of tuberculosis transmission, through the acceptance and refutation of methods to
contain and treat the disease, and through tensions surrounding the proper role of the Board
of Health and the rights of individuals to do as they pleased, the remaking of hereditary
consumption as contagious tuberculosis would take shape as a slow process of argument and
negotiation.
Debating Contagionism: The College of Physicians and the Rights of Individuals
Such negotiation was in evidence when, representing the Pennsylvania Society for the
Prevention of Tuberculosis, Flick appeared, at a special meeting, before the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Philadelphia on Jan. 12, 1894. There, Flick implored the
influential physicians of College—some of the members were his anticontagionist colleagues
from the Rush Hospital—to lobby the Board of Health to mandate the “registration and
disinfection of houses which have been infected by tuberculosis” (Physicians 1894, 223). In
making his argument, Flick drew on the precedent, established in the Kingdom of Naples in
the 18th-century, for the prevention of contagious consumption. The Neapolitan situation was
unique in the history of Western tuberculosis treatment for two reasons: firstly, as an instance
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of the widespread belief, amongst policy makers and physicians in the contagiousness of
phthisis; and secondly, as an instance of state-mandated practices for containing the spread of
the disease. In appealing to the College, Flick advocated that his colleagues endorse the
implementation of measures that mimicked the experimental approach of the Neapolitans and
the 18th century (Flick 1891): state requirement of physician-registration of all consumptive
patients with the Board of Health and the disinfection of the former residences—both houses
and apartments—of consumptives.
With a carefully worded response, the College rejected Flick's request for mandated
physician-registration of consumptives and stopped short of endorsing a Board of Health
mandate on disinfection. The College did, however, resolve to support a more tacit Board of
Health “insistence” upon disinfection. Their carefully worded statement resolved “that no
official action be taken in the matter by the Board of Health, except the insisting on the
disinfection of rooms in which consumptives have lived and died, in instances in which such
procedure is not likely to have been adopted under the direction of the attending physician”
(Physicians 1894, 222). Importantly, then, the resolution did not dispute the utility of
disinfection so much as it ruled in favor of leaving the matter up to the “attending physician.”
The College's conservative response thus protected the authority of the physicians it
represented, stopping short of encouraging significant state involvement in the matter of
containing consumption through mandated disinfections.
Yet the resolution was curiously paradoxical. By endorsing the utility of disinfection,
the College supported a practice—cleaning spaces where the bacilli were likely to persist—that
presumed the contagiousness of the disease. Spaces only required disinfection to the extent
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that they were contaminated by infectious organisms. However, in rejecting the second portion
of Flick's proposal—his appeal for state-mandated registration of consumptives—the College
carefully worded its stance so as to avoid an endorsement of precisely such a presumption of
contagionism: “Resolved, That the College of Physicians believes that the attempt to register
consumptives and to treat them as the subjects of contagious disease would be adding hardship
to the lives of these unfortunates, stamping them as the outcasts of society. In view of the
chronic character of the malady, it could not lead to any measures of real value not otherwise
attainable” (Physicians 1894, 222). In thus arguing against Flick's appeal to “register
consumptives,” the College simultaneously advanced its rejection of the theory of contagious
tuberculosis by arguing that consumptives should not be “treat[ed]...as the subjects of
contagious disease” (222).
Yet, rather than treating the question of tuberculosis transmission as an issue of the
“nature” of the disease, the College instead addressed the proposal through a liberal concern
for individual rights. In the wording of the resolution, to embrace the contagionist paradigm
would be to stigmatize consumptives, “stamping them as outcasts” (222). For the College, and,
indeed, for many anticontagionists in the last decade of the 19th-century, the “truth” of the
nature of the transmission of tuberculosis—its hereditary means of propagating—took shape,
not so much a matter of laboratory proof, but as a formulation of disease that protected the
rights of both physicians and sick individuals. Indeed, an endorsement of contagious
tuberculosis was threatening to anticontagionists to the extent that such an admittance would
remake the disease, not as a matter of biology, but as a matter of public health. Flick's appeal
for the registration of consumptives confronted the College with precisely the type of illiberal
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policy that anticontagionists feared would result from the adoption of the contagionist
paradigm. And such registration threatened the both the freedoms of physicians—to the extent
that it made them responsible to the Board in a new manner—and the freedoms of
consumptives—to the extent that it stigmatized them, or, in the worst of case, to the extent that
it led to their forced isolation (222). Flick's peers at the College thus seemed anxious that
certain policies would necessarily follow an admittance that the disease was not hereditary, but
contagious—policies they feared to be a threat to liberal values—to liberal individualism.
Thomas Mays, a former colleague of Flick's at the Rush Hospital, and witness to the
latter's appeals at the special meeting of the College of Physicians, invested energy, similar to
that of Flick, in attempting to debunk the contagionist perspective. Mays commented, in 1892,
on the prevalence of the contagionist-anti-contagionist rift, characterizing the debate as a
“controversy, which has been agitating the medical profession for the last ten years” (Mays
1892, 34). Like most physicians who disagreed with the contagious theory, he viewed
consumption as an hereditary disease and went to great lengths to argue against the
experimental evidence provided by contagionists.
Mays believed that the disease originated, not from an external source, like the tubercle
bacillus, but spontaneously, in those whose constitutions were predisposed to consumption.
He stated that “the nature of consumption...is [that] of constitutional depravity” (1893, 111).
Mays argued that the symptoms of consumption—the “wasting, the general weakness, the easy
fatigue” (111) were the product of a “preceding weakness in one or both lungs, very frequently
associated with a feebleness of the whole body” (Mays 1879, 15). Thus, Mays' anticontagionism
took shape through a paradigm that saw chronic diseases as products of physiological traits—a
179

constitution—that one inherited from one's parents. Mays wrote that the predisposition “is true
from infancy, although it manifests itself more decidedly towards puberty, and manhood and
womanhood. Such children have not received sufficient vital stamina from their parents, and
hence they are always unequal to cope with their stronger neighbors in the severe struggle for
existence” (15-16). By locating the cause of consumption in the inheritance of a weak
constitution and degeneration of one's stamina, his hereditary explanation of the nature of
consumption flirted with a fatalistic view that's one's “struggle for existence” was determined by
birth.
Mays anti-contagionism reflected the paradigm of the consumptive diathesis, inherited
from Laennec and his early 19th-century peers. Yet, in contrast to the fatalism of Laennec—the
view that consumptives were hopelessly destined to die—he offered an element of nuance in
explaining his anticontagionist stance. Mays broadened his explanation of constitutional
weakness by noting that this weakness could be “either inherited,” by birth, “or acquired”
through an individual's exposure to unhealthy environmental conditions. He explained how
the deficiency in constitution that invited consumption to manifest could theoretically be
treated through attention to those unhealthy conditions which strained the constitution. Mays
treatment program in the early 1890s, thus stressed rest—an attempt to produce environmental
conditions to counter an influence that would weaken the constitution. He held out the
possibility that the disease could be treated, yet he stopped short of the optimism of Flick—
while treating the conditions of constitutional weakness could mitigate the disease, he did not
see consumption as preventable, containable, or curable on a large scale (1879).
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In 1890s Philadelphia, then, the validity of the contagious potential of tuberculosis
would be fiercely debated. The product of these debates and the experimental evidence
amassed in the laboratory was twofold: on the one hand, 1890s Philadelphia was a site for the
slow remaking of tuberculosis as a contagious disease; on the other hand, this remaking of the
nature of disease both made possible and was made possible by a confrontation with a form of
human-nonhuman hybrid—the fomite—that acted as a vessel for the transmission of
tuberculosis. It was precisely the encounter, between liberal reformers and physicians, and the
fomite that the responsibility of city governments and the responsibility of individuals would
take shape in preventing the spread of tuberculosis. The articulation of the new-contagiousnature of tuberculosis and the social programs for the treatment of the disease where
themselves productive, as I show below, of the turn-of-the-century individual—a subject capable
of and increasingly held responsible for containing his or her own contagion.
For both Mays and Flick, the argument was hardly limited to theoretical wrangling—
rather, as was suggested by the College of Physicians' resolutions, contagionism seemingly
necessitated social policy. Where Mays feared a potential draconian approach to rounding up
and isolating consumptives should the disease be deemed contagious, Flick viewed state
intervention as a means of reducing mortality through the mandatory disinfecting of the
former living spaces and belongings of dead consumptives. In making their arguments for and
against the contagious nature of tuberculosis, they both deployed readings of historical
attempts to institute policy based on a belief in the contagiousness of consumption. Both Flick
and Mays focused, in particular, on the Kingdom of Naples efforts, in the 18th-century, to
design social policy to accommodate a belief in infectious phthisis. In what follows, I will detail
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and contextualize the policies and practices in Naples within a brief tracing of Western
thinking on the contagious potential of tuberculosis.
A Tracing of Western Thinking on Contagious Consumption: Contagion, Bad Breath, and
the Seed as Nonhuman Force
The strong anticontagionist sentiment, so prevalent in the United States and
Philadelphia at the end of the 20th century, was somewhat anomalous given repeated historical
attempts by physicians, to theorize consumption as contagious. Western historical musings on
consumption and contagion, were neither frequent, nor canonical, yet they appear with a
disjointed consistency in the works of a number of prominent physicians. Like 19th-century
scientific attempts to understand contagious tuberculosis by following the distribution of
bacilli-laden sputum in the environment, these physicians focused on the manner in which
phthisis spread through the pathological-bodily material produced by consumptives. Yet in
contrast to the focus on the threat of the saliva and mucus, prior historical formulations of
contagion identified the breath of the consumptive as the medium of the disease. Furthermore,
with the exception of 18th-century Spain and Naples, these contagious perspectives, in contrast
to those publicized by Flick in the late 19th-century, were not directly tied to a social plan for
prevention and treatment.
Aristotle, in his “Problems,” evoked the question in writing, “‘Why, when one comes
near consumptives…does one contract their disease, while one does not contract dropsy,
apoplexy, fever, or many other ills?...With the consumptive the reason is that the breath is bad
and heavy….In approaching the consumptive one breathes this pernicious air. One takes the disease
because there is in this air something disease-producing’” (quoted in Webb 1936, 36-37; italics
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added). Galen echoed this sentiment with his claim that consumptives were “‘dangerous’” due
to their “‘putrid exhalation…the houses in which they fell ill smell extremely bad’” (quoted in
Webb 1936, 37). In the assessment of Aristotle and Galen phthisis thus assumes its threatening
potential through the mediums of breath and air: the consumptive was capable of
contaminating spaces and bodies with his or her “pernicious” and “putrid exhalation.”
Where Galen and Aristotle both attributed transmission of the disease to the breath of
the sick, Hieronymus Fracastorius formulated the first recorded Western-scientific-theory of an
object—a “seed”—carrying the contagion of consumption. In his 1546 essay “De Contagione,”
he posited the existence of “invisible seminaria which carried disease, and which could exist
outside the body for several years and still infect” (Webb 1936, 37). Fracastorius' theorization—a
nascent conception of the fomite—thus provided a ground on which to understand the
contagious capacity of phthisis as different from other contagious diseases: where infection was
generally thought to spread from person to person, the speculation that an infectious “seed”
could live “outside the body” raised the possibility that the vectors of phthisis, once released,
no longer required the original sick subject to propagate. For Fracastorius this seed acted as a
nonhuman “force”—a force capable of exercising its agency outside of the willpower of the
humans it infected: “‘It may be considered’” wrote Fracastorius, “‘that the force of the disease lies
in the seeds since they have the power to propagate and reproduce their own kind’” (quoted in
Webb 1936, 38; italics added). Importantly, then, like the Southern Rhode Islanders and the
physicians of the 1890s, Fracastorius' attempts to understand consumption as contagious
grappled with the capacity of consumption to propagate itself—“reproduc[ing its] own kind”—
seemingly separate from individual will.
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Spain, The Kingdom of Naples, and State Prevention of Contagious Phthisis
For the 17th- and 18th-centuries and most of the 19th-century, the contagionist views of
Aristotle, Galen, and Fracastorius regarding consumption generally served as academic medical
history that did not contribute to movements in medical practice or social policy. Their
theorizations existed largely without any concomitant application. The exception, however,
occurred in the 18th-century when a number of Italian and Spanish cities—most notably, The
Kingdom of Naples—mandated the first recorded ordinances for the containment of
consumption (Dubos 1952, 29)(Webb 1936, 179). These practices, including governmentmandated registration of consumptive patients, and officially sanctioned disinfection of spaces
and material belonging to consumptives, institutionalized a belief in the contagiousness of the
disease—a belief in the existence of a “seed” carrying the disease—and in the capacity of
governing bodies to legislate the containment and destruction of these seeds (Dubos 1952, 29).
These mandates and the premise of contagious transmission upon which they rested, proved
controversial both in their own time, and into the 19th-century. In attempting an honest
assessment of these laws, Flick, reading before the Meeting of the American Public Health
Association in Charlestown, SC, on December 16, 1890, focused on a particular series of
Neapolitan ordinances established in The Kingdom of Naples in 1782. For Flick, the
Neapolitan approach, while not perfect, nevertheless offered a model for a governmental
response to containing consumption—a model worthy of mimicking.
The initial edict, passed in the Italian Republic of Lucca in 1699, and those that
followed throughout Italy and Spain in the 18th-century, sought, like the Southern Rhode
Islanders, to establish the purification of consumptives as a community matter: the
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community—families of the sick, physicians, state officials—would be jointly responsible for
implementing purification procedures to deal with phthisis through containment and
eradication of pathological-bodily material. Such procedures were generally concerned with
disinfection and they were often elaborate rituals, requiring caretakers to go to great lengths to
ensure the containment of a consumptive's bodily excretions. “‘It should be’” claims one edict,
the “‘duty of those around the phthisic patient…to take care that the patient does not empty
his sputum except into the vessels of glass or glazed earthenware, and that these utensils be
frequently cleansed and boiled in lye at least twice and the same should be done with all
clothes of washable wool as well with mattress and pillow-ticking…the floor of the room should
be scrubbed at least twice and the walls freshly painted’” (quoted in Webb 1933, 180). The
legislating of community participation in practices of disinfection was designed to ensure that
the pathological excretions of living consumptives were rendered harmless, thus interrupting
the potential spread of the disease. Government-enforced disinfection measures thus hailed
families and physicians—“those around the phthisic patient”—into a web of responsibility for
containing and controlling the dangerous-consumptive material.
A host of “further precautions and regulations” were put into practice to ensure the
disinfection of contaminated objects, spaces, and corpses (Flick 1925, 167). 34 The specific
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The Spanish law “passed on the 6th of October, 1751” spoke to the need for intervention to ensure the
disinfection of infected objects through the use of fire: The Spanish preamble states the following: ‘Having learned
by experience how dangerous it is to use clothing, furniture and personal belongings of those who have been sick
and have died of hectic fevers, consumptions and other contagious disease; and it having been brought to my
attention how important it is to remedy the carelessness with which the very important matter of burning articles
which have been infected by those disease is carried out, as I directed it to be; either through the inaction of those
whose duty it was to see that my instructions be lived up to or through the covetousness of those who were in
possession of such articles, using them either for their own purpose or selling them for what they would bring,
thus communicating and propagating those diseases to the lamentable ruination of many families and great risk to
public health: therefore, for these reasons, convinced that I ought to take efficient measures at once to give ample
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government-mandated-practices included “purif[ying] by fire” all belongings in the rooms of
patients; physician “register[ing of] the personal belongings and wearing apparel in the room
which has been used by the sick person and mark[ing] them in such a way that they cannot be
removed without discovery” (167); the picking clean of the walls of the residences of the sick
until the outer surface has been completely removed (167); flooring was to be redone, and the
rooms, fumigated (168). The goal of these ordinances was the prevention of future infections
by ensuring that “the emanations given off by the patient will have been completely destroyed”
(166-168). Thus, contagious phthisis took shape as an emanating threat, ushering forth in a
nondescript, yet deadly fashion from the bodies of the sick, saturating their belongings, and
hanging in air of the rooms they occupied. Far from targeting the sick, the consumptive
individual emerges from these legal requirements and social practices as a subject with limited
ability to contain, prevent, and control his or her own phthisis. Indeed, the focus of the social
policy in Naples was on the responsibility of the community of the healthy in their capacity to
disinfect the pathological products cast off, and the environments infected by the ailing
consumptive body.
Foreshadowing the Southern Rhode Islander lore, governmental and community
intervention in containing phthisis in Naples was intended to control the lingering spell of the
disease after the death of consumptives as well: “‘Pulmonary consumption is of such a
malignant nature...that even after the death of the sick person the seed of his malady remains
hidden and unseen in many houses, with serious danger to those who move into them
protection against such serious mistakes with their consequences, I have decided that not only in Madrid but
likewise in all cities, towns and places of my entire dominion there will be in each and every one of them
established, observed and inviolably carried out [a host of] precautions and regulations’” (quoted in Flick 1925,
165).
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thoughtlessly...[it] is so penetrating that it can be communicated even without immediate
contact with the infected person or thing’” (Gaetano Ruberti quoted in Flick 1925, 169-170).
This attribution of strength to the invisible “seed” in propagating “even without immediate
contact” underscored the manner in which 18th-century efforts to govern contagious
consumption divorced the chain of infection from the will and even the presence of the sick
individual. Phthisis in 18th-century Naples, as in Fracastorius' theorizations, was communicated
even in the absence of a human sower. Responsibility is here directed at those who
“thoughtlessly” came into contact with a dead individual’s environment or belongings.
In addition to the enforcement of measures designed to purify the possessions and
spaces of both living and dead consumptives, Spain and Naples mandated that physicians
“secretly” report, to the government, anyone suffering from phthisis—the practice that informed
Flick and his rejected appeal to the College of Physicians for physician registration of the
tubercular (Dubos 1952, 29). With regard to reporting: “‘Any place in which a sick person has
been declared to live or has been known to live, suffering from any of the disease
enumerated...must be secretly reported by the physicians...or any other person who has
assisted, to a magistrate, not only before death but also after the patient has died’” (quoted in
Dubos 1952, 29). The state required this secret reporting so as to generate a map of the
distribution of consumption and other disease and, thus, the knowledge to enable the carrying
out of the necessary disinfections. The regulations included steep punishments—fines, potential
suspension from the practice of medicine, and potential imprisonment—for those who failed to
report consumptives.
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Flick, in assessing the historical record, viewed this approach as generally successful in
curbing death rates—for him, the laws of Naples were “a test of the practicability of preventing
tuberculosis and as an argument for or against the theory of its contagiousness” (Flick 1891, 4).
He acknowledged the limitations of the Neapolitan approach and the potential for
authoritarian abuse, noting that, in practice, something must have gone wrong as evidenced by
a change in popular medical opinion regarding the rightness or effectiveness of the laws. The
“medical profession was at first almost unanimous in its adherence to the theory of contagion
and in its support of the law,” according to Flick. He continued, “as time rolled on it became
nearly as unanimous in its disbelief in contagion and its opposition to practical measures for
prevention of the disease” (3). Indeed, significant resistance manifested amongst a number of
Italian and Neapolitan physicians. These critics argued that the public health measures were
doing more harm than good to the extent that they often involved a severe transgression of the
rights of individuals—most noticeable in state-mandated quarantines of consumptives that were
deemed contagious threats. Importantly, much like the debates in Philadelphia in the last
decade of the 19th century, in The Kingdom of Naples, arguments about the nature of the
transmission of consumption were inseparable from arguments about the correct way to
approach a disease; about the necessity of maintaining a balance between state interventions
and individual rights.
Flick acknowledged what he perceived as “oppressive superfluous practices fostered by
the law,” yet he suggested that the policies still “contained some merit, and to some extent
fulfilled the object for which [they were]” enacted (Flick 1891, 4). In spite of the potentially
oppressive character of the laws, he promoted the positive effects of the establishment of these
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policies, arguing that the Neapolitan admittance of the contagious nature of phthisis and the
subsequent establishment and enforcement of ordinances had led to a reduction in mortality
due to phthisis in the Kingdom of Naples from the 18th into the 19th century—a reduction that
was “no doubt due to the immediate influence of the Neapolitan law” (10). The key for Flick,
then, was to translate his belief in the contagiousness of consumption into a similar social
program–making the citizens of Philadelphia, both healthy and sick alike, participants in the
process of preventing tuberculosis through disinfection, the reporting and registering of sick
cases, and, in extreme cases, through the quarantining of threats.
Thomas Mays and The Critique of The Kingdom of Naples
Where Flick lauded the efforts of the Neapolitans in reducing mortality from
consumption, conveniently dismissing the more questionable practices, his colleague Thomas
Mays evoked the very same historical instance to argue that contagious tuberculosis was
necessarily illiberal. Mays indulged the darker side of the Neapolitan experiment to argue
against both the contagious theory of phthisis and state intervention in attempting to contain
consumption. Mays critiqued “the strenuous efforts which the unfortunate Neapolitans put
forth to crush this disease. It was not enough for them that consumptives should cease to spit
in handkerchiefs, on floors, ground and pavements, and use spittoons instead, and that they
should prevent their expectoration from becoming dry, and diffuse the bacillus through the air;
but these people were at once separated from the well and in all probability neither they, nor
their bacilli, ever came into contact with the outside world again” (Mays 1892, 8). Mays thus
expressed the view that the smaller mandates designed to encourage disinfection—those
directed at ensuring that pathological sputum was correctly disposed of—did not satisfy state
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officials. In his reading of history, and in his fears over governmental overreach in the 1890s,
he argued that such officials took their mandate to a logical, nightmarish endpoint: isolating
the sick—those subjects “separated from the well”—in perpetuity so as to allow them to never
come “into contact with the outside world again.”
Thus, for anticontagionists like Mays, the danger of excessive state involvement in the
prevention of phthisis took shape through fears that it would be in the best interest of
governments to quarantine the sick for the duration of their sickness—and due to the chronic
nature of consumption, such a duration would naturally be the rest of a consumptive's life.
Mays anxieties thus took shape in regard to what seemed to him to be an imperative, born of
finding a chronic disease contagious, for a government to forego individual freedoms for the
sake of the greater good—abusing its power in doing so, by assuming the right to both judge
those who needed to be quarantined, administer the space of the quarantine, and determine
the time spent in quarantine. Within such a scenario, not only would governments be
legitimated in exercising undue influence over the future of these unfortunates: physicians,
required by law to report consumptives, would be arms of the state. Expressing concerns
similar to those of other anticontagionists, Mays thus feared that to deem a chronic disease
contagious was to open the door to an abuse of governmental and medical authority—an abuse
that, at best, threatened to undermine individual rights—and at worst, condemned certain
subjects to a life of isolation. In his view, “all the experimentation which has been devoted to
showing the contagious nature of phthisis, is not only a wretched failure, but perpetuates a
terrible iniquity on those who are afflicted with this disease...and I am safe in predicting that

190

he who persists in hugging this contagion delusion will live to reap ‘from the hope which
around him he sows, a harvest of barren regrets’” (1892, 8-9).
Yet where Mays saw a dark illiberal future should consumption be deemed contagious,
Flick used the oppressive practices of the Neapolitans as a platform for indulging his faith in
science as a progressive force. Indeed, Flick claimed that the draconian governmental measures
of the Kingdom of Naples were not a product of any malicious authoritarianism; rather, they
were the product of a flawed scientific understanding of the precise nature of the disease's
transmission. Thus, poor social policy, for Flick, followed what he regarded as incomplete
scientific knowledge of nature: “It was known that tuberculosis was contagious, but it was not
known wherein lay the medium of contagion” (1891, 3). Flick continued, elaborating on his
understanding of the Neapolitan orientation toward contagion and forwarding his vision that
late 19th-century progress in medical science would serve as a corrective for any misdirected
social policy: “It was believed that the breath and the odor given off from the body of the
consumptive were infectious, and that consequently it was not only dangerous to be near those
affected with the disease, but that anything which had been near them was infectious. The fact
that the contagion is confined to the sputa and tubercular pus was not known, and thus the
only real sources of danger were in a measure overlooked” (3-4). Hence, for Flick, the
Neapolitans lack of correct scientific knowledge—the erroneous “fact” of the breath being the
medium for contagious consumption—was productive of erroneous and authoritarian social
policy. He concluded his meditations on faulty policy by stating, “With the abstract idea that
tuberculosis is contagious as the basis, the most heroic and sweeping preventive measures were
haphazardly constructed” (3-4). Generally supportive of the Neapolitan policies, Flick
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explained away the worst of the them by offering a vision of the present—1890s Philadelphia—
where the science of the contagious nature of tuberculosis was so refined and, thus, accurate as
to eliminate the threat of authoritarian indulgences in the governmental pursuit of a
preventative crusade proffering that these policies had led to reduced phthisis mortality,
admitted the limitations of such. The late-19th century antidote, for Flick, to the misdirected
social policy, was a “better” scientific understanding of the medium of tuberculosis
transmission.
The Science of Contagion: Experimental Evidence, Inoculation and
The Making of the Fomite
Amongst physicians and social reformers in the anti-tuberculosis movement, an
effective social reaction to contagious tuberculosis was made possible by the scientific work of
the late 19th-century. A more “accurate” scientific understanding of contagion would yield, in
their estimation, a more just social program for the prevention of the disease. This new
understanding was largely the product of a series of inoculation experiments that developed in
reaction to the work of Robert Koch. These experiments produced, for Flick, “real scientific
knowledge” of the transmission of the disease. Such knowledge served as “a practical
demonstration of the preventability of the disease; and secondly, it gives us some idea of what
measures will bring about such a result...Now that we have real scientific knowledge of the
etiology of tuberculosis and know something of the biology of the organism which produces
the disease, we can understand how the empirical practices in Italy...produced such...results”
(1891, 11). This “real scientific evidence” of the contagious transmission of tuberculosis
directed attention away from the Aristotelian and Galenic notions of the “bad breath” of
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consumptions, focusing, instead, on new knowledge of the pathological human-nonhuman
hybrid—the mixture of sputum, tubercle bacilli, and objects in the environment. This “real
scientific evidence” was the knowledge of the fomite.
The discovery that tuberculosis was communicated through objects that were
contaminated by the tubercle bacilli from patient sputum was taking shape, in the late 1880s
and early 1890s, through the work of Cornet, a student of Koch, and through Dr. John Tyndall
who translated Cornet's works for the English-speaking world. The Aristotelian and Galenic
theorizations of pathological “bad breath” as the vessel through which contagious tuberculosis
was transmitted, while not widely subscribed to, nevertheless influenced thinking throughout
the 19th-century. However, by the 1890s, the association of “bad breath” with consumption
worked against contagionists, for, as anticontagionists observed, if the disease were airborne
and communicated through the breath of the tubercular, would it not follow that everyone
who came into contact with the tubercular would have the disease?
Philadelphia contagionists, in their attempt to establish consumption as infectious,
would thus have to overcome a lingering legacy of medical confusion sown by the unique
nature of consumption. Where other diseases were transmitted through the air—the flu—or
through the water—cholera—tuberculosis, in its capacity to afflict long after the initial infection,
was not obviously traceable to any single source. To resolve the vectors through which the
disease spread, researchers needed to inquire along the lines of Fracastorius' theorizations on
an external “seed.” Scientific challenges to the anticontagionist position thus came in the form
of the refutation of contagion as a product of the bad air or bad breath of the consumptive.
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Experimental efforts to prove tuberculosis contagious took inspiration from Koch's
confident proclamations on the manner in which the expectorated sputum of the tubercular
transformed, over time, into infectious dust particles—into fomites. “‘There is no uncertainty,’”
wrote Koch, “‘regarding the medium and [infectious] manner in which phthisis patients can
transmit the disease’” (quoted in Lechevalier 1965, 106). According to Koch, while one could
catch the disease by simply breathing infectious-atomized-sputum particles—the “bad breath” of
the consumptive theorized by Aristotle and Galen—such a scenario did “‘not often occur,
because sputum particles generally are not small enough to remain suspended in the air.’” (106107). In other words, where air and breath could be the mediums, the more likely vector was
the product of a merging of “‘dried particulate sputum, which can remain suspended in the
air’” with objects in the environment of the sick (106-107).
Koch explained the journey of the infectious tubercle bacillus from the mouth of the
sick, to the lungs of the healthy. He wrote, “‘Sputum that has been expectorated and that has
dropped to the floor, dries, and by trampling is resuspended as dust’” (quoted in Lechevalier
1965, 107). The “resuspended” and “infected dust” spread, not only through the spaces
occupied by the tubercular, but through personal belongings as well: “‘Sputum is also often
discharged on bed linen, clothing, and handkerchiefs. Even tidy patients, by wiping their
mouths with handkerchiefs after expectorating, contaminate handkerchiefs which may then
become sources of infected dust.’” (106-107). Thus, infectious bodily material—sputum laden
with tubercle bacilli—demonstrated the capacity to interact with inanimate objects in the
environment of the tubercular, producing the fomite—a hybrid of human, bacterial, and
environmental material. This fomite—this human-nonhuman carrier of disease—remained
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infectious even in the absence of sick individual. Healthy individuals, breathing in such
fomites, ran the risk of infection.
Koch's early musings on the spread of tuberculosis underscored the nuances of the
disease's transmission: where the transmission of contagious diseases was generally understood
as a process taking place amongst sick and healthy bodies sharing the same air, and occurring
instantaneously, upon exposure, tuberculosis behaved differently. The disease was capable, through
the hybridization of pathological sputum and objects in the environment, of infecting a space
over a period of time. Thus, confusingly for observers, individuals were exposed to potential
infection long after the original expectoration of sputum and in the absence of the original
infectious subject. Indeed, the capacity of the disease to haunt corpses, as identified by the
Southern Rhode Islanders, and homes, as identified by Flick in his assessment of “house
infections” was explained, bacteriologically, through the presence—an agency of sorts—of the
fomite. As the vessel of contagious transmission, the fomite became the lynchpin of the
contagionist paradigm—a material challenge to the anti-contagionist claim that an inherited
constitutional weakness was the cause of tuberculosis. This scientific basis of the infectious
nature of tuberculosis was further developed through the work of Koch's student, Dr. Georg
Cornet.
Experimental Evidence: Cornet's Inoculation Experiments
In the late 1880s, Koch's musings on contagious tuberculosis and on the fomite as the
primary vessel of contagion remained hypotheses. His student, Cornet, took up the theory of
the fomite as the vector through which tuberculosis was communicated, and sought to
demonstrate, experimentally, the validity of Koch's hypotheses. The work of Cornet was
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designed, in part, to challenge anticontagionist theories of predisposition and constitutional
weakness. Indeed, both Cornet and Koch “reject[ed] altogether the theory of predisposition or
hereditary tendency as a cause of phthisis, and they believe[d] that all those cases which
suggest[ed] the notion of predisposition if properly examined would turn out to be distinct
cases of infection” (Roscoe 1891, 311).
Cornet's challenge to hereditary anticontagionism took shape through his pursuit of
experimental evidence to answer the question of the material and the medium through which
tuberculosis infected its subjects. Professor John Tyndall, known for his work in chemistry and
physics, summarized the questions underlying Cornet's work: “How, [Cornet] asks, does the
tubercle bacillus reach the lungs, and how is it transported thence into the air? Is it the sputum
alone that carries the organism, or do the bacilli mingle with the breath? This is the problem of
problems” (Tyndall 1892, 403). Cornet thus sought to demonstrate, through laboratory proof,
that the bacilli were carried by sputum mixing with objects in the environment, and that the
inhalation of these hybrids of human material, microbial material, and environmental
material—these pathological dust particles—were the sole vector of the disease.
In order to do so, Cornet he went about demonstrating that a guinea pig, inoculated
with bacilli-laden dust, would contract the disease. He hypothesized that contagion could be
proved by establishing a chain of virulence linking the tubercle bacilli in expectoration from
the mouth of the sick, to the development of tuberculosis in the guinea-pigs through the
medium of dust: “If tuberculosis followed from such inoculation, a proof of virulence would be
obtained” (401). He set about measuring “the precipitate from the air...the dust of the sickroom” (400) in a number of hospitals, lunatic asylums, and over fifty private houses, in an
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effort to establish that the dust carried the disease. To further demonstrate that direct contact
with the patient—with the breath, or air surrounding the sick—was not necessary, he sought out
dust in “places inaccessible to the sputum issuing directly from the coughing patient” (401).
After gathering the dust, and mixing it with a “suitable liquid,” he went about “the infection of
guinea-pigs with his dust” injecting the substance “into the abdomen of the guinea-pig” (401).
The animals were then “allowed to live” to “permit the development of the bacilli.” (401). His
results revealed that the “animals were found charged with tubercle bacilli,” thus, “the
virulence of the inoculated matter [was] established (401). 35 For contagionists, Cornet's
experiments were empirical proof of the infectious potential of the dust. This scientific
establishment of this dust, and other fomites, as the disease vector, while not immediately
embraced by all physicians, would, over time, constitute the evidentiary ground through which
the nature of tuberculosis was remade: laboratory practice and evidence had remade the disease
as contagious, not hereditary.
This location of disease transmission in the fomite challenged the fatalism of
anticontagionists. To the extent that a consumptive constitution or a tubercular diathesis could
not be helped, contagionism offered a paradigm wherein prevention seemed possible. Tyndall,
35

To be sure, upon killing and examining the guinea pigs weeks after the inoculation, Cornet admitted mixed
results. “In some cases the animals were found charged with tubercle bacilli, the virulence of the inoculated matter
being thus established. In other cases the organs of the guinea-pigs were found healthy, thus proving the
harmlessness of the dust” (Tyndall 1892, 401). Hence, a grey area emerged out of Cornet's research. To the extent
that some inoculated subjects came down with the disease and others did not get tuberculosis, Cornet and others
reasoned that the variation was a result of the difference the variation in the concentrations of infectious material
across different spaces: “the animals injected with dust from certain consumption hospitals [and other spaces]
were impregnated with phthisis, whilst in other cases no such result followed the inoculation. In the one instance
the bacilli contained in the sputum of the patient had found their way into the dust of the room, in other cases
they had not done so, owing doubtless to different arrangements of the hospitals. In the first instance, therefore, a
healthy person living in the room and inhaling the dust—as he must do, for it is always being disturbed by
sweeping and dusting, and then flies about—might become infected; in the second, no such danger would be
incurred” (Roscoe 1892, 311).
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reflecting on the intimate articulation of this remaking of the nature of tuberculosis and the
future of tuberculosis prevention, spoke to the manner in which the adoption of one paradigm
or the other “will show whether we are able to protect ourselves against tuberculosis, whether
we can impose limits on the scourge, or whether, with hands tied, we have to surrender
ourselves to its malignant sway” (1892, 403). Advocating for contagionism and challenging
both the fatalism of the anticontagionists and the older theories of contagion that identified
bad breath and bad air as the vectors of disease, Tyndall connected the acknowledgment of the
agency of fomite as the carrier of the infection to the social capacity to cure the disease, “If the
tubercle bacilli are carried outwards by the breath, then nothing remains for us but to wait till
an infected puff of expired air conveys to us our doom. A kind of fatalism, sometimes
dominant in relation to this question, would thus have its justification. There is no inhabited
place without its proportion of phthisical subjects, who, if the foregoing supposition were
correct, would be condemned to infect their neighbors” (404). Indeed, the theory of “bad
breath” or “bad air,” had limited preventative utility to the extent that breath and air were,
matter-of-factly, ubiquitous and uncontainable. Fomites, however, were material substances that
could theoretically be contained, disinfected, or prevented from forming in the first place.
While these experimental results were enough to convince Cornet, Tyndall, and others
that the disease was contagious and the fomite was the medium of infection, the evidence was
not enough to assuage the criticism of Mays and other anticontagionists. Mays critiqued the
very method of the experiments—inoculation—as an inappropriate means for producing
scientific knowledge. “Inoculation,” wrote Mays, “merely teaches that a disease may be
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transmitted, but whether the disease originates in this manner in practical life is quite another
question” (Mays 1892, 1). He described the experiments as a “wretched failure” (8).
Given this co-emergence of the contagious nature of the disease and methods for
prevention and treatment, for both Mays, the anticontagionist, and Tyndall, the contagionist,
the “truth” of tuberculosis transmission was not simply a laboratory matter. Rather, in their
eyes, the deeming of the nature of the disease to be contagious was, at the same time, an
endorsement of a set of practices for the containment of consumption. For both parties, to
choose one nature over the other was a matter of life, death, and individual liberty. Mays called
out Tyndall for the latter's characterization of anticontagionists as “‘a number of loud-tongued
sentimentalists, who, in view of the researches they oppose, and the fatal effects of their
opposition, might be fairly described as a crew of well-meaning homicides’” (quoted in Mays
1892, 7). While Tyndall was perhaps exaggerating in his characterization of anticontagionists as
“well-meaning homicides,” by charging his opponents with murder, Tyndall underscored the
extent to which the resolving of the nature of tuberculosis transmission seemingly had
material, indeed, life or death consequences, for the sick.
New Preventative Approaches: The State and Tuberculosis Prevention
These life or death consequences articulated, for Flick and other contagionists, with the
view that Koch's discovery of the tubercle bacillus and Cornet's demonstration of the
contagious potential of the fomite had direct material consequences for society: their
discoveries, for contagionists, were determinative of a new course of prevention, control, and
treatment. The emergent nature of the disease as contagious was not merely a matter of the
laboratory; rather the remaking of the disease constituted a simultaneous remaking, not only of
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the social practices surrounding the treatment of consumptives, but of the public and private
spaces of the city environment. Hence the goals of Flick and his Society for the Prevention of
Tuberculosis—the state-mandated disinfection of the former residences of consumptives, the
registrations of tubercular cases, and the educating of city dwellers in methods for policing
pathological bodily materials—took shape through the conviction that the containment and
eradication of the fomite was a major step toward prevention of the disease.
Koch, himself, in his 1884 paper “The Etiology of Tuberculosis” argued that “‘emphasis
must be placed on prophylaxis. Such measures must be directed, in part, toward suitable
disinfection and, in part toward prevention of contact of healthy persons with tubercle bacilli.’”
(quoted in Lechevalier 1965, 109). Tyndall suggested that “‘[t]he most pressing work of sanitary
reformers is not now so much to legislate as to educate, to make the mass of the people in
some degree participators in the knowledge of the causes of disease which is possessed by the
man of science’” (New York Times Dec 2, 1891). The nascent anti-tuberculosis efforts of
reformers like Flick and New York's Hermann Biggs (see Chapter 4) thus took shape through
their appeals for state-mandated education of the public in behaviors that would re-make
individuals as technologies—as “participators”–in containing their own contagion and that of
those around them. And they took shape through appeals to state-mandates like those
developed in Naples—the identification of all consumptive subjects through mandatory
physician registration of consumptive and the containing and destruction of disease-carrying
fomites through state-organized prophylactic measures designed to disinfect the homes and
belongings of consumptives.
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Where hereditary theories of the disease generally posited that consumption could not
be cured, the contagionist perspective, with its theorization of the fomite as the material vessel
of contagion, underwrote the increased conviction, amongst public health officials, of the
prudence of state legislating and funding of tuberculosis prevention. Benjamin Lee, secretary of
Pennsylvania’s Board of Health expressed these sentiments, tying the new nature of the disease
to a changing medical attitude: “But once [sic] admit that consumption is an infectious and
therefore a preventable disease, and presto, the whole situation is changed…That which would
before have been an unwarrantable and vicious use of the public treasure now becomes an
imperative duty…of the state” (Bates 1992, 76). This linking of the changing nature of the
disease's transmission with the notion of the disease's preventability thus served, not only as a
foundation for elaborating the proper methods for prevention and treatment, but as an issue
for clarifying and reworking the responsibility—the “duty”— of the state in intervening in the
lives and habits of its citizens in the interest of preventing disease.
In the 1890s, this state duty would be clarified through the increased participation,
across the United States, of boards of health in the containment, treatment, and prevention of
tuberculosis. And the role of public health in controlling tuberculosis transmission would take
shape, primarily, around the technical problem of “controlling” the disease—of containing the
fomite, the hybridized assemblage of microbe, sputum, and dust. This problem was articulated,
shortly after Koch's discovery of the tubercle bacillus, when James T. Whittaker, speculated on
the course of tuberculosis prevention to come in presenting before Philadelphia's College of
Physicians. “So…we have the clue,” Whittaker proposed, “to the control of the disease...when
the phthisical patients pulls out his sputum-saturated handkerchief, he opens the box of
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Pandora on the public highways” (1883, 11). State control of consumption would involve an
intervention in—indeed, a policing of—this very moment, this very behavior, and this very
bodily material. The contact between the pathological sputum of the sick individual and an
environment rife with potential fomites—in this case, the handkerchief—would require
retooling: “the really crucial point [of prevention]—whether the patient has deposited all his
sputum in the spittoon, thus avoiding the possibility of the expectorated matter becoming dry,
and reduced afterwards to a powder capable of being inhaled” (Tyndall 1892, 404).
Tuberculosis, no longer a force of nature, no longer reproduced through the inheritance of a
weak constitution, no longer subjecting the fates of human to its deadly whims, was
increasingly reduced to a containable material and a policeable moment. For boosters of the
emergent preventative spirit, the disease could be mitigated—even eradicated—if the tubercular
were merely identified, educated, and exposed to surveillance, and their premises (and former
premises), registered and disinfected. The precise role of public health authorities in pursuing
prevention would take shape through questions of the very police powers of the state.
Contagionism and Concerns Over the Purview of the State Board of Health
In 1889, the Philadelphia State Board of Health clarified its position on the police
power of quarantine. Dr. Benjamin Lee summarized the power of the Board to isolate those
subjects that were disease threats.
What is the actual power of the health officer in the matter of removing persons
infected with contagious diseases. I found during a slight outbreak of small pox which
we were having, that the board of health was much hampered in its work from the fact
that persons whom it considered ought to be removed, refused to be removed…[I]t has
been determined in our State that a health officer has the absolute power to remove
cases, which he deems necessary to be removed, for the protection of the public health.
(1889, 239)
202

Lee's concerns, while directed at small pox, underscore an emergent articulation—the
articulation of public health, law enforcement, and individual discipline. With Lee's citing of
certain sick subjects who “refused to be removed,” the Philadelphia Board of Health was faced
with the question of its right to police individuals and to both decide when a subject required
removal, and to use force in conducting such a removal. These emergent police powers were
unsettling, within the context of the prevention of tuberculosis, to those who feared that the
Board of Health might unnecessarily or in an authoritarian manner, exercise its relatively
newfound “absolute power.”
The fears of Mays and others over the powers of the state in seeking to prevent the
spread of a chronic contagious disease continued to play out. Philadelphia physician Owen J.
Wister, in making a point about the dangers of investing too much authority in public health
officials, recalled a cholera scare suffered by the East Coast in the summer of 1892. Wister
described the sensationalism and “state of hysterics” that accompanied the outbreak and
sarcastically condemned the health officer for “propos[ing] a quarantine against New York.”
While the Philadelphia papers indulged in characterizations of the “raging” disease, Wister
noted that, in spite of the Board of Health's characterization of the cholera outbreak as raging,
it was hardly so: “this case amounted to [merely] four cases in a population of a million in a
month” (Physicians 1894, 224).
Critiquing the Board of Health for perpetuating “spams of terror” where terror was
unjustified, Wister, an anticontagionist, evoked what was, for him, the frightening specter of
finding tuberculosis to be contagious. He argued that a similar overreaction—a consumption
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scare—would not end, like the overblown cholera “epidemic,” in mere weeks. Rather, given the
chronic nature of consumption, “instead of a scare of two or three weeks, it will last ten or
fifteen years, while from forty to fifty are dying a week...[such hysteria] may lash the whole
community into a panic, and that instead of regarding the unfortunate victims of consumption
as objects of compassion they will be looked upon as peripatetic fountains of danger, and a
feeling of hostility to them will arise” (Physicians 1894, 223). For Wister then, like Mays, much
of the validity of the nature of the transmission of consumption did not rest on laboratory
results. Rather, it rested on a social incompatibility: how would a society treat the victims of
contagious-chronic diseases? Wister feared their being stigmatized as constant threats.
He elaborated, describing the material process of consumption in the body of a victim
in articulation with his projection of social stigma: the disease, and the stigma “may last for
years, for during the whole period of softening [of the tubercles and the accompanying
degeneration of tissue] they are regarded as sources of danger. In fact, they are to be treated as
criminals guilty of consumption. As I said before, their residences, however temporary, are to
be disinfected and their miserable lives are to be rendered more wretched by being haunted by
the familiars of the inquisition” (223). In Wister's fearful scenario, then, tuberculosis ceases to
haunt; rather, the board of health authorities, “the inquisition,” become the haunters, stalking
registered consumptives, waiting for just the right moment to criminalize those dangerous
tubercular subjects. Mandated disinfection and registration threatened, in Wister's opinion, to
make consumptives dangerous for life, and, perhaps, even more threateningly, legitimated
isolating them for life. The capacity for public health authorities to act, like the inquisition, in
grabbing consumptive bodies and isolating them permanently, while exaggerated, was, for
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anticontagionists, founded upon both recent codifications of the power of public health
departments vis-a-vis the right to quarantine, and by readings of the history of attempts—
especially those of 18th century Naples and Spain—to contain consumption in communities
where it had been deemed contagious by the state. Lee recognized the potential for concerns
like those of Wister and Mays, yet he maintained that “The people would soon regard [the
policies of the Board of Health] as a refuge and relief rather than a means of tyrannical and
cruel invasion of their rights” (Lee 1889, 221). 36
Conclusion
Lee's words were prescient. In spite of the College's resistance to the theory of
contagious tuberculosis in 1894, attitudes amongst physicians and the public were changing.
This change was in evidence, when on January 22, 1897, a Pennsylvania paper noted a
declining death-rate from consumption. The paper noted that “The Philadelphia Board of
Health...attributes the [decline] to the...avoidance of [consumption's] contagion.” What had
been taboo in the early 1890s was quickly becoming conventional: “There can be no doubt
that the change is due to the prevailing belief that the affliction is communicated from one
person to another” (Health 1896-1897). The grammar of the paper's report is telling: left,
standing, in the description of the transmission of tuberculosis is the human subject—the
person. However, this human subject is not, in fact, the subject of the sentence. Rather, the
disease “is communicated”—the agent transmitting the disease, while left to the imagination of
the reader, was firmly established, by 1897, as the hybrid of human and nonhuman: the fomite.

36

Note that these are not Lee’s exact words but, rather, a paraphrasing of his comments.
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By nightfall, the sidewalks and streetcars of Philadelphia bore a day’s worth of human
spit as professionals, steelworkers, and opera-goers expectorated with little concern for the
dangerous bacteria potentially stewing in their saliva. The casual practice of spitting in public
had become increasingly criticized as physicians linked the spread of contagious tuberculosis to
the production of the human-nonhuman fomite. In an effort to regulate this unhygienic
practice, the city would employ a “Cuspidor Brigade”: an army of impoverished and
uneducated young men clad in clothes of red, white, and blue, and wearing signs reading,
“One cent a spit.” The Cuspidor Brigade would solve two urban problems: on the one hand,
they would police the public's spreading of germs and producing of fomites by fining those who
spit; on the other hand, the Brigade would employ formerly shiftless boys: the money made off
the fines would supply the wages for the boys.
Such was the sarcastic vision of a letter printed in The Philadelphia Bulletin on May 11,
1897. While the author’s suggestion of a Cuspidor Brigade was fanciful, it was also a legitimate
reaction to practical social concerns regarding the breadth of the preventative mission (Health
1896-1897). Such concerns took shape, on the night of May 10th, as Philadelphia police
apprehended a train engineer for violating a new citywide anti-spitting ordinance. The
ordinance was an attempt to address, through policy, the national concerns of physicians and
the warnings of the local Women’s Health Protective Association regarding human sputum as a
necessary element in the transmission of tuberculosis (Health 1896-1897).
Yet, echoing the Bulletin’s recognition of the absurdity of enforcing such a law as
described by the author of the “Cuspidor Brigade” letter-to-the-editor, Philadelphia Desk
Sergeant Martin would not hold the train engineer—this outlaw—in custody. Indeed, according
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to the May 11 Telegraph, Commissioner Kerr, and Chief Badenoch admitted the inefficiency—if
not impossibility—of adequately enforcing a law that was broken with such frequency (Health
1896-1897). Tuberculosis was worth containing—but the literal policing of individual conduct
would require the constant attention of a police force that had other matters to attend to.
There was something fanciful about policing individual conduct—where was the city to
get the labor power and resources to apprehend and process all the deviant expectorators?
Similar ordinances had been passed a few months earlier in Chicago and New York. The
Chicago measure to prohibit spitting was described by the city’s Chronicle as “Hard to Enforce”
and “Farcical” (Health 1896-1897). Furthermore, the prohibition raised questions about the
proper reach of government in a city environment structured to honor the rights of individuals.
Attorney A.S. Trude commented on the constitutionality of the Chicago initiative, “Whether it
is the right of a citizen to spit all over the floor of a car and inconvenience other people is a
matter that will have to be decided by courts higher than those which pass on city ordinances”
(Health 1896-1897). Indeed, it would seem that there were those who maintained that even
spitting was an individual freedom worth preserving.
Over the next decade, city anti-spitting ordinances would remain in place across the
United States. The resources required for such efforts proved taxing and city officials were
confronting the realization that the successful governance of a chronic communicable disease
would require more than the funding of a diligent police force to enforce hygienic laws; more
than the presence of an army of public health officials mapping and surveilling sick
populations; more than the heroic efforts of city and public health officials to quarantine
populations at risk of spreading contagion; more than scientific attempts to use new
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understandings of disease properties to eradicate contagion at the source. The work of
containing tuberculosis would become increasingly dispersed amongst city officials, physicians,
reformers, and individuals—both sick and healthy; and this work proceeded in the fraught
space of a liberal order challenged by the growing scientific production of the microbial and
environmental interconnectedness of biological bodies.
Following New York’s passage of its anti-spitting ordinance in 1897, on January 22,
Privy Councilor Ehrlich, in a letter to the editor of the New York Journal, argued for “self-help”
as a means of enforcement: “The most effective agent against consumption is the self-help of
the public, which should hinder patients in closed apartment from expectorating anywhere
save in water spittoons” (Health 1896-1897). Ehrlich’s understanding of the utility of social
mores and the limitations of using official laws to discourage people from their habits proved
prophetic of things to come in the management of contagion over the next decade in the
United States. While the anti-spitting ordinances remained in place, nearly five years after the
law was passed, a Philadelphia physician commented, on May 12, 1904 in the Public Ledger, on
the ineffectiveness of the policy relative to individual behavior: “In spite of the ordinance
which prohibits spitting on the sidewalks and of the notices in the cars there are…hundreds of
consumptives who ignorantly, carelessly or from vicious habit violate the one and disregard the
others. The sputum-soiled cars should be mopped with carbonized water on entering the
depot” (Charities 1903-1904).
Change would seemingly not come from without—from a power over bodies, or
through procedures of legislation and policing. Rather, in urban areas of the United States at
large, and in Philadelphia, specifically, a new tool for containing contagious tuberculosis was
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taking shape through the very terms of “self-help” and self-reliance. In light of the pernicious
and overwhelming potential of infectious consumption, reformers like Flick and his Society
would advocate the education of the public in methods for containing their own pathological
material and that of those they lived with and cared for. Indeed, the drift of prevention was
increasingly toward the production of a more hygienic population: a citizenry armed through
voluntary vaccination; a public careful in sterilizing their own food and water; individuals
vigilant in their pursuit of a hygienic regimen; a people willing to cultivate healthy bodies and
characters founded on correct conduct, and practices of self-care and self-responsibility. In this
regard, tuberculosis was but one of many infectious threats—smallpox, yellow fever, diphtheria—
that increasingly contributed to circumstances in which the educating of the public and the
tailoring of individual conduct in matters of health and hygiene seemed like the most rational
and economic means of governing contagious threats.
While contagionism was viewed, by anticontagionists, as a potential threat to and
imposition upon liberal individualism, the eventual embrace of the theory of contagious
fomites and the medical admittance of the communicability of the disease had a wholly
different effect: the remaking of tuberculosis as a contagious disease simultaneously remade
individuals—in their agency, in their freedom, in their capacity to help themselves—as the very
tools of the preventative mission. Individuals were increasingly to become technologies of the
broad social effort to contain tuberculosis. Thus, where contagious tuberculosis confronted
liberal society with a hybrid human-nonhuman assemblage that demonstrated a capacity to act
in a realm that was seemingly beyond the scope of the will of individuals, the governmental
response—public health initiatives to educate the populace in methods of self-care and
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hygiene—paradoxically constituted individuals as subjects possessing a capacity to control the
disease—to prevent and eradicate the fomite. The late 19th-century individual, educated in
policing his or her own bodily material, and caring for his or her own soil thus emerges as a
technology for the control of that which was formerly incontrollable. What began, as it had in
Rhode Island, with an acknowledgement of the need for a community response in the face of a
threat that proved beyond the scope of individual control—in the realm of the supernatural or
transindividual—resolved into a reengineering of the very capacity of individuals: the subject of
the late-19th century was increasingly an individual capable of controlling the spread of the
disease. In practice, however, the execution of the control of the fomite would prove uneven,
messy and, in many instances, ineffective.
The precise mechanism by which the Philadelphia medical establishment—indeed, the
United States medical community—began to accept the contagious theory remains vague. Yet
the positions of contagionists and anti-contagionists—the positions of Flick and Mays—were
not, in the end, as incommensurable as they seemed at the height of debate in 1894. Indeed,
explanations of the “cause” of tuberculosis would, over time, broaden to include the tubercle
bacilli, the fomite, and the constitution of the sick. The hereditary heuristic of Mays was not
entirely discarded, but rather, it became incorporated into the broader theory of immunity and
resistance: those with strong constitutions seemed, as Mays argued, less predisposed to the
disease—they were less likely to contract it. Yet, rather than emphasizing a predisposed
constitution, Flick and his cohorts in the anti-tuberculosis movement would increasingly focus
on the capacity of the sick to cultivate resistant constitutions through the practice of regimen.
Indeed, this focus would constitute the basis of treatment of in the emergent sanitaria
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movement and the foundation of the preventative mission that Flick would undertake in 1902,
with the founding of The Henry Phipps Institute for the Treatment and Prevention of
Tuberculosis. It was within the walls of Institute where Flick set about actualizing his crusade
for the eradication of tuberculosis—where, over his seven years as director, he would be
confronted with the nagging materialization of bodies that could not be cured, and subjects
that failed to help themselves get better.
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Chapter 4
The Henry Phipps Institute: The Remaking of Tuberculosis as a Sociological Problem
On February 1st, 1903, Lawrence Flick's relentless advocacy for the preventative and
cure of tuberculosis, materialized in the slums of Philadelphia, in the form of The Henry
Phipps Institute for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis. In the late 1890s, a few years
before the founding of the Institute, these very slums raised concerns amongst reformers.
While the living quarters of Seventh and Lombard were “much improved” from their state in
the 1840s and 1850s, the alleys remained garbage-strewn and the majority of the houses lacked
sewer connections. The cobbled streets of the narrow Gillis' Alley, where a differentiation
between house and stable could not be drawn, were infamous amongst the police. Entering
one of the homes of the Alley's four African-American families through a slim-two-foot-wide
courtyard, the houses sat beneath an almost permanent blanket of darkness that yielded, only
briefly, to the midday sun. The small outdoor space of the backyard was unusable—a “pile of
ashes, garbage, and filth.” Observing the situation, health inspector Dr. Frances Van Gasken,
shared his observations with the Civic Club, remarking, “In such heaps of refuse what disease
germ may be breeding?” (Du Bois 1995, 307).
While the tubercle bacillus did not literally breed in the “heaps of refuse,” the
unhygienic conditions of the homes Philadelphia's slums limited the capacity of the sick to
cultivate healthy tissue and retard the bacilli in their bodies. To the extent that the tubercular
required sunlight, fresh air, and a hygienic space in order to combat the disease, much of the
city's homes proved hospitable to the disease. With “one of the largest concentrations of blacks
and...the third highest prevalence and mortality rates of tuberculosis among blacks in the
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country,” Philadelphia was one of a number of American cities that reported a slower decline
of the disease amongst blacks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Carthon 2008, 3-4). In
spite of the increasing acknowledgment by reformers and physicians that these socio-economic
conditions underlying the decrepit state of Philadelphia's slums were serious barriers to the
cure of the disease, alternative hereditary explanations of the transmission of tuberculosis, like
those espoused by anticontagionists, continued to linger into the 20th -century. These biological
explanations overlooked the importance of social conditions in disease transmission.
In 1896, Frederick Hoffman, a statistician for the Prudential Insurance Company, used
heredity to explain the high mortality rates due to consumption amongst blacks—rates that
were higher than those amongst whites. Hoffman's theory—“Race Traits Amongst the
American Negro”—published in a mainstream journal of political economy 37, was proffered to
calculate the risk involved in insuring African Americans (Hoffman 1896). Hoffman argued
against the insurance of black consumptives, citing the high mortality rates as evidence that the
physiology of “the black race” was weaker than that of the white race. The scientific effort to
specify the biological differences between blacks and whites was fueled by the overlap of the
then-legitimate “science” of eugenics, and a translation of the Darwinian notion of the
“survival of the fittest” into the social context of American race relations. Hoffman viewed
black susceptibility to tuberculosis as part of a larger struggle—a downward descent of the
“American Negro.” He wrote, “it can be proven that at the present time the colored race is
subject to an inordinate mortality from consumption and respiratory diseases, which will
menace the very existence of the race in the not far distant future” (82). The black race, then,
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in Hoffman's estimation, was engaged in a teleological progression toward its own eventual
destruction as evidenced by biological weakness to tuberculosis.
But he appealed to the broader community of political economists by framing this
racialized biological susceptibility as a threat to whites as well. Blacks, in Hoffman's argument,
were not only destructive to themselves to the extent that they manifested a tendency toward
social regression and disease: they also threatened the progress of whites. This threat
manifested in “diminished social and economic efficiency, which in the course of years must
prove not only a most destructive factor in the progress of the colored race, but also in the
progress, social as well as economic, of the white race...” (311). Fearing the effect of what he
perceived as inherently-weak black-bodies upon the white race, Hoffman offered a political
economy of care cautioning against the provision of all aid for blacks.
Hoffman's solution was both refusing the insuring of black consumptives, and a more
general appeal to limit “liberal charity” for the black race. Positing the inferiority of the nonwhite “lower races,” he declared, “Easy conditions of life and a liberal charity are among the
most destructive influences affecting the lower races; since by such methods the weak and
incapable are permitted to increase and multiply, while the struggle of the more able is
increased in severity” (326-327). Charity then, in Hoffman's formulation, enabled weak
populations to grow, thus increasing the strain upon “the more able” populations. He
continued, claiming that one of the primary characteristics of the modern liberal subject, “self
reliance,” would not come to those, who, due to charity, received “easy conditions of life...”
(327). Hoffman claimed that aid made life easy for blacks and linked the refusal of aid and the
corresponding perpetuation of “easy conditions of life” to the retarding of black
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individualism—in his theory, blacks receiving aid would never manifest the liberal ideal of “selfreliance.”
Thus, Hoffman's appeal to keep things difficult for blacks so as to insure that they
develop the “virtues of...self reliance” established an operational notion of individualism—an
individualism premised upon the capacity of subjects to help themselves in the most adverse of
situations, in the absence of any form of dependence or assistance. He framed the challenge as
one of allowing blacks to “struggle”: “Instead of clamoring for aid and assistance from the
white race the negro himself should sternly refuse every offer of direct interference in his own
evolution. The more difficult his upward struggle, the more enduring will be the qualities
developed...Together with a higher morality will come a greater degree of economic
efficiency...The compensation of such an independent struggle will be a race of people who will
gain a place among civilized mankind and who will increase and multiply instead of dying out
with loathsome diseases (329).” He thus cautioned that should aid continue to be given to
blacks, “gradual extinction [of the black race] is only a question of time” (Hoffman 326-329).
Hoffman's blending of a Malthusian courting of the naturalness of disease as a limit on
population with a Darwinian assumption that society is a struggle of fitness, also echoed
rationales of individual betterment, prominent in the management of the 18th-and 19th-century
almshouses. His critique of both the perceived inferior biology and the insufficient will of
blacks to be healthy and independent, ignored the multitude of social factors that cultivated
the soil of the slums in which tuberculosis spread. His political economy elided the very
conditions of production of the squalor of the homes—the dark and dirty back alleys, where so
many African Americans suffered to be independent.
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Hoffman's reduction of tuberculosis mortality amongst blacks to inferior biology and
an inability to be self-reliant was not lost on W. E.B. Du Bois. In The Health and Physique of the
American Negro, Du Bois confronted tuberculosis amongst blacks, directly addressing Hoffman's
biological determinism. Noting that between 1901 and 1905, 1589 blacks, or “an average of
26.5 per month,” died from consumption (1906, 87), Dubois elaborated on the numbers in
relation to Philadelphia. He wrote, “Consumption is the chief cause of excessive death rate.
One out of every six Negro persons who die in Philadelphia, dies of this disease, and probably
five out of every seven who die between 18 and 28 die of this disease. It attacks the young men
and women just as they are entering a life of economic benefit and takes them away. This
disease is probably the greatest drawback to the Negro race in this country” (88). Where
Hoffman located the economic inefficiency of blacks in a racial trait, Dubois targeted the
tendency of tuberculosis to kill those who were at a ripe age for productivity as a major cause of
the black struggles. Tuberculosis was thus a “drawback” to perceptions of the “Negro race” to
the extent that it furthered the stereotype of blacks as incapable of actualizing the self-reliance
undergirding liberal individualism of self-reliance: it was not weakness, but tuberculosis that
eliminated, in blacks, the capacity to be laboring and productive citizens. Indeed, the treatment
for tuberculosis required that the sick avoid certain forms of labor in order to get well—for the
tubercular, the pursuit of a livelihood, independence, and productivity, could hasten their
death. To the extent, then, that the very tenants of liberal individualism were contraindicated
for the tubercular, the black-consumptive subject thus emerged as materially inimical to the
liberal values lauded by Hoffman.

216

Dubois further contextualized black death rates to tuberculosis by engaging the
question of the relationship between tuberculosis, black mortality, and heredity—and more
specifically, the question of Hoffman's inferiority thesis: “The undeniable fact is, then, that in
certain diseases the Negroes have a much higher rate than the whites, and especially in
consumption...The question is: Is this racial? Mr. Hoffman would lead us to say yes, and to
infer that it means that Negroes are inherently inferior in physique to whites” (89). Dubois
thus noted Hoffman's use of the inferiority theory and his linking of a racialized understanding
of biology with susceptibility to the disease. However, he challenged the premise of racial
susceptibility, arguing that the causes of tuberculosis were more than biological. “But the
difference in Philadelphia,” he argued, “can be explained on other grounds than upon race...If
the population were divided as to social and economic condition matter of race would be
almost entirely eliminated (89).” Thus, for Dubois, the very “social and economic” factors that
produced the conditions of squalor within the slums were the primary drivers of mortality due
to tuberculosis: consumption was “not a racial disease but a social disease” (89). In challenging
black inferiority by arguing against biology, and thus, race, as a determinative factor in the hightuberculosis-mortality rates of blacks, Dubois shaped and was shaped by a broader movement
in medicine and charitable practice: a remaking of tuberculosis as a sociological disease. This
remaking increasingly looked, not simply to the bacillus as the cause of the disease, but to the
very social conditions that produced environments in which the bacillus was more likely to
thrive. And there, in the very slums of Dubois study, emerged a key site in this remaking: the
Henry Phipps Institute.
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The Origin of the Henry Phipps Institute
On a wet Saturday in April, 1902, Lawrence Flick and the philanthropist Henry Phipps
traveled a half mile from Smith’s Hotel to the White Haven Sanitarium. There, in the small
country town of White Haven, PA, Flick and his colleagues at Philadelphia's Poor Hospital for
Consumptives had established a ragtag-country-hospital for the care of the tubercular. Touring
the grounds of the sanitarium, Flick, seeking to impress the wealthy Phipps, felt an unease—an
anxiety regarding the bricolage facility he had erected on limited resources. The iron beds for
the male patients sat in a large barn amongst the haystacks. The administrative offices were
housed in a small two-story farmhouse. The sewage disposal was, according to Flick, “primitive”
(Flick 1944, 179). In spite of his anxiety, he would learn, through a letter delivered the next
morning, that Phipps had both enjoyed his visit and given his approval to Flick’s crusade: “It
really surprises me,” wrote Phipps, “how much good you are doing with so little money at your
command. It is very creditable to your management” (179-180).
This visit lay the foundation for continued negotiation between the two—negotiation
that would revolve around a question of management: how to do the most good for
Pennsylvania's consumptives with limited resources. Flick, the reformer, sought funding to
establish a state-of-the-art urban sanitarium—that “special hospital for consumptives”—to pursue
both the cure of tuberculosis, and the citywide prevention of the disease. He imagined a space
with a clinic, hospital beds for convalescent consumptives, and a laboratory to study
tuberculosis in the hopes of finding a means—a drug or vaccine—to eradicate the disease.
Phipps, a retired steel and railroad magnate with connections to Andrew Carnegie, was seeking
a noble cause toward which to direct his philanthropy (Bates 1992, 99). Flick convinced Phipps
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that the cure of tubercular was not only possible, but important enough to warrant his
resources. The desires of these two, the vision of Flick, and the money of Phipps, would meet
and materialize, in February of 1903, with the opening of the doors of The Henry Phipps
Institute for the Study, Treatment, and Prevention of Tuberculosis at a temporary location of
238 Pine Street in the slums of Philadelphia.
While the two founders shared a vision, the purpose of the Institute and the degree of
its success during Flick’s tenure, between 1903 and 1909, was a matter of dispute between the
two. The charter spells out the institutional mission as such: “The study of the cause, treatment
and prevention of tuberculosis and the dissemination of knowledge on these subjects; the
treatment and cure of consumptives” (Hatfield 1909, 841). From its inception, Flick and his
staff pursued, with varying levels of success, the overlapping goals outlined in the charter:
curing tuberculosis in individuals, preventing its contagious spread through the educating and
disciplining of the public, studying its interaction with both human bodies and with drugs. Yet
in spite of the overlap in the vision of both Phipps and Flick, the charter’s complicating of the
“cure of consumptives” with the “prevention” of tuberculosis underscored a divergence in goals
between the two. Where Phipps admired the sanitarium model and sought similar results—
patients check in sick, and leave cured—Flick desired the wholesale eradication of the disease.
For the latter, the focus of the Institute needed to be broader than the mere treatment of
convalescents in hospital beds; rather, he sought a reengineering of the behavior of urban
subjects—re-making city dwellers into tools for containing their own contagion and thus
preventing the spread of the disease (Flick 1944, 213-217). Even the Institute's hospitals ward, a
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potential sanitarium for the cure of the disease, was, in Flick's mind, a space less for curing,
and more for preventing the disease's spread through isolation of dangerous-advanced cases.
To achieve his goals, Flick cast a wide net in establishing the operations of the Institute,
implicating himself and Phipps' contributions in a web of social relations that extended far
beyond the hospital walls. Within Philadelphia, thousands of tubercular were treated. Some
were cured—more often than not, only temporarily. Additionally, the Institute was central to
the growth of the national and international anti-tuberculosis movement. It experienced a
degree of renown for its International Lecture Course (202-203), its scientific experimentation
with the Margaliano serum, its role in founding The National Association for the Study and
Prevention of Tuberculosis (211), and its courting of the International Congress on
Tuberculosis to a meeting in the United States (205). Yet in the pursuit of these larger goals,
Henry Phipps, with his modest desire to see an individual come in sick and leave cured, began
to question the prudence of Flick's management—that same management that the former
found so respectable on that wet Saturday at White Haven in 1902.
Within months of the opening of the doors of the Institute, the tension between the
Institute’s two visionaries took shape—a tension regarding the precise mission of the Institute
and the means through, and terms by which they would pursue and measure success. Not even
a year after becoming operational, the two men faced rising expenditures, prompting questions
over the day-to-day operations and the populations being served. Phipps' resources, while
directed at the tubercular, were also being used to support various other sick and poor subjects
that made use of the clinic. On December 2, 1904, Flick penned an enthusiastic letter to
Phipps, lauding, in characteristically grandiose terms, “what the [first two years of work at the]
220

Henry Phipps Institute had meant to the civilized world” (Flick 1944, 214). While Flick was
clear, in the letter, about some of his “misgivings” in addition to the Institute’s successes, he
was met with a decidedly stronger misgiving in a conservative response from his colleague.
Phipps wrote, “Replying to your congratulatory letter…I hope the future has a great deal more
for us than the past year” (214). Phipps cautious assessment of the work of the second year left
Flick with a sense of opposition that would remain unresolved for the duration of his tenure.
While the details of Phipps dissatisfaction remained vague in the initial letter, over the
next six years, they would become clearer to Flick. Where Phipps was invested in the pursuit of
measurable results—definitively cured individuals—Flick’s broad preventative campaign and his
goal of eradicating the disease, would position the Institute at the intersection of medical
treatment and a more generalized social welfare—precisely the charity that Hoffman critiqued.
While the tubercular suffering from advanced stages of the disease were best treated in the beds
of the Institute sanitarium, prevention was designed to reach those suffering early or incipient
stages. The Institute dispensary was the primary node in the preventative mission, allowing for
the diagnosis of walk-in subjects, the evaluation of individuals in an effort to discern those who
required hospitalization, and the education of the sick in the correct habits to contain and
treat their disease. Flick's operations sought to extend the principles of regimen, pursued in the
isolated and controlled environment of the sanitarium, into the homes of the poor. The
preventative mission, with its extension of the eyes, arm, and resources of the Institute into the
homes of the sick poor brought Phipps' resources to bear on a population of all but “invisible”
tubercular subjects—in Flick's words, those needy “unknown people, whom one never sees.”
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This mission, with its unseen subjects of aid, would prove uncomfortable for Phipps as
the funding of these broader preventative measures would imbricate the Institute in treating a
potentially endless sea of costs with immeasurable returns. Where Phipps had initially praised
Flick's management at White Haven, over the course of the next decade, the latter's investment
in prevention, while praiseworthy, entangled the Institute in a variety of efforts that seemed, to
Phipps, to be more tuned to the treatment of poverty—the sociological conditions underlying
the disease—than the cure of tuberculosis. The success of such an project was, to Phipps' mind,
all but impossible.
Importantly, then, the disagreements between Phipps and Flick reveal an underlying
difference of opinion with regard to an effective political economy of care. The difference
hinged on a utilitarian calculation: how to most efficiently spend resources in the interest of
achieving the best results for those suffering from tuberculosis? Yet, in locating a hospital and
clinic in a poor urban environment, the Phipps Institute had to confront tuberculosis as a
disease with a cause that was not reducible to biology—the tubercle bacillus, a necessary agent
in the disease process, acted in tandem with the social circumstances—the poverty—of the
subjects of the slums. These social circumstances included labor, income, housing, nutrition—
the very conditions in which a subject's health, their quality of tissue, took shape. Given the
urban location of the Institute, and due to the manner in which Philadelphia's broader poor
population—even the non-tubercular—sought aid and medical treatment from the Institute's
walk-in dispensary, Flick found himself confronting, on a daily basis, not only subjects of
tuberculosis, but subjects of destitution.
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In what follows, I argue that the tension between Phipps and Flick was produced by
and productive of a broader remaking of tuberculosis as a “sociological disease,” and the
concomitant limitations, encountered by liberal reformers and physicians, in efficiently
treating the multitude of social variables underlying the disease. While physicians maintained
their exploration of the interaction between the tubercle bacillus and the physiology of the
human body, the Phipps Institute took shape in a decade characterized by an increased focus
on the social factors—particularly those factors contributing to and resulting from social class—
that shaped individual susceptibility to tuberculosis. Where Flick, in the 1890s, dramatized
consumption as a simple biological struggle between individual immunity—the capacity to
cultivate a resistant “soil”—and the tubercle bacilli's ingenuity in surviving within human tissue,
the 20th-century saw increased discussion of the manner in which the very human capacity to
cultivate resistance was, in fact, as much a product of social circumstances as it was of biology.
The acknowledgement of the sociology of the disease contributed to the desire,
amongst reformers, to provide charity—in the form of both resources and education—to help
the tubercular get better. I explore this articulation of charity, sociology, and tuberculosis
through the operations of the Henry Phipps Institute between 1902 and 1909. As the Phipps
Institute initiated and pursued programs of treatment and prevention within its own walls, and
throughout the city of Philadelphia, both tuberculosis and tubercular individuals were remade.
Through the Institute's network of actors and practices and its engagement with the
community of sick poor in Philadelphia, liberal individualism—in the form of an individual's
capacity to overcome sickness and poverty and be self-reliant—takes shape, not as some inherent
internal quality, but as the product of a variety of social and institutional practices. The
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willpower of independent individuals was, in fact, dependent upon extra-individual forces in
the form of Institute physicians and nurses, social reformers, philanthropists, landlords, public
health officials, and the preferences and affinities of the tubercle bacillus.
Within this context, I argue that tubercular individuals seeking treatment at the
Institute found themselves constituted, paradoxically, as subjects both dependent upon charity,
and independent in their supposed capacity to help themselves get better. I trace this
paradoxical production of the liberal tubercular subject in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia
through an analysis of the discourses and practices of the Henry Phipps Institute—in particular,
the operations of both the sanitarium and the dispensary. I focus on the institution's execution
of its various missions—treatment, cure, prevention—and the concomitant divergence, between
Phipps and Flick, that surrounded this execution. Through these operations, I show how
liberal individualism took shape through the organization of efforts to confront tuberculosis as
both a biological and sociological phenomenon.
I begin by describing the Institute's sanitarium—referred to, by Flick, as a hospital—
placing it in the context of the late-19th century sanitarium-movement. In establishing the
mission of sanitaria, from their roots in Silesia through the development of the Saranac Lake
sanitarium in New York, I trace the manner in which sanitaria practices, in their origins,
produced a subject whose “cure” was necessarily temporary and required a form of
dependence. This form of dependence was a product of the sanitaria emphasis on patient
pursuit of regimen—and on the tight structuring of institutional space and time so as to
discipline tubercular subjects in such a pursuit. Focusing on the observations of Dr. Trudeau in
New York, and those of Flick in Philadelphia, I show the manner in which this sanitarium
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tendency to produce dependent subjects was constituted by a biological paradox a paradox
whereby the human body could be simultaneously free from tubercular symptoms, yet still
infected with the disease—and thus susceptible at a future date. The very capacity for the bacilli
to survive, dormant in the bodies of the “cured,” and the very preferences of the tubercle
bacillus for the squalid environments of the impoverished made the transition from sanitaria
to home a dangerous one. These bodies that existed in the dual state of being both cured and
sick at the same time confronted science and anti-tuberculosis reformers, physicians, and
philanthropists with the intimidating question of how to design social policy capable of
replicating the controlled conditions of the sanitarium within the homes of poor consumptives
so as to dissuade the tubercle bacillus from propagating. The capacity of the sick to be “cured”
thus required the specialized conditions, resources, and discipline of the sanitarium
environment. In analyzing the elaboration and enforcement of rules and attempts to educate
and discipline sick bodies at the Phipps Institute, I thus show how the “cured” individual
emerges, in the space of the sanitarium, through the paradoxical intersection of dependence
and independence.
I then shift to the preventive operations of the Institute's dispensary—the node of Flick's
preventative mission—to describe how this paradoxical constitution of the cured individual was,
itself, a component in the remaking of tuberculosis as a sociological disease. Through the
dispensary's efforts to reach Philadelphia's poor population, Flick maintained “The poor
consumptive…can make him self harmless to others if shown how and supplied with the means
of doing it” (Flick 1903, 262-263). Analyzing the practices of the dispensary to show and supply
the means to a cure—educating and disciplining the sick, home visits, the provision of free
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resources—I analyze how the efforts of the preventative mission to translate sanitaria regimen
into the homes of the city imbricated the Institute in the investment of resources in a citywide
campaign. This campaign increasingly brought Phipps generosity to bear, not simply on the
treating of tuberculosis, but on the treating the poverty.
Where the disease had transformed, in the 19th-century, from a force of nature into a
material form—the tubercle bacillus—and a material vector—the fomite—the remaking of
tuberculosis as sociological disease required the acknowledgment of the manner in which the
tubercle bacillus and its effect upon the human body were shaped by social factors—especially
the factor of poverty—that were beyond the control of individuals. Indeed, where the problem
of translating the environment of the sanitarium into that of the homes of the sick was framed
as sociological, I address the manner in which it was simultaneously biological: the assertion of
the failure of individuals—individuals who seemingly could not help themselves—was, in fact, a
product of the capacity of the disease to succeed. Such social factors thus articulated with the
very preferences of the tubercle bacillus—its affinity for the environmental conditions resulting
from poverty. The dual spaces, then, of the sanitarium and dispensary in producing individuals
through the paradoxical intersection of dependence and independence would prove to be
inimical to the subject of liberal individualism: the very dependence cultivated within the
sanitaria and perpetuated through the preventative mission with its dispensary practice of
providing material assistance produced dependent subjects—subjects incapable of helping
themselves.
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The Roots of the Country Sanitarium: Finding the Cure in Regimen
In conceiving of the Institute, Phipps and Flick took inspiration from the European
sanitarium model—hospitals, located in country environments, that specialized in the
treatment of consumptives. Where the urban hospital had traditionally afforded the tubercular
little more than a bed to die in, the country sanitarium materialized as a space of hope and
possibility—a space for curing. Through the concerted regulation of the habits of the sick and
the right combination of intangibles, a consumptive seeking the cure at a sanitarium might
actually get well. Importantly, the country sanitarium extricated the sick from the social
circumstances of their lives, offering isolation from the stress of the home, and, perhaps most
importantly, from the stress of the urban environment.
This practice of removing the sick from their homes and isolating them from stress and
overwork reflected the belief that individual sick subjects could not adequately recover so long
as they remained in their native environments, subject to day-to-day stresses and distractions.
Nor could the tubercular be left to their routine behaviors—including the pursuit of their
livelihoods—if they wanted to get better. With its physician-enforced disciplining of the sick in
the pursuit of healing regimen, with its enforcing of eating and sleeping schedules, and with its
investment in the surveilling eyes of authorities (physicians), the sanitarium emerged as an
environment for regulating the sick so as to make them capable of cultivating tissue healthy
enough to retard the disease. To treat the tubercular, sanitarium proponents thus pursued
methods that presumed the necessity of bringing extra-individual factors to bear on the bodies
and habits of consumptives. Paradoxically, to cure the tubercular—to make them independent
of the disease—they first had to become dependent upon a regulatory environment. The
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sanitarium provided this in the form of an isolated, structured, resource-rich space: a space that
denied the preferences of the tubercle bacilli for weak tissue forged in squalor. The sanitarium
as a tool for treatment thus materialized through the concomitant production of tubercular
individuals as subjects incapable of curing themselves without the resources and structure
provided by professionals. And the model was becoming increasingly popular.
At the time of the founding of the Phipps Institute, the state of Pennsylvania, as
mentioned above, had already made a foray into the country treatment of the tubercular with
the White Haven Sanitarium. The genesis of state support for this sanitarium appeared in a
Board of Commissioners of Public Charities annual report from 1901, authored by Board
General Agent and Secretary, Cadwalader Biddle. Biddle echoing Flick's sentiment from the
early 1890s, noted the still-low priority of treating the tubercular. Biddle wrote, “The number
of hospitals for sick care are increasing….There is, however, one class of patients for whom
Pennsylvania has not provided as good accommodation and care as have her sister
Commonwealths. We have, as a State, made no provision for the care of consumptives” (1901,
7). The following year, Biddle’s successor, Francis Torrance would report on efforts to
overcome this lack of accommodation through the establishment of a state-supported facility in
the country, “under the provision of the last Legislature...steps have already been taken for the
erection of cottages for the care of consumptives and now a number of patients are being
treated and successfully so, at White Haven…We trust that the success of the institution at
White Haven will equal, if not rival, similar stations established in sister States for the
mitigation of the dread disease” (1902, 2). The sanitarium movement in Pennsylvania, at
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White Haven, and across the United States looked, for guidance, toward one of these
particular “sister States”—New York—home to the well-known sanitarium at Saranac Lake.
Founded in 1885 by Edward Trudeau, the Adirondack Cottage Sanitarium set the
precedent, within the United States, for country hospitals for consumptives: an isolated and
“controlled” space where physicians could keep patients under constant surveillance, regulating
and disciplining the sick in a regimen designed to enable individuals to cultivate healthy tissue,
and thus, immunity to the tubercle bacillus. Trudeau, a sufferer of consumption himself,
highlighted the isolation of the environment in reflecting on his first trip into the Adirondacks
in 1873, “…Saranac Lake...was then situated forty-two miles from the nearest railroad, and
consisted of a saw-mill and half a dozen guides’ houses” (Trudeau 1905, 123). The mountain
environment and the isolation from the social conditions that proved preferable to the tubercle
bacillus would prove key to curing individuals.
Trudeau characterized the isolated nature of the space and the effect it had upon his
tuberculosis. He and his wife “settled down in 1874 at…a small summer lodge, to face the
severity of an Adirondack winter...completely cut off for weeks at a time by the deep snows
from any communication with the outer world. The spring found me much improved [and] Dr.
Loomis published a paper in the “Medical Record” in 1876, drawing attention for the first time
to the climatic value of this region for pulmonary invalids. The following winter, and indeed
the next twenty-nine winters, have been spent in Saranac Lake (123). At a time when, as
Trudeau recalled, tuberculosis “was generally believed to be fatal” by both the physicians and

229

the public (123) 38, the genesis of his own cure came in a privileged form of isolation “from any
communication with the outer world.” He sought to translate this opportunity for isolation
and for a cure to others. By 1903, the year the Phipps Institute opened, Saranac Lake had
“grown to be a town of four thousand inhabitants and [was] known [in the United States] and
abroad as a health resort” (123), and the sanitarium-model was regarded, the world over, as a
legitimate tool for treating the disease.
For Trudeau, the 19th-century change in attitudes toward the curing of consumption
(see Chapter 1) was bound up with his perception of the role of country hospitals in facilitating
this cure—no longer a mere place to go and die, special country institutions for consumption
provided an isolated-treatment environment tailored to the needs of the tubercular. This
isolation translated, beyond the geographical sequestering in the country, to the containing of
the sick in a “controlled” environment—a space where patient schedules, diet, and activities
could be regulated and where the minutiae of patient behavior could be subjected, constantly,
to the disciplining gaze of physicians. Trudeau acknowledged the debt he owed to Dr. Brehmer
of Silesia, the founder of the European sanitarium, in emphasizing the procedure of isolation
of the patient as a means of achieving a complete regulation of their habits.
The cure of the tubercular, in Brehmer's program, required the authoritative regulation
and surveillance of patient behavior. Indeed, for Brehmer, it was not a question of an
individual's capacity to help him or herself—quite the opposite, he “insisted that [the
tubercular] cannot be left safely to his own devices as to his mode of life…A life spent entirely
38

“The poor, and the large class of men and women who depend upon their daily work for their support, were left
to their fate. No special stress was laid on the early recognition of the disease, as it was generally believed to be
fatal. This, then, was approximately the attitude of the profession and the public toward tuberculosis when I went
to the Adirondacks in 1873.” (Trudeau 1905, 123)
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out of doors, in any kind of weather, good and abundant food, and rest and discipline, are the
all-important factors to utilize in bringing about a cure” (Trudeau 1905, 123). Consumptives
required, in Brehmer's estimation, a regulatory environment so as to structure and direct their
willpower toward the maintenance of a hygienic regimen that would enable individual
cultivation of immunity. Trudeau wrote that Brehmer “demonstrated by the excellent results he
obtained that the careful regulation of the patient’s daily life (so far as air, food, rest, and
exercise are concerned) is necessary, if the best results are to be looked for, and that if this is
done for many months a cure may confidently be expected in a fair proportion of cases.
Nowhere can this plan be followed thoroughly except in a sanatorium built for this purpose,
and where the patients live with the physician and are constantly under his eye” (124). Thus,
the roots of the sanitarium treatment, and the investment in curing consumptives, took shape
through a treatment method based upon facilitating a relationship of dependence between the
tubercular and the environment and resources of the sanitarium: the very capacity for
individuals to recover on their own, independently of isolation, regulation, surveillance, did
not inhere, naturally, in individuals; rather this capacity was a product of the resources and
structure of the sanitarium.
The surveilling eye of the physician allowed for the structuring of patient lives so as to
ensure the pursuit of a regimen designed to encourage the cultivation of healthy tissue capable
of retarding the tubercle bacillus. The regimen began with a diet—a common facet of the cure
of the disease—to facilitate proper nutrition. Charles Fox Gardiner, author of The Care of the
Consumptive (1900), described a diet suitable for the tubercular. Beyond the specification of
foods—milk and eggs being fundamental—he also prescribed food-preparation methods, and the
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time of day in which a patient should consume certain foods: “On awakening, the patient was
to drink a half pint of milk and eat a piece of toast (“in making toast, use stale bread, cut thin,
and toast quickly”). Breakfast, less than an hour later, should include eggs (poached, softboiled, or raw), mutton chops or broiled steak, poultry, sweetbreads, scraped raw meat,
sardines...crisp bacon, “mush of several kinds provided it is boiled at least four hours,” fruit
(though “pineapples, bananas, and al tropical fruits are not allowed”), and bread (two days
old)” (82). Gardiner also touched upon the manner in which the food was to be consumed,
“The food must be eaten slowly” (47). In the regulatory space of the sanatorium, physicians
could prescribe a regimen that included an emphasis on the minutiae of patient behavior—
details such as the specific foods, the proper method of consuming food, and the correct time
of day in which to eat. Such attention to this minutiae and the disciplining of the sick in such a
regimen, however, was not as easily pursued beyond such a structured space. The question of
how to translate the controlled conditions of the sanitaria into the homes of individuals would
become central to Flick's investment in preventative mission of the Phipps Institute.
By the first decade of the 20th century, the successful sanitaria of Brehmer and Trudeau
increasingly served as models as other specialized hospitals for the tubercular materialized, not
only in Pennsylvania, but across the United States. In 1899, twelve sanitaria existed in the
United States. By 1904, the number had increased to fifty-five and by 1908, one hundred and
thirty (Teller 1988, 82). Brehmer's seminal emphasis on an ostensibly controlled environment—
a space that afforded the “regulation of the patient’s daily life”—coupled with constant patient
surveillance—the omnipresent-regulatory gaze of the physician—constituted the foundational
practices of treatment through which the tubercular individual of turn-of-the-century
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Philadelphia took shape. In the absence of a miracle drug, vaccine, or serum, the emergent
medical cure for the disease came in the form of the tubercular subject’s pursuit of selfdiscipline within the highly structured environment of the sanitarium. Like White Haven,
many sanitaria (if not most) were open-air environments in the country. Both Flick and Phipps
saw the promise and utility of such a model that efficiently centralized advanced tubercular
patients under one roof, subjecting them, not only to the benefits of physician oversight, but to
a regimen of fresh air, good diet, and proper rest—inculcating the pursuit of a “hygienic mode
of life” in those who might overcome the disease through isolation, regulation, and discipline.
Yet tensions would take shape over the precise mission, and the necessary conditions in which
to cure individuals. Where Flick advocated an urban sanitaria bucking the trend of country
hospitals, Phipps would vacillate between support for a city hospital, and a desire to fund a
more conventional country sanitarium—a space where individuals were unambiguously cured
of the disease. While Brehmer and Trudeau seemingly had success in curing the tubercular,
Flick's increasing investment in the preventative mission—focusing on the social conditions
enabling the spread of the disease throughout Philadelphia—was partially a product of his
recognition that the sanitaria cure was, more often than not, impermanent.
“Cured” Individuals and The Phipps Institute Sanitarium
The promising work of Brehmer and Trudeau inspired the vision of Phipps and Flick—
a vision that materialized, in 1903, as sunlight shone through the windows, onto the wooden
floors and faces of the sick, gathered on the second floor of The Henry Phipps Institute.
Located “in the slum district” of Philadelphia (Walsh 1908, 399), the tuberculosis ward was
anything but squalid—with its potted flowers on the table in the middle of the room, and well233

spaced beds lining the walls. There, tubercular patients—advanced cases—sought to recover
under the supervision of medical professionals. Paid physicians and nurses provided oversight
in the ward regulating the schedules and behavior of the sick—creating conditions within which
the sick could discipline themselves—exacted control over their pathological tissue—by following
a tightly prescribed regimen.
During the first year, a staff of sixteen physicians treated two-hundred-and-fifty-four
patients in the sanitarium. The average stay of each invalid was forty eight days, with one
patient staying for two-hundred-and-eighty-six days (Flick 1905, 9). The doctors participated in
routine daily activities—the weighing of patients, the updating of case histories, the staffing of
nascent departments—neurological, laryngological, and dermatological (29)—the examining of
brains and nerves (6, 62-66), the “recording” of “derangements” (65), and the studying of
“attitude.” By mobilizing connections with other hospitals, by the end of 1904, the Institute,
“through staff appointments in other hospitals…control[led] 621 beds”—in the Philadelphia
Hospital, White Haven, Sunnyrest, and other institutions—fully three-quarters of the hospital
resources available for tuberculosis in Philadelphia and its vicinity” (Francine 1906, 233).
Patients were scheduled in their daily exposure to fresh air, they slept for a
predetermined number of hours, and they ate what they were prescribed—a regimented diet of
“milk, eggs, and plain nutritious food”—in the controlled portions: “three quarts of milk and
six raw eggs a day and one meal of solid food” (Flick 1905, 30). Physicians measured the
“mental attitudes” of patients—their “hopefulness” and “hopelessness; and they took notes on
the degree to which the sick observed the rules—the success of the sick in “caring” for their
pathological “sputum” (65).
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The space of the Phipps Institute was carefully arranged so as to achieve the optimal
conditions to regulate and discipline patients in habits that would allow for the strengthening
of tissue—an effort to maximize “cleanliness and economy” in the treatment of tuberculosis:
“We put a dining table in each of the wards for the patients who are up and about and a food
carriage to keep the food warm while being served. These three large rooms made excellent
wards, having high windows on two sides, and a ventilator above a door on the third side. We
placed three electric fans in each ward to supplement the natural ventilation and also to keep
the wards cool in summer. We placed a gas range in the little kitchen on the fourth floor. This
we did as a matter of cleanliness and economy” (5). Thus, space was carefully arranged to both
provide a clean environment, access to fresh air and sunshine, and ease in eating. The careful
structuring of the space, so as to do the most good for the most patients in the most efficient
manner, echoed 18th-and 19th-century almshouse ideals regarding the treatment of the poor. Yet
Flick had improved upon the dinginess and the indiscriminate mixing of bodies he
experienced at Blockley, creating a clean, more organized, and more efficient space. The
entirety of the temporary space—“every available foot of floor space”—was being used “for some
useful purpose” (Flick 1906, 3). Yet, in spite of the careful arrangement of space, and in spite of
his optimism and advocacy throughout the 1890s for the possibility of hospitals to treat and
cure the tubercular, Flick was conservative in his assessment of the potential benefit of the
Institute sanitarium—of its capacity to cure.
For both Flick and Trudeau, the success of the sanitarium could not be solely evaluated
through the tallying of “cured” bodies. In presenting the results of the work of Saranac Lake as
part of the Phipps Institute's International Lecture Course, Trudeau spoke to the difficulty of
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measuring success through a simple counting of cured patients—a difficulty resulting from the
very impermanence of the cure. He summarized the results of the work of 1902 at Saranac as
such:
In my report for 1902 we find that of the really incipient cases, which were only forty in
number, 75% were discharged as apparently cured, 15% had their disease arrested, and
10% improved; while of the advanced cases, ninety-nine in number, 12% improved, 8%
failed, and 1% died in the institution; of the far advanced cases, none was apparently
cured, in 33 ½ % the disease was arrested, and 33 1/3% failed while under treatment.
Thus, for the one hundred and sixty-five cases at whatever stage treated during the year,
we find that 30% were discharged as apparently cured, in 41% the disease was arrested,
19% improved, 7% failed, in 2% the diagnosis was doubtful, and 1% died in the
institution. (Trudeau 1905, 127)
Trudeau's numbers were, on the one hand, cause for optimism to the extent that few patients
under his care died: three out of every four patients at Saranac left the Institute cured.
However, those cured were primarily the incipient cases—those that had been diagnosed and
treated in an earlier stage of the disease and thus, were usually regarded as having the highest
chance of recovery. The trend of the far advanced cases dying bore out as well. Yet the specifics
of the instability of the distinction between “cured” and “uncured” were made evident by
Trudeau's choice of words for categorizing his patients: “apparently cured,” “disease arrested,”
“failed.” Was a “failed” patient a dead one? Was the arrest of the disease permanent? What
made the cure “apparent” rather than certain?
Trudeau complicated his numbers by drawing on “a most exhaustive and yet
unpublished inquiry by Dr. Lawrason Brown, the Resident Physician” at Saranac Lake. He
noted the “relapsing nature of tuberculosis” and expressed his concern in summarizing Brown's
“inquiry on the permanence of the results obtained”—results that “promised most discouraging
revelations.” Referencing Brown, Trudeau noted “that 31% of all cases discharged from two to
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seventeen years ago have remained well, that 66% of the incipient case discharged during the
same time continue well at present” (128). While Trudeau's data suggested that those
“incipient cases” who had received an early diagnosis had a legitimate chance of getting and
staying well, the recognition that two of every three patients treated did not stay “cured”
pointed to a limitation of the sanitarium model: the inability to translate the controlled conditions
within the sanitarium into those of the home and the outside world and the corresponding inability to
ensure that the treated maintained regimen after leaving.
Trudeau, recognized this problem as one linked to the nature and/or lack of
appropriate work available to discharged patients: “more patients could be permanently
restored if they could procure suitable employment after leaving the Sanatorium” (130). Thus,
where the sanitarium ostensibly cured consumptives, tuberculosis waned, only to wax again
when the “cured” attempted to reintegrate into the world outside the sanitarium walls—
especially into the world of labor. Echoing Trudeau, Flick maintained that such aid could best
be realized through facilitating the livelihood of the sick with “fair incomes”: “[r]esults...cannot
be made permanent unless a way is found of helping those who have been restored to a mode
of life which takes them out of the ordinary struggle for existence. Positions at fair incomes
must be given to people of this kind...” (Flick 1908, 61). Flick thus acknowledged the vastness
of the problem to the extent that the practice of disciplined regimen within the Institute—and
thus the arresting of the disease—was impermanent, unless recovered individuals were removed
from the “struggle for existence.” Those who were recovering could not “struggle” on equal
footing with the non-tubercular lest they run the risk of weakening themselves and inviting a
relapse. The presence of “cured” tubercular subjects attempting to reintegrate into the world
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outside the sanitarium thus confronted the liberal imperatives of independence and
productivity with a material challenge: bodies in which the disease had been arrested appeared,
on the outside, to be better—to be capable of actualizing individualism. Yet were they to push
this capacity too far, they made themselves susceptible to relapse.
This impermanence of the cure was a product of what Flick called the “nature of the
disease” (Flick 1899, 192). He wrote, “In tuberculosis permanent immunity is exceedingly
difficult to establish.” He continued, describing the interaction between human physiology and
the tubercle bacillus: “its parasitic life runs its cycle in some restricted portion of the body
where it is soon cut off and entombed in such a way, that it cannot have any effect upon the
vital fluids until necrosis has taken place and it again finds its way back into the circulation to
begin a new cycle of life somewhere else” (192). Thus, the ingenuity of the tubercle bacilli in
maintaining its “life cycle” in an “entombed” state, awaiting the break down of tissue—
necrosis—to enter “back into the circulation” of the human physiology established the
biological basis of the disease's chronic quality tendency—and concomitantly, of the
impermanence of the cure (192). Flick continued, “In practical every day life persons suffering
from tuberculosis usually have one exacerbation of the disease after another until they finally
go under; and this is so because each attack really prepares the victim for a subsequent attack
by leaving him with less power of resistance” (192). Thus, given the capacity of the bacilli to
remain alive, in a state of suspended life, awaiting the vulnerability of the human host, the very
possibility of an absolute cure seemed fleeting. “The word cured,” according to Trudeau, “can
be used only in a relative sense, as we know that relapse is the rule rather than the exception in
this disease” (1905, 127). According to Flick, for his physicians, “the word cured [was] not
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permitted to be used at all in records”; rather, he required them to use the phrase “Disease
arrested” (1908, 106). Echoing Trudeau, the arresting of the disease suggested a temporary
state, rather than a permanent one.
Flick, with characteristic sympathy for the afflicted, summarized the manner in which
the compromised physiology of tubercular subjects made them vulnerable even after arresting
the disease. This vulnerability, while biological, could be treated, in Flick's estimation, through
the provision of material assistance.
No one who has had both lungs involved can again be strong and vigorous enough to
compete with those who never have had tuberculosis, and when persons advanced to
this stage are restored to a fair condition of health they can only maintain that health
by a life of moderate activity. This means that when a poor person advanced to that
stage recovers with the aid which is extended him he maintains his health only so long
as the helping hand is held out. The moment assistance is withdrawn he relapses and
goes under. Usually the family is too poor to give the necessary aid, and the stricken
individual either depends upon charity or succumbs to the disease.
[This complicated social process] explains the high ultimate mortality from
tuberculosis even among those who have been restored to a physical condition of health
in institutions for the treatment of this disease. (Flick 1908, 60-61)
Thus, in Flick's assessment, given the manner in which tuberculosis incapacitated bodies and
given the impermanence of the cure, those within whom the disease were arrested reintegrated
back into their lives at a severe disadvantage. The antidote to this disadvantage was not
medical—rather, Flick located it in the provision of material assistance. In the absence of
material changes to the lives of the poor subjects of Philadelphia's slums, Flick conceded that
the former patients of the Institute were likely, die to poverty, to experience a relapse: “the
average earnings of consumptives are insufficient to purchase the food, bodily comforts, home
comforts, and sanitary conditions for restoration to health or maintenance of health after it
has been regained. This seriously complicates the problem of the cure of consumptives who are
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very poor. It explains, in a great measure, too, the instability of the results obtained in
sanatoriums [sic] for poor consumptives and points the way for philanthropy in the crusade
against tuberculosis. The work, to be permanent and efficient, must go further than the
sanatorium; something must be provided for the consumptive after he has left the sanatorium”
(Flick 1907, 19-24).
For Flick, the disappointing results as the “cured” attempted to assimilate back into life
outside the sanitarium complicated the purpose and the value of Institute's hospital. In
reckoning with the impermanence of the sanitarium cure, and in spite of his optimism,
throughout the 1890s, regarding the potential role of special hospitals to cure consumptives, he
increasingly adopted a practical, if not cynical view of the Institute sanitarium. “[T]he hospital,”
according to Flick, “is for advanced cases only and that all cases which are admitted are expected
to die, while the dispensary is for ambulant cases, very few of which are supposed to be far
enough advanced to be classified in the terminal stage” (Flick 1908, 106; italics added). Staff
physician Joseph Walsh reiterated Flick's take on the sanitarium, commenting on its purpose,
“The principal object of the hospital is prevention. It takes the poor workman from his home, where
he has not sufficient care, and where he is probably infecting other members of the family, and
gives him a proper place in which he may improve, if that is possible, and in which at least
further contagion of the family is prevented” (Walsh 1908, 398; italics added). The Institute
sanitarium thus veered away from the direction taken at Saranac Lake, seeking, not to cure, but
to prevent, through the removal of those subjects so advanced as to be incapable of containing
their own contagion—the hospital, in Flick's vision, would serve, like the dispensary, as an arm
of his preventative campaign.
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Indeed, the limitations on the capacity of the sanitarium to permanently cure the
tubercular, and the concomitant provision of charity to those attempting to move beyond the
isolated and regimented space of the hospital, increasingly produced tuberculosis as a social
disease. Those in whom the disease had been arrested required continued charity:
“Occasionally one gets well who can stand alone and maintain his health through his own
resources. Most of them, however, go under unless assisted” (Flick 1906, 48). Flick's description
thus suggested that the individual capable of helping him or herself—the independent
individual “who can stand alone”—was an anomaly. The key then, for Flick, was to reengineer
the social conditions of the sick by investing in prevention, providing assistance for outpatients,
and extending the influence of the Institute into the homes of the sick. The preventative
mission would address this need for continued assistance. Indeed, while restoring the sick to
health within the Institute was possible, the task of “keep[ing] them well” required continued
investment—the continued dependence of the sick.
This practice of attempting to perpetuate the cure through the provision of assistance
suggests the manner in which Flick and Phipps, would come to struggle with the paradoxical
nature of the Institute and their attempts to treat tuberculosis: as a space designed to produce
“cured” individuals, capable of independent living, it seemed, instead, to forge dependent
subjects—subjects whom, upon leaving the space, found themselves caught up in the
physiologically taxing struggle of pursuing a livelihood and in need of continued material aid.
While an individual's discipline—their capacity to follow a regimen—was a necessary component
of becoming cured, this very capacity was, itself, an ability that did not entirely inhere entirely
in individuals; rather, the will and capacity to get better was made possible by those socio241

economic conditions in which individuals—outside of the sanitaria—worked to make ends
meet. And in making ends meet, it was all but necessary to sacrifice regimen for the pursuit of
a livelihood, and to thereby tax one's body, one's tissue, and one's capacity for immunity. Such
dependence was materially inimical to the actualization of the self-reliant subjectivity of liberal
individualism.
The reflections of Flick and Trudeau thus established the manner in which the
foundational requirements of liberal individualism—independence and productivity—were
qualities that could, in fact, encourage relapse. Consumptives were often destined to a life of
invalidism to the extent that even routine labor was too strenuous and thus, could threaten to
end in the relapse of the disease. Flick challenged the utility of independence by proffering that
the solution to making cures permanent was the perpetuation of welfare—keeping the “helping
hand…held out.” Mortality from tuberculosis then—especially amongst those who were
attempting to recover from advanced stages of the disease—was not cured through merely
inculcating certain habits—regimen—in individuals. For such subjects to succeed they remained
dependent on charity and conditions that allowed for “moderate activity.” Yet in attempting to
extend the resources and influence of the Institute throughout the city and to continue to treat
those who could not entirely care for themselves, Flick's endeavors increasingly appeared to
Phipps, not simply as care for the tubercular, but as generalized charity—the provision of
“material aid” to combat poverty itself.
Indeed, the missions of the Institute—cure and prevention—were ostensibly
complimentary. To prevent was to regulate the spread of the disease in the urban population so
as to eliminate the need to treat it. Fewer sick individuals would result in fewer advanced cases
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and the need for beds for consumptives to die in would decrease. Yet within the context of his
relationship to Phipps, Flick framed treatment and cure as binary approaches. And it was in
this difference of approach that Flick identified a major source of tension between he and
Phipps:
Prevention of tuberculosis by removal of the focus of infection in the advanced cases
from the home was not well understood and made little appeal. Mr. Phipps had
grasped the idea when he started out the crusade, but became confused about it...To
cure a person of the disease grips one’s heart, because there is a definite individual
whom once can see, whose sufferings are knowable, who has relatives and friends with
whom one sympathizes, whilst to prevent the disease appeals to reason only—one deals
with unknown people, whom one never sees, and with whom one can have no
sympathy. (Flick 1944, 196)
Flick thus explained his investment in prevention as a recognition of both the elusiveness of
this definitively cured individual and of the much larger effectiveness, and, in his opinion, the
reasonableness, of treating the disease at its source—removing the “focus of infection” through
citywide preventative measures. Flick's critique of Phipps' confusion and emotionally-motivated
investment in curing individuals framed his divergence from his co-founder as stemming, in
part, from the immediate immeasurability of his long-term goal compared to that of the
ostensibly-definitive measurement of the cured individual. To prevent the disease was to save
people before they were even sick—“unknown people, whom one never sees.” Yet, as both Flick
and Trudeau had learned in their close interaction with the tubercular over many years, even
cured individuals were not so easily measured and tallied due to the capacity the tubercle
bacillus to hibernate in the recesses of the “cured,” only to attack in a subject's moment of
weakness. The tension between the two founders would continue to play out as Flick
committed resources—labor, materials, free milk—to the preventative mission: a mission that
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increasingly looked, to Phipps, like the treatment of a more general problem of poverty—an
effort that Phipps would come to regard as endless and futile.
The Pursuit of Prevention: The Administrative Control of Tuberculosis
Flick, facing the difficulty of permanently curing advanced cases, set about pursuing a
preventative mission. Given the improbability of making a cure last, the best hope for treating
tuberculosis began, in Flick's blueprint, with the interrupting of the disease in its early stages—
and preferably, containing its contagious transmission so as to avoid the implantation of the
bacillus altogether. This mission took shape through the educating of the sick and the families
of the sick in methods for containing contagion, and in the attempted translation of aspects of
the controlled sanitaria environment, including the practice of regimen, into the homes of the
urban environment. By focusing the operations beyond the walls of the Institute, on the
broader population of sick poor, Flick would further imbricate the Institute in a number of
resource-intensive practices that continued to blur the line between medical treatment and
social welfare.
These preventative pursuits were not unique to Flick and Philadelphia. Rather, they
had already materialized through the work of Flick's colleague, New York public health official
Hermann Biggs. On February 16, 1904, Biggs presented a lecture in the Institute's series,
entitled “The Administrative Control of Tuberculosis.” In the lecture, he outlined his vision
and those practices already implemented in New York City designed to prevent the disease.
Much like Flick’s efforts, the “administrative control of tuberculosis” would effectively seek to
extend the principles of regimen, pursued in the isolated and controlled environment of the
sanitarium, into the homes of the sick poor.
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For Biggs, preventing the disease through the administrative control of tuberculosis
began with educating and disciplining the public in proper methods of disinfection—methods
for containing and eliminating their own pathological bodily material—their expectorations.
Biggs summarized the situation, focusing on the “fundamental importance of the careless
disposal of sputum in the causation both of pulmonary tuberculosis and the acute respiratory
disease” (Biggs 1905, 185). Echoing the contagionist emphasis on containing sputum, Biggs
established his understanding of fomites as the primary vector in transmitting the disease: “in
tuberculosis, the causative microorganisms are found in the secretions of the respiratory tract;
and when these secretions are not properly destroyed at the time of their discharge form the
body, they become more or less widely scattered, dried, pulverized and suspended in the air as
dust” (185). For Biggs, individuals could serve as technologies for interrupting this scattering—
this formation of fomites—if they were educated in the correct manner for policing their spit:
“It is of vital importance in the propaganda for the prevention of tuberculosis...that we should
educate all classes of the people to a...belief in the fundamental importance of the proper
disposal of the expectoration and should gradually inculcate the idea that the habit of spitting
carelessly anywhere is not only filthy and indecent, but is in many instances to be regarded as
almost criminal” (185). Biggs thus reiterated the position, developed in the 1890s, that
disinfection was the basis of the preventative mission, and that the administrative control of
tuberculosis began with the containment of personal pathological material—the “chief factor in
the solution of the problem of the prevention of tuberculosis” (185).
The preventative mission could further be actualized by ensuring a presence in the
homes of consumptives. Biggs advocated home visits—sending medical authorities—a “physician
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or trained nurse”--into the private spaces of the city to document the severity of tubercular
subjects, assessing the “sanitary condition of the premises,” and instructing the sick and their
families in the practices for containment of the disease. Rather than curing the sick, these visits
were intended to educate in the interest of interrupting the transmission of the disease, and to
evaluate and monitor subjects so as to ascertain if and when they moved from an incipient to
an advanced stage in the disease process. “In the course of these visits,” Biggs reported, it
becomes evident in many instances that a patient should be removed to a hospital or sent to a
sanatorium outside the city. In such instances...the patient should be induced by persuasion to
avail himself or herself of such institutional care as seems desirable or available” (177). Thus,
the administrative control of tuberculosis included both the educating of the sick and the
families of the sick in methods for containing the spread of their disease, and in removing and
isolating dangerous advanced cases in hospitals.
In offering a final important aspect of this preventative framework, Biggs echoed Flick's
conclusions on the necessity of the provision of welfare. In lecturing to the physicians of the
Institute on that February evening, he noted the relationship between the sick—the difficulty of
“controlling” them—and the availability of assistance. In order to achieve the prevention of
tuberculosis, Biggs proffered the belief that poor consumptives were more likely cooperate in
adopting preventative habits—containing their own contagion—to the extent that they were
provided with some form of welfare.
It will be readily understood that the classes of cases which have been referred to as
necessarily coming under the supervision of the health authorities generally are very
undesirable and difficult to control. Yet the experience of the Department of Health of
New York has shown that rarely is any real difficulty experienced in the management of
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these cases if the accommodations which are provided and the food and care given are
of a superior character. (184)
Biggs elaboration of the need for the “administrative control of tuberculosis” thus took shape
through his formulation of the equation that welfare translated to acquiescence. To the extent
that the poor were lacking in means, they thus lacked the resources to invest in a change of
behavior. Yet more tellingly, Biggs' preventative procedures challenged the notion that
tubercular individuals possessed an innate willpower to get better; rather, in Biggs' formulation,
poor consumptives and those poor populations deemed potentially at risk for contracting or
spreading the disease would not possess a will to participate in hygienic regimens to ensure the
policing of personal pathological material in the absence of some form of material
accommodations. The very unwillingness of such poor consumptives to do as they ought was
revealed, in Biggs assessment, to be a product of social circumstances—a product of material
need. He thus located the problem of the administrative control of tuberculosis less in the
individual, and more in the social circumstances of the poor—in their material needs. In New
York, Biggs implemented a socio-medical vision that viewed welfare as a governmental
technology for making subjects controllable—making them do as they ought vis-a-vis the
adoption of hygienic regimen. In the process, obedient subjects became technologies
themselves, of the preventative mission. The will of individuals to do as they ought thus took
shape through the enabling conditions of material aid, as tuberculosis materialized as a disease
that could not be reduced entirely to biology—rather, it increasingly took shape as a social
disease.
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Prevention and The Phipps Institute Dispensary
The educating and disciplining the sick in preventative methods, the surveilling the
sick in an effort to track the progression of the disease, and provision of relief through home
visits, required a considerable infrastructure. This infrastructure began, at the Phipps Institute,
with the operations of the dispensary. To the extent that individuals could not be relied upon,
due to social circumstances, to maintain their own strength—and thus immunity to the
disease—and to contain their own contagion outside of the gaze of the Institute's physicians,
the dispensary allowed for Institute physicians to treat, assess, educate, and track—through the
keeping of copious records—the contagious tubercular population of Philadelphia. The
surveilling physicians off the Phipps Institute dispensary labored to both restore the sick to
health and to re-make the sick into self-surveilling individuals—“bettered” individuals capable
of living at home and regulating their own habits so as to maintain a physiology resistant to any
future recurrence of tuberculosis. The regulation of the habits of the sick was intended to
shape the tubercular subjects dependent on the Institute, into individuals, wittingly and
independently cultivating immunity through the pursuit of disciplined regimen. A successful
dispensary would, in theory, not only cure those suffering the early stages of tuberculosis, it
would enable the emergence of independent liberal individuals.
By Flick's accounts, the work of the first two years—especially within the dispensary—was
accomplished in an ad hoc and chaotic manner, born of too much to do, and too few
resources—a disorganized effort, that betrayed the careful organization of space and the precise
arrangement of schedules, beds, and flowers. Physicians at the Phipps Institute labored in the
dispensary visiting with, educating and disciplining, and caring for tubercular patients. Limited
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to no more than one new patient a day, the twelve doctors operating the dispensary were
overworked by an over-abundance of sick bodies appeared, in need of care (Francine 1906,
228). Nurses and doctors “carefully outlin[ed]” the rules they expected their patients to follow
(230), providing “careful instruction in prophylaxsis” (237), the times in which the sick should
remain “confine[d]…to bed” (22), emphasizing the imperative to get the “greatest amount of
fresh air and sunshine” by resting on a roof or porch, and the need to keep “windows…wide
open both day and night (22-23); and, of course, the necessity of pursuing a proper diet (230).
Clinic nurses, in discharging first-time patients, sent them home with “prophylactic
measures,” “sputum cups, paper napkins, and bags for the street; a printed list of rules to
follow” (229). Poorer patients were sent home with “up to four quarts” of milk (230). These
daily practices of the Institute dispensary thus served disciplinary, regulatory, and charitable
functions: educating the sick in hygienic regimen—not unlike that followed by the patients in
the hospital ward—and providing resources for the containment of contagious material and, in
the case of the poor, milk for sustenance and nutrition, in the hopes of regulating the spread of
consumption by preventing its development.
With a packed dispensary and a constant stream of sick bodies to attend to, physicians
had their hands full. In addition to this labor of curing, they were also required to take
histories and make records of each patient. Physicians spent an hour to an hour-and-a-half
recording, according to a Phipps employee, with a “painstaking scrutiny of detail,” the minutiae
of each case (227). “[A]ge,” “sex,” “color,” “residence,” marital status, “occupation” (Flick 1905,
8-25), “respiration, pulse, temperature…weight…notes made of the treatment and progress of
their condition” (Francine 1906, 228); “the condition of the lungs and the cardio-vascular
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system, and a most detailed report on the rest of the body” (230)—“chartings of the condition
of lungs and heart” (231). Physicians took records “systematically,” “symmetrically,” and
“accurately” on “printed forms” for each case, “unfailingly and accurately fill[ing] out” (226)
“data of symptomatology [sic?] and physical examination” (227). This labor of observing and
record-keeping served the preventative mission as it facilitated efforts to diagnosis and treat
consumptives in the early stage of the disease, and to track the tubercular, form visit to visit,
and, in some cases, from dispensary to home, allowing for surveillance in the interest of
minimizing threats. Indeed, the work did not end at the doorstep to the Institute. Rather, the
preventative mission required physicians and nurses to translate the discipline and control
exercised in the sanitarium into the lives and homes of incipient tubercular subjects.
Reaching into the homes of the sick required, firstly, education and discipline in the
dispensary. Beyond caring for patients, physicians were called upon to teach the sick the
components of a hygienic regimen. “All the dispensary patients” according to Flick, were
“taught and drilled in preventative measures”–in methods for policing and disposing their
pathological material. He continues, “As each patient comes into the waiting-room he is
handed a spit-cup, and during his stay he is taught to use it. When he goes away he is given a
tin spit-cup holder, a bundle of paper cups, and bundle of paper napkins and paper bags to
take home with him. He is also given a set of rules on a large cardboard to hang up in his
house, and on a folder to carry in his pocket. Every time he comes back to the dispensary he is
given a new supply of preventative measure material, and it further instructed in its use (Flick
1905, 29-30).
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The verbal instructions, made material in the form of objects for containing contagion,
and rule boards for the home and the pocket, thus subjected the private spaces and bodies of
city dwellers to the disciplinary influence of the Institute. Even when outside of the dispensary,
miles away, the population of incipient tubercular subjects theoretically remained within the
sphere of the Institute, regulating their own behavior through the internalization and
performance of Institute rules and regimen. The effects of the operations of the clinic were
thus to discipline the sick and to encourage them to influence their families to pursue a similar
regimen and to practice the disposal of sputum. As Flick noted, “The dispensary is an excellent
means of bringing ambulant tuberculous subjects under control and discipline and of getting
into the homes of such patients to educate and direct them and the healthy members of the
family for protection and self-preservation” (1908, 106).
Yet this “control”—this subjection—was, like the sanitarium cure, incomplete, as the
mere training of the sick did not necessarily equate to their adoption of the regimen. Within
the sanitarium, physicians could insure greater compliance through surveillance of patient
behavior. However, to ensure patient compliance across the city, following Biggs, the Institute
developed a program to train and deploy home-visiting “Inspectresses” to act, like the
physicians in the sanitarium, as watchful-disciplining eyes. According to Flick, “At regular
intervals [the patient who has been treated at the dispensary] is visited in his home by a pupil
nurse and is given such instruction and assistance as he may need for prevention of the spread
of the disease” (Flick 1905, 29-30).
These Inspectresses of the Henry Phipps Institute combed through the crowded
dwellings of the poor, led by the coughs—the ubiquitous rasping—that plagued early-20th251

century Philadelphia. They moved through spaces hidden from the streets and stuffed full of
people—three to a single outhouse. (Sutherland 1973, 176). These families lived in dark rooms
without windows: masses of bodies, breathing, coughing, and sharing the same communal
dust. In tending to the rattling bodies of the sick, the Inspectresses surveyed the conditions of
the outpatients in their homes, working through a checklist of assessments of patient behavior:
“Does patient take cure out of doors?”; “Does patient sleep with windows open?”; “Does
patient use spit cup?”; “Does patient burn spit cups and napkins?”; “Are premises of patient
clean?”; “Does patient use stimulants?”; “Are any other inmates of house sick?”; “Is [Institute]
milk used by patients?”; “Have the rules of the Institute been hung up in the house?” And,
finally, the Inspectresses evaluated themselves: “Have you instructed patient in observance of
rules?” (Flick 1906, 430).
These questions—but a sampling of the inquiries covered on the official worksheet—
were an attempt, by the Phipps Institute, to map the movement of contagious expectoration
and document the minutiae of patient behavior in their homes—the degree to with the sick
were following Institute-prescribed regimen and prophylactic measures so as to help themselves
get better and so as to contain their own contagion. Out-patient observance of rules was
tracked closely by the Institute. According to Flick, “The nurses who make the inspection are
required to report upon the observance of rules...The percentage of patients who observed
rules well is quite high...Usually a patient is quite anxious to co-operate with the Institute in
the prevention of the disease when the purpose of the rules which have been laid down is
clearly explained to him” (Flick 1908, 104). The Inspectresses, having identified, through their
checklists and observations, tubercular individuals who continued to practice unhygienic
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behaviors, sought to further educate and discipline these subjects into the practice of correct
sanitary habits. The ideal sick patient was one who vigilantly policed his or her own sputum,
containing the personal pathological material by spitting into napkins or cups, burning any
objects that bore the trace of tubercular spit; a subject who ate the proper food and got the
proper rest; a subject who kept his or her windows open at the proper times to ensure the
circulation of fresh city air. By mapping and documenting the degree of Institute “control” over
Philadelphia’s poor tubercular population, Flick hoped to materialize the preventative mission:
containing tuberculosis by reforming individuals who practiced habits that spread the disease
and identifying and removing advanced cases from the home and planting them in the
sanitarium.
The Inspectresses, subjects whose title was bound up with their role as a vessels of
surveillance, were, themselves, former objects of this very surveillance: subjects who had
previously been “cured” of tuberculosis at the White Haven sanitarium. The hiring of a
nursing staff at the Institute took shape in reaction to overabundance of sick bodies that
needed attention. Organizing the staff was not easy, however, due to a “fear of tuberculosis.”
“The nursing problem was finally solved by opening a training school with girls who had been
cured at the White Haven Sanatorium…The nursing staff at the end of the first year consisted
of five trained nurses and five pupil nurses” (Flick 1905, 6).
By using the clinic to treat those who were in the early stages of the disease and by
mobilizing Institute workers and resources to move across the city and into the homes of the
sick, to discipline subjects in hygienic regimen and to seek out dangerous-advanced cases,
Flick's preventative mission was constituted by a the re-making of tuberculosis as a sociological
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problem—not simply a problem of individuals with bad tissue. Where the definitive curing of
individuals in the sanitarium left him grasping at ambiguities, prevention seemed, to Flick, to
be a more certain means to stopping the spread of the disease: nip the contagion in the bud by
reaching out to and treating incipient cases before the disease had ravaged the body.
Paradoxically, as the remaking of the disease as sociological confronted physicians and
reformers with those circumstances perpetuating tuberculosis that were beyond the control of
individuals, the emergent focus on prevention re-constituted the subjects of the city as
individuals with the capacity, through their participation in Institute-prescribed regimen, to
help themselves and those around them. Through the disciplined observing of Institute rules,
the poor tubercular and their families were reconstituted as technologies for the control of
tuberculosis—preventing the contagious spread of the disease through the cultivation of
regimen.
The Sociological Disease: Free Milk, Poverty, and “Bailing Out the Sea”
Phipps eager to use his money for curing rather than isolation, was not entirely at ease
with the pursuit of prevention and with the Institute’s sanitarium—isolating advanced cases
until their death, rather than curing those who still had a chance at life (Flick 1944, 195). In
spite of his financial backing of Flick’s vision of an urban sanitarium, he had, on many
occasions during the Flick's tenure, advocated moving the operation to a country setting—a
sanitarium designed expressly for curing tubercular individuals. The country would seemingly
have been less financially risky, for Phipps, to the extent that it would have focused on the cure
of consumptives and on a particular population—consumptives seeking long-term care in the
pursuit of getting better. The urban sanitarium with its attached dispensary, opened up the
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Institute, to city foot traffic—to a broad population of subjects, many without consumption, in
need to treatment and aid. Indeed, during the first year of operation, Flick admitted that he
and his colleagues were treating far more than tuberculosis. He explained to Phipps in
December 1903, “the poverty and distress of the poor people who appeal to us are so great that
it is difficult to say no” (Bates 1992, 122). In the dispensary, physicians were confronted, daily,
with the blurred subject of poverty and tuberculosis. A sick-poor woman dropping into the
clinic, fearing she had tuberculosis, might be diagnosed with another disease. The clinic, with
its treatment of the general poor population—both tubercular and non-tubercular—and its
provision of free resources, seemed, at times, to be serving the roll of an almshouse by saying
“yes” to all those who appeared in need of treatment.
The modest goal of an environment where the tubercular could convalesce in fresh air
and isolation to get better was dwarfed by Flick's discomfort with enforcing a triage of the
subjects seeking treatment in the dispensary and by his far grander goal of re-engineering the
habits and lifestyles of an entire urban population in the hope of suffocating the contagious
spread of the disease. Phipps was not cold to these practices or the sentiment driving physicians
to care for the sick poor. Yet the decision to locate a sanitarium in the city, and subsequent
expenditure of resources on the treatment of general urban population had raised questions of
economy and prudent management. In writing to Flick, Phipps was pragmatic in his concerns,
“‘I can quite understand the great pressure upon you to help the poor people, and you are the
best judge what extent the work should go’” (quoted in Bates 1992, 123) In putting the
decision in the hands of Flick, he continued to invest in the latter's managerial skills. But
Phipps remained skeptical about any goals and practices that spread his limited resources
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beyond the treatment of the tubercular. Phipps argued that the Institute was operating on a
slippery slope, for to treat Philadelphia’s general sick and poor population was, in his words
“‘like bailing out the sea’” (quoted in Bates 1992, 123).
In comparing the poor to a force of nature—an endless sea—and Flick's preventative
efforts as an attempt to “bail out” this force of nature, Phipps communicated his reservations
and his own political economic assessment. To the extent that poverty was like a sea, and the
preventative efforts, like bailing out this very sea, Phipps established his aversion to throwing
money at a problem that he considered futile. Even Flick acknowledged the difficulty of
calculating the successes of the preventative mission: “One of the objects of the Institute is the
prevention of tuberculosis. What has been accomplished...in this direction cannot be
measured” (Flick 1905, 29). The success or failure of the preventative mission was difficult to
judge and the operations and resources—the home visits and record keeping—required to track
the progress of patients beyond the walls of the Institute proved a distraction from, what
Phipps considered to be the more immediate and more measurable concern, of curing.
The seeming endlessness and immeasurability of the preventative mission and the
ambiguities of the Institute's success would cast shadows over the relationship between the two
men. Where Phipps had invested in curing “definite” tubercular individuals, his vision ran up
against a limitation in the form of the very ambiguities of the cure, known intimately by Flick
and Trudeau. Indeed, where Phipps invested in combating tuberculosis as a biological disease
affecting individuals, the shift, in United States cities, to the preventative mission—the
“administrative control of tuberculosis”—was, itself, produced by and productive of the
remaking of tuberculosis as a sociological problem. Where he had initially praised Flick's
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management at White Haven, and where he continued to support Flick's investment in a host
of sociological preventative measures—home visits, the provision of free milk to dispensary
patients, the treating of the general-non-tubercular sick population of Philadelphia—Phipps
hesitation, and at times, tacit support, was apparent and frustrating to Flick.
In spite of the tensions, Flick was not immune to Phipps' concerns over the
indiscriminate provision of welfare and the repercussions of treating poverty itself. Given his
investment in the sociological conditions undergirding the transmission and perpetuation of
tuberculosis, his claim, five years into his work with the Institute, that a subject who had
“received milk for six months ought by that time to be restored to a condition of health in
which he can help himself” (Bates 1992:127) suggests a paradox at work in his thinking and in
the practices of the Institute—a paradox of early 20th-century liberal individualism: poor
tubercular were both victims of biological and social circumstances—or, rather, biological and
social circumstances were inseparable as evidenced in formation of tubercular subjects that
could only achieve independence through dependence. Where progressive medical reformers
like Flick and Biggs initially embraced and admitted the necessity of this paradox, investing
charity in the poor sick, through the Institute's practice of free milk distribution, the former
had become increasingly ambivalent. Indeed, in his ambivalence, Flick would express concerns
similar to those of Frederick Hoffman, about the prudence of providing charity to certain
populations, and the potential for abuse of the Institute's helping hand.
In attempting to influence the citywide social conditions that propagated tuberculosis,
Flick invested the Institute in a program for distributing free milk to the poor tubercular.
Given the prominent role of milk as a nutritional staple in the prescribed diet for
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consumptives, and given the inability for so many of the Institute's patients to afford nutritious
food, charity through free milk seemed an appropriate practice to treat the social conditions
underlying the propagation of tuberculosis. The process began, as it had for two centuries of
charity in Philadelphia, with a “judgment,” by a physician, of the worth of a dispensary
patients: were they, in fact, “too poor to buy”? After having been evaluated as “entitled” to the
receipt of free milk, these patients were then required to visit depots, manned by milkmen.
Flick describes the process—the attempt to ensure that the needy tubercular were not taking
advantage of the system. He writes, “Alphabetic card-indexes of those who are entitled to milk
are each morning taken to the depots by the nurses who give out the milk, and each patient is
identified by an assistant before he gets his milk. When the party presents himself he calls out
his name. If the name is found in the index, he is given the amount of milk indicated on the
card” (Flick 1906, 42).
While Flick found this system to be “the most satisfactory of those tried so far,” the
provision of free milk caused a number of headaches for the Institute as it allowed for the
“misuse of milk.” Flick described this misuse as such, “Many of the patients probably do not
use the milk which is given them. Some give it to other members of the family, and some
perhaps even sell it. Every effort which can be made in a practical way is made by the Institute,
to guard against abuse of the charity which is extended to its beneficiaries. It is impossible,
however, to prevent the misuse of milk. When the milk is used for members of the family,
especially children, no action is taken, as such use is in the interest of prevention; when,
however, there is suspicion of the milk being sold, it is stopped” (Flick 1906, 42). Milk
distribution thus confronted Flick and his colleagues with the very sea of poverty that
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concerned Phipps. It was difficult to fault those patients who, rather than drinking their
allotment of free milk, gave it to their family members. Was it reasonable for Institution
devoted to the treatment of tuberculosis to provide material aid in the knowledge that some, if
not much, of the charity was being used to treat the general rather than the tubercular poor
population? Furthermore, and more to Flick's frustrations, there was also evidence of the
subjects of Phipps' beneficence committing “fraud”—selling the milk.
The practice of providing free milk to dispensary patients, more than any other
practice, situated the work of the Institute at the intersections of social welfare and medical
care, thereby contributing to the remaking of tuberculosis as a social disease. Where Phipps
wanted to provide discriminate rather than indiscriminate charity, milk distribution and others
provisions of assistance to the poor sick imbricated the Institute in that broader sea of
neediness. Flick, in his frustration with the abuse of the Institute's generosity, would come to
clearly articulate the danger brought about through this articulation of preventative measures,
welfare, and the treatment of the general poor population—the danger, in his words, of
“pauperization.” In 1909, the York County Medical Society met to debate the merits of
tuberculosis dispensaries. Concerns had emerged in relation to patients abusing these clinics
and receiving treatment for maladies that did not include tuberculosis. Indeed, the Phipps
Institute had struggled with this very problem. In the middle of the meeting, Flick was quoted:
“Indescriminate [sic] charity works for degeneracy rather than for upbuilding….many people are
able to help themselves, but will not do so when others are willing to help them.” For Flick,
being more discerning in the provision of charity would “help to stem the tide of pauperization
which threatens the crusade against Tuberculosis” (Flick 1909).
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The provision of free or indiscriminate care and the distribution of free milk, then,
produced individuals, in Flick’s opinion, that were too dependent—individuals capable of being
independent, yet unwilling to do so in the face of Institute charity. The very remaking of
tuberculosis as a sociological disease and the concomitant—and intentional—investment in
practices that created dependency in patients thus ran into a limitation, in Flick's eyes, in the
form of voluntary pauperization—a limitation in the form of the “unworthy” poor. Indeed, it
was seemingly possible for the sick to be too dependent—a state of being that was inimical to
the foundations of liberal individualism. This very outing of the limits of prudential
dependence in relation to milk distribution laid bare the paradox by which the entirety of the
preventative program of the Institute took shape through efforts to create independence
through dependence. So long as the maintenance of the cure of tuberculosis in the poor
required some form of material assistance, the Institute ran the risk of producing too much
dependence in the vast sea of Philadelphia's poor.
The tense mix of social conditions, a bacillus that showed affinity for the unhygienic
conditions of the slums, and the threat of patients becoming too dependent had an effect on
Flick's optimism. Ultimately, in spite of his continued investment in the dispensary, Flick was
increasingly cynical about the capacity of the clinic to serve the preventative mission, “Much
can be accomplished in the way of treatment in tuberculosis dispensary, but it has relatively
little preventative value. Patients get better, have their lives prolonged, and sometimes even get
well. The majority of them, however, ultimately become advanced cases, serve their turn as
sources of seed-supply for new cases, and die” (Flick 1908, 84). With the ideal of curing the
disease already complicated by the ambiguous success of the sanitarium in producing “cured”
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individuals, the recognition that much of resources of the dispensary had been invested in
producing more “seed supply” complicated the very notion that liberal medicine, in the early
20th century, could, in fact, treat tuberculosis. At the very least, efforts to treat the disease were
risky ventures. Indeed, the remaking of the disease as sociological and the accompanying
complicating of the “cure” of the disease brought the ventures of the anti-tuberculosis
movement to an awkward crossroads that would not see resolution until the antibiotic
revolution of the 1950s.
By 1908, Flick had grown agitated with Phipps failure to invest in a new, permanent
location for the Phipps Institute. The “old, inadequate quarters” were embarrassing to Flick.
He required “new facilities,” lest the Institute “abandon its scientific work,” and focus
exclusively on charity (Bates 1992, 130). Writing to Phipps' assistant, he expressed his
frustration, “The delay...in putting the Institute on a permanent basis...has a very disconcerting
influence upon my organization here.” He continued, arguing that, due to the impermanence,
he had difficulty maintaining the morale of his staff—Phipps' reticence was “a damper...upon
the zeal and ardor or our organization” (129). Indeed, between 1906 and 1908, Flick had
witnessed the resignation of a number of his colleagues and, consequently, work—especially
record keeping—was falling through the cracks. For years, Flick had made do, in spite of his
frustrations, with the limitations of the space. Upon hearing from Phipps’ assistant, on
October 29, 1909, that the Institute would neither create new facilities, nor move to a new
location, Flick tendered his resignation (219).
Rather than appoint a new director, Phipps, seemingly reacting to Flick's resignation,
set about looking for a new location for the Institute. In the winter of 1909, Phipps, on the
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advice of a number of other physicians, including the prominent William Osler, “selected the
University of Pennsylvania to carry out, on an enlarged scale, the work now being done by the
Phipps Institute” (Pennsylvania 1910a). While the successes of the Institute, prior to the shift,
had been difficult to measure, in the years of its operation, tuberculosis had firmly taken
shape, in the medical world, as a sociological disease. This firmness of this remaking
materialized, in 1910, with the statement, by the University of Pennsylvania, that “tuberculosis
[is] a disease of the people, offer[ing] a problem that is much more social than medical in
nature” (Pennsylvania 1910b). Indeed, the operations of the new Phipps Institute would,
ironically, move almost entirely away from curing consumptives. Citing efforts to cure—the
former “medical endeavor” of the Institute—as “of but little avail except in individual cases,”
the University chose to streamline the operations, considerably reducing the size and
investment in sanitaria treatment, eliminating the dispensary, and focusing, instead, on
“sociological imperatives” (Pennsylvania 1910c) and an educational campaign: “Money hitherto
expended for the maintenance and care of the advanced cases could bring larger results,”
according to the “Report of the Committee Appointed by the Provost to Consider Plans for
the Future Operation of the Phipps Institute,” if put to other uses, especially that of “the
conduct of a vigorous educational campaign, in order that the people themselves and through
them the Municipality and State officers may recognize their responsibility to this class of
incurable consumptives” (Pennsylvania 1910d). While aspects of the preventative mission
remained—a focus on educating “the people among whom the disease exists,” the charitable
impulse—and especially, the provision of welfare—was gone (Pennsylvania 1910b).
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Flick's fate in relation to the Institute was convoluted. In spite of the staff of physicians
endorsing him as director in December of 1909, he established his lack of interest in
continuing as medical director in a polite letter sent to the University on January 6, 1910
(Pennsylvania 1910b). Upon learning that he had not been appointed to a position at the new
Institute, Flick, according to his daughter, lay “on the couch in his study, shading his eyes with
his hands.” The University would be the permanent location that Flick had so desired.
However, it would not serve as the home Flick sought. And while he appeared to have chosen
to not pursue a position at the Institute, Flick’s pain on that day, as attested to by his daughter,
suggests a deep ambivalence born of a career spent investing unbridled optimism in a cause—
and in a disease—that ebbed, only to flow again, and again, with a relentlessness that
perpetually defied the human will.
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Epilogue
The conclusion, proffered at the end of the first decade of the 20th century by the
University of Pennsylvania as it absorbed the Henry Phipps Institute, that tuberculosis was a
sociological disease, was both encouraging and disconcerting. While it directed attention
toward the manner in which healthy subjects and resistant bodies were partially the product of
class-based access to resources including nutritious food, and the time to pursue health, the
sociological orientation offered no obvious medical solution—no immediate improvement
upon the sanitarium method for the cure of tuberculosis. The pursuit of regimen in
sanitariums continued to be a popular means of seeking the cure as evidenced in the
tubercular “tourists” that flocked to institutions across the United States—to Arizona and New
Mexico, Kentucky, and Virginia. In spite of the questionable effect of the sanitarium cure and
in the absence of a new medical solution, death rates from tuberculosis declined in cities across
the United States in the first half of the 20th century. In hindsight, the decline was less likely a
product of medicine and regimen, and more the effect of an overall rise in the standard of
living of the average American (Dubos 1952, 216).
As late as 1952, with the publication of The White Plague, a seminal work in the
historiography of tuberculosis, René and Jean Dubos were still directing attention toward the
nexus of sociology and disease, while simultaneously implicating individuals in the continued
propagation of consumption. Tuberculosis, they argued, “is the consequence of gross defects in
social organization, and of errors in individual behavior. Man can eradicate it without vaccines
and without drugs by integrating biological wisdom into social technology, into the
management of everyday life” (xxxviii). Such an orientation toward the disease reflects the
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sensible understanding that the treatment of tuberculosis cannot be located solely in the tools
of medicine and that such treatment should proceed through attention to social
circumstances—through intervention “into the management of everyday life.” Yet in valorizing
management, they simultaneous established a continued investment in a form of progressive
social reform that proceeded through the production of diseased natures as subject to humans:
weed out the errors and defects in social organization and social management, and humans can
effectively take responsibility for tuberculosis. Gesturing toward the lingering influence of the
anti-tuberculosis movement, Dubos and Dubos noted that the “tuberculous patient has been
indoctrinated in the belief that it is his responsibility to take measures to minimize the spread
of bacilli” (219). The residue of Flick's investment in the “crusade” against consumption, the remaking of individuals as responsible for the disease, and the transformation of tuberculosis
into a sociological problem colored, and continues to color, thinking and approaches to
preventing the disease. By rendering the disease as technical social problem, tuberculosis
repeatedly takes shape as something that not only could, but should be eradicable if only
humans pursue more efficient “science of social engineering,” organizing correctly and
rationally in the fields of science and social reform (Dubos 1952, 228).
The White Plague was published on the doorstep of the antibiotic revolution—the
Western scientific-medical discovery of antibiotics and the emergent feeling, accompanying this
technological accomplishment, that infectious disease was conquerable. The confrontation
with the sociological conditions undergirding susceptibility to the disease would yield to a
socio-medical model based upon the administration of antibiotics and the disciplining of the
sick into regimens, not of fresh air, diet, and rest, but regimens of antibiotic consumption. The
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“problem” of tubercular subjects failing to do as they ought re-emerged, in a slightly new form:
no longer an issue of hewing to a regimen for cultivating the requisite tissue to resist the
disease, tuberculosis treatment in the latter half of the 20th century increasingly revolved
around individual success or failure in completing an antibiotic regimen.
This orientation continues to dominate public health discourse and practice today
serving as the commonsensical framework through which to practice the treatment of
tuberculosis. Where contemporary global health campaigns would have us focus on individuals
as both responsible for the propagation of superbugs, and as the primary agents in overcoming
multi-drug-resistant superbugs, such an orientation, like that of the anti-tuberculosis movement
of the 1890s, produces the individual as a technology for the control of the disease and as a
subject, either robust or deficient in willpower—compliant or non-compliant. The will of this
individual continues to take shape through the erasure of microbial agency—through silence on
the question of the disease itself in “willing” its own evolution.
This unquestioning investment in the human capacity to control disease is evident in
an often-cited book, Laurie Garrett’s 1994 The Coming Plague. Garrett, anxious about the
potential-apocalyptic-disease-scenarios facing humans in the last decade of the 20th century
writes, the “wonderful news in the emerging disease story” is the understanding that “nearly all
outbreaks and epidemics are the fault of our own species—of human beings—not of the
microbes” (32). Garrett, in claiming that contemporary disease threats are not the fault of the
microbes, but rather of humans, means to allay anxieties. To the extent that humans have
caused these threats, in Garrett's narrative, this is “wonderful news” as it can thus be reversed
through rational social reorganization. Yet to suggest that the contemporary disease climate is
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simply the failure of humans—and a correctable failure at that—is to overlook the much more
complicated parasitic interaction between science and technology, human physiology, and
unpredictable microbial tendencies.
While the specifics of Garret's text are more nuanced in addressing the fascinating
capacity of microbes to survive, her call to action necessarily remains invested in the notion
that, while control of infectious disease has failed in the past, it remains a possibility for the
future through “better” science—genetic engineering—and through “better” social organization:
human beings moving beyond their “personal ecospheres” to participate in a new form of
global community. This progressive investment in humans evolving superior sociotechnological solutions to disease in the interest of eventual eradication of microbial threats is
a contemporary iteration of the optimism of reformers like Flick in the late-19th century and
scholarly interventions like that of Dubos and Dubos. Technological solutions in conjunction
with a reengineering of human behavior are posited as a means of interrupting apocalyptic
disease threats and ensuring the survival of the human species.
Furthermore, with regard to contemporary disease threats, both as they take shape
through global public health practices and campaigns, and in popular representations, the scale
of individual responsibility has grown to encompass, not simply the care of oneself and thus,
the care of the public, but a purported responsibility (and a presumed capacity) for taking care
of the entirety of the human race. Indeed, as Andrew Speaker's remains haunted by his own
contagious potential in the form of a number of outstanding lawsuits filed by those who sat
upon the same plane as he did, those suffering from drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis
ostensibly carry a pandemic threat within their bodies—within their spit. This responsibility for
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the spread of the disease and the evolution of superbugs continues to hinge on the production
of humans as having the capacity to control tuberculosis and a concomitant tendency to
downplay or subsume the role of the disease in the processes of its own spreading and
evolution. This reasoning that we, as humans, have brought superbugs on ourselves and we, as
humans, can combat this threat—this Western investment in both the power and responsibility
of humans to control disease—is, itself, a reification of the Enlightenment narrative of science
and technology as capable of mastering, dominating, and controlling nature. Such reasoning
continues to constitute human societies as capable of subjecting disease through the technology
of individuals—individuals that are themselves constituted by a willpower that is responsible for
this subjection. Disease, in this narrative, is there to be mastered—all that is required is the
correct “enlightened” approach. Such thinking leaves in place the assumption that science and
technology yield progressive improvements on past approaches so long as they are implemented
correctly—without human error.
Lost in narratives of progressive science and social engineering is the question of the
manner in which science and technology are implicated are implicated in the evolution of
drug-resistant diseases. The creation of antibiotics locates scientists as actors in the history of
the evolution of superbugs. Scientists and scientific practice are thus constituted, paradoxically,
through practices and creations that are both solutions and problems. The contemporary
confrontation with the monstrous-tuberculosis-superbug suggests an avenue for a discussion on
the role of science and technology as partially “responsible” for the creation or propagation of
disease threats. This discussion must necessarily confront the historically repeated scenario
whereby a technological fix—lead in gasoline to prevent engine knocking, for instance—yields
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unintended and often dangerous consequences. Indeed, focuses on individual responsibility
and individual failure in propagating threats like multi-drug-resistant-tuberculosis elide frank
discussions on the dual capacity of scientific innovations to be both beneficial and dangerous.
Where Flick did not give up on tuberculosis, as evidenced in his publication, in 1925,
of the comprehensive medical-historical text, The Development of Our Knowledge of Tuberculosis,
the very crossroads in which he was formed and his inability to fully materialize his visions
through the Phipps Institute are indicative of a broader limitation born of a progressivereformist-humanism founded upon a commitment to positivist knowledge about society and
nature, and the investment, often unstated, in the capacity of humans to manage, and control,
not only nature, but society as well, through socio-medical social engineering. Flick's solutions
and contemporary approaches to the evolution of drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis remain
incomplete not because humans—and human individuals—are prone to error or deficient in
willpower, but because this very evolution evades totalizing efforts at control and adapts to,
overcomes, and works through those very human technologies that reformers uncritically call
“solutions.” The late-19th century marriage of modern bacteriological science, with progressive
public health investments, and a liberalism that increasingly produced individuals as possessing
a capacity to overcome their own tuberculosis through the willful shaping of their internal
bodies, continues to haunt the contemporary confrontation with tuberculosis superbugs: the
very premise that tuberculosis is controllable, and the commitment to its control, is produced
by and productive of an erasure of “vitality” of the Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
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